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Drawing on a fieldwork conducted in Narova, a working class Alevi 
neighborhood in Istanbul, Turkey and in Specially Authorized Assize Courts, 
specialized in “crimes against the state,” this dissertation analyzes a complex 
relationship among law, violence and sovereignty. Like other Alevi populations in 
Turkey in general, the residents of Narova are known for their active participation in 
socialist movements. In addition to discussing current militarized spatial control and 
its effects in Narova, this dissertation also illustrates social and historical processes 
and relations that contributed to the Alevi community’s affiliation and identification 
with leftist politics in Turkey, and sheds light onto the tradition of rule and violence 
in Turkey. 	  
Approaching the state as an impossible promise of monopoly over violence 
and law and as a fantasy product (re)productive of relations of production, I focus on 
Narova residents encounters with those who gained the authority to act on behalf of 
the state. I discuss the ways in which manifestations of sovereignty in Narova’s 
streets and in the courtrooms produce a relationship of mimetic rivalry between the 
police forces and Narova youth and illustrate the ways in which this relationship 
contributes to the assimilation of the police as the external object within the 
revolutionary self. I also demonstrate that the revelation of the “men” in the state 
through repressive practices lead to the state’s simultaneous demystification and 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
mystification. I argue that the effect of mystification inherent to the fantasy of the 
state can thus be traced back not only to aspects of the representative system, such 
as the formal equality of citizens or welfare, but to its violent side as well.
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PREFACE  
 
As a child born and raised in Zeytinburnu, a working class neighborhood of 
Istanbul, I grew up listening to stories about the revolutionary struggle that took place in 
Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s.  When I was a child in the mid-1980s, my 
grandmother would tell me stories about Deniz Gezmis, a revolutionary student leader 
who was executed by hanging in 1972 at the age of twenty-five. She would also talk about 
the clashes between the revolutionary youth and the nationalist youth that took place in 
Zeytinburnu streets, mass strikes, marches organized by Zeytinburnu workers and torture 
in prisons. I would play with the handmade wooden toys made by my revolutionary uncles 
in prison while listening to my grandmother’s stories. I do not remember her exact words. 
But I remember the tone she used when talking about the past, which sounded like a very 
distant past to me back then.  
She was sad, angry and fearful at the same time. She was feeling sad for my uncles 
and for all those who filled the prisons or had to leave the country after the coup of 1980. 
She was angry. For her, all the generous and nice people were put behind bars and 
tortured. She was fearful. She was afraid that when I grew up, I might have to face similar 
violence. After all, I was named after Deniz Gezmis.  She was continuously telling me that 
I should never speak about the state in critical terms and that if did I would end up in 
prison and be tortured there. I suppose that was her way of protecting me; by telling me 
how brutal the soldiers and the police could be.  
 Zeytinburnu was among the most organized working class neighborhoods of 
Istanbul before the coup of 1980. However, in the 1990s, the socialist movement lived 
largely in the memories of Zeytinburnu residents. It was as if all the strikes, factory 
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occupations and clashes between the revolutionary youth and the nationalist youth were in 
the distant past. It was as if Zeytinburnu was inhabited by different people back then and 
that those people had left. When I entered high school in another neighborhood in 1994, I 
realized that there were still people in Turkey who believed that the revolutionary struggle 
was continuing and who considered themselves as part of the struggle. These people were 
my Alevi schoolmates from Alevi working class neighborhoods. That was the time I first 
learned that there were Alevis in Turkey. I remember listening to their stories about what 
had been taking place in their neighborhoods. They were talking about the barricades set 
up in their streets, marches organized to protest against the government and clashes 
between the police forces and their revolutionary sisters and brothers. They were also 
talking about kidnappings, tanks driving in the streets, house raids, torture and deaths in 
custody. While listening to their stories, I realized that there were Alevi-populated 
neighborhoods in Istanbul and that urban life in these neighborhoods was radically 
different from what I had witnessed in my own neighborhood, while being at the same 
time very similar to what my grandmother had told about the 1970s.  
 I wanted to learn more about these neighborhoods. An Alevi friend took me to her 
neighborhood, Yenibosna, in 1994. It was very similar to and yet very different from my 
own neighborhood.  Like Zeytinburnu, in Yenibosna the streets were muddy and most of 
the houses were makeshift shanty houses or incomplete apartment buildings. However, 
there was one big difference.  There was not a single wall in the neighborhood without 
spray-painted leftist slogans, such as: “Long live our revolutionary struggle,” “The 
murderous state will pay the price,”  “The people’s justice will call for an account,” etc. 
My friend took me to a café. While drinking tea in the café that day I watched high school 
kids discussing the possible paths to revolution. In my following visits to my friend’s 
neighborhood, I often found myself listening to intense conversations about the difference 
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between democratic revolution and socialist revolution, the legitimacy of revolutionary 
violence, the disagreements between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, and so on.  After my 
visits to Yenibosna, I thought that revolution might not be as far away as it seemed from 
my neighborhood. The ghost of revolution was still haunting the minds and souls of Alevi 
youth.  
 Although those young people at the café were optimistic about the future, the 
1990s were, indeed, dark times in Turkey. Some of the young people I met at that café 
were imprisoned, others had to leave the country and many of them were confronted with 
the most brutal forms of police violence. In 2012, when I was examining the human rights 
abuse application documents of the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (THIV), I 
understood that the police were especially violent towards high school kids in those years. 
In the 1990s, hundreds of leftist high school kids were left in highways or graveyards after 
being kidnapped and tortured by police forces. Hundreds of young people had to escape to 
Europe illegally even before reaching the age of eighteen. They were afraid of one day 
being killed by undercover police officers. 
Fear is one of the most difficult feelings to live with.  
 After I graduated from high school in 1997, my second visit to an Alevi-populated 
working class neighborhood was in 1998. In March 1998, I went to the Gazi neighborhood 
to participate in the demonstration organized to protest against the killings of fifteen Gazi 
residents by police forces in 1995. That day, for the first time in my life, I saw hundreds of 
masked policemen, located on rooftops and street corners, pointing their rifles at people. It 
was also the first time in my life that I heard elderly people publicly talking about “the 
state” as a perilous enemy. That was something my grandmother would be too afraid to 
do.  
I do not know exactly why, but hearing uneducated people over the age of sixty 
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talking about the state in that way affected me. I suppose that until then I had believed that 
arguing that the state was an enemy was a Marxist theoretical conclusion. I thought that 
my schoolmates and their college student brothers and sisters were against the “state” 
because they believed in Marxist ideas and ideals. However, hearing old people who had 
no knowledge of Marxism talking about the state as an enemy made me think that such a 
perception is more than a mere theoretical conclusion. After talking to a sixty-four-year-
old Alevi woman in the Gazi, I started thinking that some people were against the state not 
because of their ideological convictions, but because of state practices. Two years later, in 
2000, I went to the Kurdish region, which was currently held under marshal law. There, I 
spent hours and days with Kurdish women talking about everyday life in the region. While 
I was listening to their stories under the gaze of masked and armed policemen located at 
the street corners, I once again realized that it is the violent acts of the police and soldiers 
that turn the state into an enemy in the eyes of the people. In addition to my grandmother’s 
stories, the stories I heard in those places have compelled me to think about the 
relationship between state and violence. 
The things I witnessed and heard in Alevi-populated working class neighborhoods 
and in the Kurdish region have haunted me ever since. I always thought about possible 
ways of making these stories and the stories of police and military violence visible. I 
suppose this is the reason I chose to become an academic. Even when I was an activist 
during my college years, I believed that in a county like Turkey, where activists are 
always marginalized and forced to be silent, I had to find a more influential way to make 
what I had witnessed known.  However, violence is an agent that actively forces those 
who are subjected to it and who have witnessed it to deny it, to forget it and to repress the 
memories of it. Therefore, while the stories of political violence had been in my luggage 
since the mid-1980s, I tried to keep that luggage unopened for years. As years passed, new 
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stories were added to the luggage. It became heavier.  
Until I went to Narova in September 2011, I was not planning to conduct a 
research about political violence. While I was searching for a neighborhood suitable for 
conducting a study on the criminalization of working class youth, a friend’s father, Ali, 
told me that he had heard that crime was a significant issue in Narova, a predominantly 
Alevi-populated neighborhood associated with revolutionary Marxist organizations. Ali is 
a trade union activist and has friends from Narova who work in the same trade union. He 
offered to take me to Narova. Upon receiving his offer I simply could not resist going 
there. We met in one of the central districts of Istanbul and took the public bus to Narova. 
As our bus approached the neighborhood I began to see the revolutionary slogans written 
on the buildings and shanty houses. The writings on the walls took me back to the 1990s. 
They made me remember what I had witnessed as a high school kid. Only ten minutes 
after we stepped into the neighborhood I saw small tanks, locally termed akrep, patrolling 
the streets.  
I realized that what I had witnessed in the 1990s was still continuing. I was struck 
by the realization that there are still neighborhoods in Istanbul where akreps drive in the 
streets. I was also struck by the fact that nobody had yet written about such 
neighborhoods. At that moment I decided that I had to write about these neighborhoods. In 
October 2011, in Narova, my luggage was finally opened. I had finally reached a point 
where I could not escape from writing about political violence.  Scheper-Hughes argues 
that 
 so-called participant observation has a way of drawing the ethnographer into spaces 
of human life where she or he might really prefer not to go at all and once there 
doesn’t know how to go about getting out except through writing, which draws others 
there as well, making them party to the act of witnessing  (1992: xii). 
 
Scheper-Hughes’s argument is also true for me. I was drawn to Narova. I suppose the only 
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way of getting rid of my baggage, the burden I’ve carried with me since I was a child is 
writing about the events I’ve witnessed and making them visible.  
   However, I have realized that researching and writing about violence is not an easy 
task. Violence is sticky. It sticks in one’s body and soul. It sneaks into dreams, 
imaginations and fantasies. It has been very difficult for me to put distance between what I 
witnessed during the fieldwork and myself. The attempt to translate the injustice and 
human suffering I witnessed into an academic language was a painful process for me. I felt 
that such a translation would be unjust. I did not want my own “academic” voice to 
suppress the people’s voice. Hence, I found myself often resisting analysis of what I had 
witnessed.  
  The writing process became even harder when the current government’s violence 
and injustice, spreading all around society, became more and more visible. Towards the 
end of my fieldwork in 2012, a new wave of terror operation began and thousands were 
put behind bars as terrorist convicts and terrorist suspects. Towards the end my writing 
process, at the end of May 2013, large-scale uprisings began in Istanbul. This time, it 
wasn’t the Kurds or the working class Alevis who occupied the streets. A significant 
percent of the people who took part in the summer resistance were white middle class 
Turks who felt that their lifestyles were being threatened by the government. Istanbul’s 
middle class Turks were, for the first time in their lives, subjected to police violence and 
saw tanks chasing people. Interestingly, but not coincidentally, all five of the young 
people killed with police bullets in the uprisings were Alevis. While I was writing this 
dissertation political violence, concentrated in the locations populated by Alevis and 
Kurds for more than twenty years flooded over everywhere. All of a sudden, Istanbul’s 
central locations became similar to Istanbul’s Alevi-populated neighborhoods. Now, since 
May 31st, the policemen with their long-barreled weapons, plastic rubber bullets, tear gas, 
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tanks and other local military vehicles became part of the ordinary in Istanbul. What we 
witnessed in the summer of 2013 was a real state of emergency, a process of coming forth; 
the violence hidden in the Kurdish and Alevi zones emerging in other parts of Istanbul to 
make a public appearance. 






Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Narova, the pseudonym of a working class Alevi 
neighborhood in Istanbul Turkey and in Specially Authorized Assize Courts, which 
specialize in crimes against the state, in this dissertation I analyze complex relationship 
among law, violence and sovereignty. Narova is populated by rural Alevi migrants, who 
migrated to Istanbul to seek jobs or who had to leave their hometowns due to pogroms 
targeting Alevis in Anatolia during the 1960s and 70s. Alevis are the second largest 
religious group after Sunni1 Muslims in Turkey. As I elaborate in Chapter II, Alevis have 
been perceived as the first internal enemies of the Ottoman Empire. Although various other 
ethnic and religious communities enjoyed relative autonomy, Alevis were not recognized as 
a minority group, thus neither enjoyed majority rights as Sunnis nor minority rights as non-
Muslim communities. Due to the long history of oppression and violence against Alevis 
both in the Ottoman Era and in the Turkish Republic, Alevis are known for their support of 
left-wing politics in Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1996). Much like Alevi towns and villages of 
the time in Anatolia, Narova became a shelter for revolutionaries soon after its 
establishment and it is still known as one of the most politicized neighborhoods of Istanbul. 
While listening to the daily conversations of Narova residents, one can easily think that 
there is an aggressive, demonic entity called the state, which actively wages a war against 
Narova residents. In this dissertation, focusing on the violent and intimate encounters 
between the police forces and Narova residents, I discuss the operation of law and 
sovereignty in Turkey and analyze the ways in which the state appears as a god-like entity 
with demonic powers in the eyes of Narova residents. Discussing the ways in which the 
Turkish ruling elite manifest and maintain their power in Narova through various 
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manifestations of violence, I illustrate the ways in which such manifestations have been 
productive of a relationship of rivalry between the police forces and Narova’s socialist 
youth. I argue that violence, as an act, which attacks the person’s dignity and threatens her 
very being, is a call for counter-violence. Violence produces a mimetic desire amongst 
targeted populations to be as powerful and as violent as those who manifest and maintain 
their power through violence. Accordingly, in this dissertation, after illustrating the ways in 
which the State “becomes a subject” (Aretxaga 2005: 256) in Narova, I demonstrate the 
attempts made by Narova's youth to become like the state in the neighborhood. I question 
the formation of the modern state in Turkey in relation to the counter-violence, injustice, 
desires and fantasies this formation has been (re)productive of. 
I approach the state as an impossible promise of monopoly over violence and law and 
as an “imagined reality” (Kapferer 2005) (re)productive of relations of production – 
including production of exploitation, domination and desire. The state is not an actor or an 
entity in pursuit of its own interest; it rather is a fantastic and abstract “field of power” 
(Bourdieu 1986), in which some actors (such as the police, military officers, law enforces, 
bureaucrats, bourgeoisie) gain the authority to speak on behalf of (or even claim an 
ownership of) this abstraction. As Sangren (1995) argues, an analysis of power without 
examining the human agency embedded in power relations has a reification effect; “the 
study of the operations of power requires identifying the subjects (collective or individual) 
that exercise it” (26).  Accordingly, in addition to residents of Narova, the other 
protagonists of this dissertation are those who have gained the authority to speak on behalf 
of the state, especially the police and law enforcers (judges and prosecutors). Looking at 
real and imaginary relations and encounters among these three parties, I ask: a) how is the 
state as a product of fantasy produced and reproduced in Narova residents’ “minds and 
souls” (cf. Taussig 1992b: 135)? b) and through what kind of techniques, performances, 
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operations and manifestations of power does the state become a real and material entity in 
Narova residents’ lives? c) what kind of political subject positions emerge in relation to 
these operations and manifestations? 
This dissertation underlines the central role of violence in making and maintaining the 
political power associated with the state. I argue that state-making and state-maintaining 
processes -bound to violence- are productive of counter-violence. In other words, the 
processes of forming and maintaining the state create and recreate their own enemies and/or 
rivals. The monopoly over violence is an impossible promise and it is always contested. 
Modern state formation and maintenance processes intervene in people’s lives as a 
colonizing and/or external force. Due to the externality of the central ruling elite and to their 
strangeness in the eyes of some populations, these populations may consider local rivals of 
the state as more legitimate, especially those who have been ruled and controlled by local 
leaders for centuries.  Utilizing Benjamin’s concept of the great criminal as an outlaw, who 
does not seek for individual gains and benefits and whose violence and law receive 
sympathy from the public, in this dissertation I elaborate on the rivals of the state. Focusing 
on the encounters between Narova residents and the police I examine the practices and 
processes that put certain groups of people in a relationship of rivalry with those who speak 
on behalf of the state. I ask: Who are rendered as internal enemies/rivals/ terrorists2? Who 
threatens and challenges the power of the ruling elite who present themselves as the sole 
representatives of the state? Why? What kind of practices and performances challenge the 
power and violence associated with the state?  
Law, I argue, is a privileged sphere of violence, hence, of state making. It is a field 
of the unspoken warfare between the people, subjected to exploitation and domination, 
and those who attempt to rule them. Hence, law has nothing to do with justice even though 
this is the pretense of the lawmakers. On the contrary, it is productive of injustice. Like the 
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fantasy state, law is productive and reproductive of relations of production. Accordingly, 
throughout this dissertation, I illustrate the ways in which law in Turkey is instrumentally 
used in making and maintaining the social order. I demonstrate how the Turkish ruling 
elites, no matter how competitive they have been among themselves, continuously wage 
war against certain populations who do not consider the “state” as legitimate and who 
attempt to make their own law. 
Violence is a relation transformative of social relations and productive of desire and 
fantasy. Police or military violence against the rivals/enemies of the state is first and 
foremost informed and legitimized by the fantasy of a unified social whole. This fantasy, 
informative of the fantasy of the state, always assumes the existence of enemies who 
prevent the realization of a whole and unified society. Hence, the state emerges as the 
(impossible) promise that would eliminate the enemies and help us to realize our goal. 
According to official discourses, the terrorist (in our case Narova residents) appears as the 
Other that prevent the state from realizing its promise. I demonstrate that as a result of 
violent and intimate encounters between Narova residents and the police, Narova residents 
see the state as the Other who prevents their wholeness/jouissance. This relation between 
the police and Narova youth is informative of the political projects and subjectivities 
developed in Narova. It produces the desire among Narova’s young residents to deactivate 
police/state power and give rise to various mimetic performances of sovereignty among 
Narova youth. 
 
The State as an Ideology 
The state is a highly contested theme in the social sciences.  Although Weber’s 
notion of the state as a legitimate monopoly over violence in a given territory, which 
secures the territorial border and governs a particular population, was widely accepted in 
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academia in the first half of the 20th century (Weber 2004), more recently Althusser’s 
thinking on the relationship between the state and ideology has been influential. 
Althusser’s main contribution to the theory of the state was his attempt to problematize the 
(capitalist) state in relation to the (re)production of relations of production. In other words, 
Althusser (2006) approaches the state as an apparatus of capitalist 
exploitation/expropriation that contributes to the production of  “political conditions of 
the reproduction of relations of production.” (149). For Althusser the state is productive of 
repression and ideology that serves ruling class’s or bourgeoisie’s’ ends. It operates 
through repressive (i.e., army, police) and ideological (i.e., churches, schools) apparatuses.  
Abrams (1977), who also underlined the state’s contribution to the (re)production of 
relations of production, criticizes the Althusserian argument that the state is an apparatus. 
For Abrams, the state is not something that acquires agency or intentions. On the contrary, 
the state as such does not exist; the state itself is an ideological product. Problematizing 
the very notion of the state, Abrams opens new critical trajectory in questioning the reality 
of the state. For Abrams, the state is an abstraction that produces the false impression that 
there is a coherent and concrete political entity, an independent political agency that acts 
over and above people. Such an impression, for him, obscures the “actual disunity of 
political power” (79) and prevents us from seeing the realm of politics and of power as a 
realm of constant struggle. Hence, according to Abrams the state is an idea that conceals 
the practices of power. It is “the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” 
(Abrams 1977: 82). Accordingly, for Abrams, the task of social scientists ––especially of 
the sociologist–– is to demystify the state, to unveil the mask that appears in the name of 
the state.  
Following Abrams’s call to demystify the state and his emphasis on the power and 
effects of the state as an abstraction and/or ideology, Corrigan et.al (1980), Sayer (1987), 
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Corrigan and Sayer (1991) contributed to the theory of the state by problematizing the 
very process of abstraction and, accordingly, the separation of the state from the social, 
economic, cultural and moral spheres. Invoking Marx’s theory of ideology, and hence 
commodity fetishism, Sayer  (1987) argues that abstraction is intrinsic in and unique to 
capitalist relations. He refuses the distinction between base and superstructure and argues 
that the social forms associated with superstructure, such as nation, state and law, are 
commodity-like abstractions, constructed by human beings in and through social relations. 
Separating them from one another and from the wider realm of relations of production (not 
only from commodity production, but also from the production of social, cultural and 
moral relations which, according to Sayer, are all interconnected) leading to their 
appearance as natural and universal entities over and above individuals. 
 In a similar fashion, Taussig (1992), too, underlines the ideological character of the 
concept of the state. For Taussig (1992), the state is the greatest fetish of contemporary 
modern society, with the idea of the state replacing the idea of god. That is to say, the idea 
of the state, like the idea of god, is a human product, a product of relations of production 
and reproduction. Like god, the state is imagined to be a universal and natural force over 
and above individuals –– a fetish character to which omnipotent power is attributed. 
Arguing that the state’s fetishistic qualities are produced and reproduced through the 
works of colonial officers, governors, public administrators, the army, etc., and Taussig, 
too, emphasizes that the task of ethnography should be to demystify such reification.  
 
Practices, performances and manifestations of power and the (fantasy) state 
 The path opened by Abrams is widely acknowledged by critical scholars 
(Aretxaga 2005, Bourdieu 1999, Coronil 1997, Mitchell 1991, Steinmetz 1999, Navora-
Yashin 2002, Trouillot 1990). However, some dispute Abrams’s implicit expectation that 
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the state as an idea/fetish/abstraction would lose its power solely through the processes of 
demystification and/or reification (Mitchell 1991, Trouillot 1990, Navoro-Yashin 2002, 
Aretxaga 2005). For instance, Mitchell (1991) argues that although Abrams’s approach to 
the state as an idea is suggestive, his argument does not explain “why the state still haunts 
us” (85). Invoking Foucault, Mitchell argues that students of the state should examine 
“particular practices and techniques that have continually reproduced the ghost-like 
abstraction of the state” (85).  
Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Aretxaga (2005) also, while engaging the question, 
“why does the state still haunt us?” emphasize “the centrality of fantasy to the political” 
(Aretxaga 2005:133). They approach the state as a fantasy product in the Lacanian sense 
of the term. For Lacan, “fantasy is not the realm of pure ideas and representations” but “it 
is the mechanism of ‘production’ and canalization of enjoyment, and this way it may hold 
the key to our status as subjects-both as political subjects and subjects of desire” 
(Grosrichard 1998:x). According to Lacan, the self can only grasp itself through its 
reflection in and, recognition by, the other person (Elliot 2007). The other, in Lacan, is the 
prerequisite for the development of a sense of self. The self-imaginary develops through 
the mirror of the Other. However, the mirror is also a reminder of Otherness, the 
impossibility of being one and the same with the Other, and of the lack –– a constitutive 
lack, which cannot be separated from the subject’s attempts/desire to eliminate it. For 
Lacan, identity is formed in and through the processes of one’s attempts to eliminate the 
lack, namely the lack of jouissance (enjoyment) (Stravakakis 2012). Jouissance is always 
already lost, or “stolen” by the other and fantasy promises to cover over the lack in the 
Other; the lack created by the loss of jouissance” (Stravakakis 2012: 45). In other words, 
fantasy provides a convincing explanation for the lack of total enjoyment (Zizek 1994). It 
is the imaginary promise of (the fantasy) recapturing the lost and/or impossible enjoyment 
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that provides the support for many political projects, political fantasies and social roles 
and etc. In other words, the lack produces political projects informed by the desire to 
compensate for the lack. Zizek (1989), carrying the Lacanian notion of fantasy into a 
broader field of social relations, argues that “social-ideological fantasy” constructs  “a 
vision of society which does exist, a society which is not split by an antagonistic division, 
a society in which the relation between its parts is organic, complementary” (126). It also 
provides an explanation for the symptoms. For instance, Zizek argues that Jews are 
symptoms of Europe. The Jew is the embodiment of  “the impossibility, which prevents 
the society from its full identity as a closed, homogenous totality” (ibid: 127). In this 
sense, the “Jew” is a fetish, which simultaneously denies and embodies the structural 
impossibility of “Society” as a whole.  
Accordingly, for Aretxaga (2005) and Navaro-Yashin (2002), the state gains its 
power through its fantastic production, its promise to compensate for the lack stolen by the 
Other, i.e. the state's foreign and domestic “enemies.”  It is due to this fantastic power, for 
Navora-Yashin, that the state is more powerful than Abrams assumes. That is to say, for 
Navora-Yashin, due to its impossible promise to compensate for the lack, the state is 
produced and reproduced as a symptom. Hence, demystification of the state is not an easy 
task. The state as a symptom easily escapes demystification. Navaro-Yashin explains this 
process with reference to psychoanalytic therapy practices. In psychoanalytical therapy, 
healing is made possible through a process of interpretation/analysis. In this process, the 
analyzed eventually becomes aware of his/her symptoms and/or fantasies, which are based 
on childhood events that construct and shapes the psychic life of the analyzed. As a result 
of a long interpretation process ––we can also read it as a demystification process–– the 
symptoms will disappear. But, the procedure of interpretation does not always result with 
healing. For Lacan (1977), the analyzed, sometimes, wants to keep his/her symptoms as 
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they are. The analyzed unconsciously fears that she/he would no longer exist if her/his 
symptoms disappear. The analyzed continues reproducing the symptom (as fantasy) in 
order not to risk the unknown. (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 186). Hence, for Navaro-Yashin, the 
fantasy of the state is kept active and alive by those who do not know how to replace this 
fantasy. As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, this fantasy is not only (re)produced 
by those such as military men, police, bourgeoisie, who want to keep the fantasy of the 
state alive due to their own interests. The fantasy of the state is also (re)produced by those 
who consider the state as an enemy, as such a fantasy also provides them with an 
explanation for the lack. 
 Aretxaga (2005) asserts that “the being of the state is, […], being a symptom” 
(106). Following Zizek (1989), she (2005) argues that “if the symptom is a stage setting of 
fantasy”, then “the state is a privileged setting for the staging of political fantasy in the 
modern world [.]” (106). However, although the state is a fantastic product, Aretxaga 
(2005) specifically underlines that “the question is not the reality or unreality of the state-
subject” but we should “take the reality of insubstantial state-being seriously and question 
how it is imagined by the people who experience it, what its particular manifestations and 
forms of operation are” (216). Hence, Aretxaga invites us to examine the practices, which 
reproduce the ideological fantasy of the state. 
Anthropologists increasingly tend to examine the idea of the state in relation to the 
operations, practices, performances, techniques, and effects of power (Aretxaga 2005, 
Coronil 1997, Coronil and Skurski 2006, Das and Poole 2004, Feldman 1991, Hansen and 
Stepputat 2009). Feldman (1991) and Blom-Hansen (2004), for instance, illustrate how the 
state acquires material existence through displays of violence and sovereign power by 
police and military forces. Das and Poole (2004) point out the significance of analyzing 
various manifestations of power associated with the state, emphasizing the “political, 
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regulatory and disciplinary practices that constitute, somehow, that thing we call, ‘the 
state’ ” (3).  Hence, for Das and Poole (2004) the task of the anthropologist is not to show 
that the state actually does not exist, but rather to locate the “stately practices” that gave 
rise to the imagining of the state as a thing/an entity (6). 
 Accordingly, in analyzing how the state gains a material character in the eyes of 
Narova residents, I follow the anthropologists’ emphasis on the “stately practices,” 
performances, manifestations, and techniques of power, which combine to give rise to the 
fantasy of the state. In Chapter IV, for instance, I illustrate the militarized spatial practices 
that contributed to the perceptions of the Turkish state as an external and brutal force 
among Narova residents. In Chapter V, analyzing the ways in which the state is perceived 
as a force that actively plans projects against Narova residents, I illustrate how the Narova 
residents see the state as a force that steals their jouissance. In other words, I demonstrate 
how Narova residents see the state as the embodiment of an impossibility, which prevents 
Narova residents from actualizing their political demands. 
 
Political Subjectivities, Mimicry and Desire 
The state, like fantasy, is unreal. However, like fantasy, it has real effects. It informs 
reality and is constitutive of material experiences of (political) subjects. It was first 
Althusser (2006) who emphasized that modern subjects are formed within the 
organizational terrain of the state and ideology. Althusser does not consider the state as an 
ideological product. But for him the state produces ideology, which he defines as an 
imaginary relation to real relations. For Althusser ideology is imaginary and material at 
the same time. That is to say, for Althusser ideology is productive. It is productive of 
practices; imaginary relations are materialized in various practices. These practices shape 
our very beings as subjects; “ideology interpellates the individuals as subjects” (Althusser 
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2006: 177). Inspired by Althusser’s emphasis on constitutive relations between ideology, 
practice and subject, Butler (1997) in Psychic Life of Power argues that “power is both 
external to the subject and the very venue of the subject” (15). For Butler (1997) power 
penetrates in our psychic lives and is constructive of our subjectivities.  
 In a similar fashion, Lacanian political thinkers underline the significance of 
fantasy and the desire it implies, in shaping our political subjectivities (Ahiska 2010, 
Glynos 2001, Glynos and Stravakakis 2008, Khan 2010, Madra 2006, Zizek 2000). The 
subject’s desire is structured around the unending quest for the lost, the 
impossible, jouissance (Elliot 1992). Accordingly, the fantasy organizes, canalizes and 
supports the desire. It is the “imaginary promise” of covering over the lack that provides 
the fantasy support for political projects and political subjectivities (Glynos and 
Sravakakis 2008:261). As Sangren (2000) argues, desire, as a constitutive part of fantasy, 
is also a “systematic product of social production” (232); it is productive and reproductive 
of social life. 
Students of political violence illustrate the ways in which political violence 
produces the desire to manifest power through violence among those who were subjected 
to violence. They illustrate that paramilitary forces, such as revolutionary militants and 
pro-independence guerrillas, mimetically reproduce performances of state sovereignty 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, Aretxaga 2000, 2005, Buur 2006, Feldman 1991, 
Zilberg 2007, Smith 2008). Aretxaga (2000), for instance, analyzes mimicry between state 
and non-state actors. She illuminates how the practices of state terror in Spain were a 
“mimetic desire” to reproduce the violent acts of the separatist groups in the Basque 
region. Accordingly in Chapter V, I discuss how police violence, by threatening the very 
being of the Narova community, produced desire among Narova’s young radicals to 
become like the police. I demonstrate that the young radicals of the neighborhood have 
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reproduced the role/performances of the police by checking identities of people on 
Narova's streets, stopping and frisking pedestrians, carrying guns or beating up criminals, 
hence becoming like the police. 
 
 
The State, Law and Violence  
     “There is a cruel one who dwells within justice” 
        Birhan Keskin, poet3  
 
Benjamin’s path-breaking essay On the Critique of Violence (OCV) and his 
concept of the “great criminal,” as an outlaw who gains the sympathy of the public, lie at 
the heart of this dissertation. This essay, which signifies a radical break from liberal 
understandings of law that tie law to justice, provides a thought-provoking analysis of the 
constitutive relation between violence and law/the state. The essay is particularly 
important in discussing the ways in which the law/state owes its presence and the 
maintenance of its power to acts of violence. In addition, the essay provides significant 
insight regarding who are considered enemies of the state. Like Weber, Benjamin argues 
that modern politics were characterized by the state’s attempt to monopolize violence 
and/or law. However, as Greenberg (2009) notes, “unlike Weber, who viewed the 
coupling of violence and law as an inevitable part of modern rational politics, Benjamin 
viewed law’s monopoly over violence as a grotesque and perverse tyranny on the part of 
the law-makers” (312). Moreover, with his notion of the great criminal, Benjamin also 
reminds us that monopolization of violence and law is not possible, it is an impossible 
promise, a fantasy. 
For Benjamin, like Weber and Schmitt, the state is founded and maintained by 
violence, which he views as implemented by law. In other words, lawmaking, which is 
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inextricably linked to violence, is power making. Benjamin defines two forms of violence 
in relation to the law: Lawmaking violence and law-preserving violence. Lawmaking 
violence is against already existing law. It is a founding violence. And, law-preserving 
violence acts to enforce existing laws (i.e., the courts). Lawmaking violence is a form of 
violence that exists at the threshold of the legal and the illegal. It is illegal because it is a 
violation of already existing laws. It is legal because it is itself constitutive of a new law. 
This form of violence maintains the authority of the legal system and the state. States are 
built on a founding violence, the lawmaking violence. For Benjamin, the relation between 
lawmaking violence and law is not an ends-means one.  Although initially violence may 
be seen as a means to lawmaking, Benjamin argues that 
for the function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking 
pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law, but at 
the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather at this very moment of 
lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence but one 
necessarily and intimately bound to it under the title of power.  (1978:248) 
 
 That is to say, in order that law, hence state power, be preserved, law must be bound to 
violence. In other words, law and violence are inseparable. There is no law, which is not 
productive of violence.  
In contrast to conventional wisdom, law, according to Benjamin, is not an 
independent institution that regulates society. Whereas liberal understandings of law assert 
that law protects “society” and provides justice by punishing those who transgress the law, 
for Benjamin law has nothing to do with protecting “society” and providing justice. The 
main concern of the law is not punishing those who transgress the law. More than 
transgression, the lawmakers are concerned with affirming the place of power.  As Derrida 
(1992), following Benjamin, insists that “the essence of the law is not prohibitive it is 
affirmative” (929) (Emphasis mine). It is in essence not prohibitive because, as Comaroffs 
(2006) explains it in Durkheimian terms, “the system […] demands ‘violators’ to sustain 
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itself” (24). “The law and lawlessness […] are the conditions of each other’s possibility” 
(21). 
The lawmakers’ main concern is to affirm and reaffirm the place of the power 
holders (cf. Newman 2004). For instance, as I illustrate in Chapters II and V, today, in 
Turkey hundreds of former high rank military men were put behind the bars as terror 
convicts. These men, all of whom were responsible for the deaths and torture of 
thousands, were not tried because of these human right abuses but because of their alleged 
aim to organize a coup against the government. Hence, the cases of these military men 
offer a perfect example to the affirmative aspect of law. The current government has 
affirmed and/or declared its power within the very sphere of law by putting the former 
representatives of the state behind bars. By doing so the AKP government announced 
itself as the (representative of the) state.  
  Hence, as Benjamin underlines, there is no connection between law and justice. 
What lies in the origin of law is not justice, but violence –violence that is used to maintain 
and preserve the relations of domination and exploitation. As the poet Birhan Keskin puts 
it in Benjaminian terms, cruelty is internal to “justice.” That is to say, law, which 
according to the liberal, conventional understandings is the field of justice, is indeed the 
very origin of injustice. Law is the regulation of violence for the sake of power/violence. 
The law is “an immediate manifestation of violence,” hence, “the highest violence occurs 
in the legal system” (Benjamin 1978: 295). For Benjamin, the police are the privileged 
figures within the sphere of the law/violence. The police are the “cruel” ones who sit 
within the sphere of the law. The police stand at the threshold of lawmaking and law-
preserving violence.  As  “all-pervasive” and “ghostly” figures, the police are lawmakers 
and law-preservers at the same time. Although the official duty of the police is law 
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enforcement, as Benjamin notes, police power goes well beyond law-enforcement. As 
Benjamin puts it,  
The  “law” of the police really marks the point at which the state, whether from 
impotence or because of the immanent connections within any legal system, can no 
longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical ends that it desires at any 
price to attain.  (1978:243). 
 
 Hence, the “law” of the police preserves the legal authority of the state by going 
beyond legality. Granting the police the authority to act in the name of the state effectively 
places police above the law.4 For Benjamin, the police stand at the threshold of the law, 
transcend the dichotomies of legal and illegal. In this regard, the police embody 
sovereignty as defined by Schmitt.  
 
State of exception and the sovereign  
As a communist Jew in the Nazi Germany, Benjamin was a witness to, and a target 
of, the most brutal forms of organized police violence. Nevertheless, he argues that the 
state of emergency in which he lived was not an exception but the norm. For Benjamin, 
“the tradition of the oppressed” claims that violence and oppression are immanent in the 
normal order of modern capitalist societies and/or modern state formations. Hence, for 
Benjamin, Nazi Germany was not an exception but representative of the modern state. 
Schmitt, as a Nazi jurist who was concerned with the establishment and perpetuation of an 
all-powerful state, also underlines the significance of state of exception5 as a constitutive 
of the normal order and rule. 6 For Schmitt, the state of exception, which is based on 
suspension of the law, is in fact constitutive of legal order. The state of exception 
guarantees the order. As Agamben (1998) explains, although the exception is exclusion, 
the exception is not contra the rule. On the contrary,  
 
what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of 
the rule's suspension. The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in 
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withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order 
but rather the situation that results from its suspension. (18) 
 
 Hence, like Benjamin, for Schmitt, too, law always goes outside itself and requires 
an exteriority in order to persist. He argues that the law –and the legal order– is 
maintained and preserved due to the suspension of the law. However, whereas Benjamin 
problematizes legality itself and calls for a “real state of emergency,” violence unbound to 
law, which would abolish the legal order without establishing a new law/state, for Schmitt 
the state of exception is inevitable and necessary. For Schmitt, the one who “decides on 
the exceptional case” (cited in Agamben 1998:1) is the sovereign. For Schmitt (1985), “all 
law is situational law” (13). That is to say, there is always a human intervention in 
applying the law; law always involves a decision. The sovereign guarantees the legal order 
by its capacity to make a decision about suspending the law. The sovereign, like the police 
in Benjamin’s essay, stands at the threshold of the legal and the illegal, hence it goes 
beyond these dichotomies.7 It simultaneously oscillates between the legal and illegal, 
hence remains extra-legal. It is the one whose violence is not restricted by law and whose 
criminal acts do not count as a crime. In other words, the sovereign is the one who 
exercises violence freely, free of any legal restrictions and punishments (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005, 2006).  
  Agamben (2000) points out “the extermination of the Jews was conceived from 
the beginning to the end exclusively as a police operation” (106). He argues further that 
the sovereign is materialized in the figure of the police: 
[T]he police –contrary to public opinion- are not merely an administrative function of 
law enforcement; rather, the police are perhaps the place where the proximity and the 
almost constitutive exchange between violence and right that characterizes the figure 
of the sovereign is shown more nakedly and clearly than anywhere else ( 104). 
 
Moreover, Agamben (1998) notes that sovereign power can maintain and manifest itself 
indefinitely without ever passing over into actuality. Hence, for Agamben, sovereign 
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power is an actuality and potentiality at the same time. The sovereign, for instance, in the 
figure of a gun-holding policeman, reminds us of the potentiality, hence actuality of 
violence, thus manifesting and maintaining its power.8 In other words, the sovereign 
power preserves and maintains its power by showing us that there is no law, which can 
restrict and control its violence. As Das and Poole (2004) put it clearly, the sovereign who 
appears in the figure of the police challenges “the very possibility of the law itself”  (13).  
Accordingly, in Chapter IV, V and VI, I demonstrate how the presence of akreps, house 
raids and armed policemen serve as reminders of the potential for violence, making the 
police/state present as a sovereign figure in Narova residents’ lives.  
 Hansen and Stepputat (2001) point out the ways in which sovereignty is claimed 
and manifested through performative acts of violence. For them sovereignty, like the state, 
is a fiction and a tentative, unstable, and ambiguous project made real through “ritualized, 
everyday confirmations of  […] violence” (7).  For them, sovereignty must be performed 
publicly to prove the existence of the sovereign (state). In a similar vein, Feldman’s works 
(1991, 1995, 1997), which provide illuminating analyzes on the performative construction 
of the state in Ireland, demonstrate that the state achieves reality among the Irish 
population through the performative displays of police power and violence. For Feldman, 
potentially resistant populations perceive the state as a real and material entity through the 
performative acts and displays of arrests, killings, interrogations, or torture. The 
performativity of sovereignty is due to the counter-violence the sovereign violence 
provokes. In other words, sovereign violence selectively targets the populations the state 
does not consider a legitimate power. Hence, as Graeber (2011) argues the war between 
the sovereign and the people is a war that the sovereign can never truly win.  
Sovereign performances of violence cannot be used against all populations. As 
Gramsci (1992) argues, ruling requires legitimacy, hence consent of the entire population. 
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Using the notion of hegemony, Gramsci explains that ruling elites and their supporters aim 
to develop a positive program that actively wins the consent of the population. Hence, for 
Gramsci, the success of capitalist society, which is based on the exploitation of the masses 
by a [small] group of people, is based on the production of hegemony, the process by 
which a particular class’s interests become universalized and articulated as the general 
interest of society. Tugal (2009), demonstrates that some segments of the working-class 
populations, especially Sunni Muslim Turks, have gradually been incorporated into the 
system after the coup of 1980. He illustrates how members of the current government 
party, the AKP, gained the support of some segments of the working class. From a 
Gramscian point of view, he argues that the success of the AKP is due to its members’ 
ability to represent their own interests as the interest of the masses. This dissertation 
focuses on the other side of the coin: on those who do not consider the representatives of 
the state as the legitimate representatives of the people. In other words, this dissertation 
focuses on those who could not be pacified and/or taken under control by the ruling elites. 
Hence, being aware that the relations of domination and exploitation are not only 
reproduced through performative acts of violence/sovereignty, I argue that manifestations 
and performances of sovereignty specially target the populations who remained potentially 
or actually resistant. 
 
The “great criminal” as the rival of the fantasy state 
In the course of examining how and why Narova residents have been targets of 
police and military violence, I employ Benjamin’s concept of the “great criminal.” As I 
argued above, the great criminal is an outlaw who gains the sympathy of the public. 
Hence, she/he is neither a criminal per se nor does her/his greatness derive from the scale 
of his/her criminal acts. The great criminal's uses of violence have the potential to form 
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new laws. Her/his challenge derives not only from her/his use of violence but also from 
the public admiration he/she gained. As Derrida (1992) argues in his interpretation of 
Benjamin’s concept of the great criminal, what threatens the state is not simply crime, no 
matter how large-scale (24). For Derrida, 
what the state fears (the state being law in its greatest force) is not so much crime or 
brigandage, even on the grand scale of the mafia or heavy drug traffic, as long as they 
transgress the law with an eye toward particular benefits, however important they 
may be. The state is afraid of fundamental, founding violence, that is, violence able to 
justify, to legitimate or to transform the relations of law and so to present itself as 
having a right to law (1992:989).  
 
Hence, the crime of the great criminal is not simply a violation of law. The violation of 
law, indeed, is the very affirmation of law. The great criminal’s violence signifies a break 
from existing laws. Thus, the great criminal is the rival of the state. Because first of all, 
like the ruling elites who claim to use violence not for individual gains and benefits but for 
the general interest of the people, the great criminal also claims that she/ he do not seek 
individual gains and benefits. In other words, like the fantasy state, which according to 
liberal understandings was established to provide law and order, the great criminal also 
attempts to provide law and order and presents herself/himself as the one who has the right 
to make law. Hence, for Benjamin, the great criminal as a Robin Hood figure, is the rival 
of the state. Moreover, the great criminal is not only threatening due to her/his potential to 
make new law. The great criminal, by using force, also reveals the areas that escape from 
control of those who represent the state, such as the military and the police. 
Benjamin, like Weber, underlines violence’s constitutive relation to the state. 
However, Benjamin, with his concept of the great criminal specifically emphasizes that 
the monopolization of violence can never be completed. There are always rivals of the 
ruling elites who are committed to the maintenance of the idea and/or fantasy of a unified 
powerful state (cf. Abrams 1989). That is to say, although ruling elites attempt to 
legitimize their sovereign power and the violence associated with it in the name of general 
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interests and order and peace, for Benjamin there are always people whose violence is 
considered more legitimate than that of the ruling elites by certain populations. Hence, 
monopolization of violence is an unfinished task, an incomplete project, which ruling 
elites continuously attempt to complete. In other words, Benjamin emphasizes the 
incompleteness of a state project, the impossibility of the promise of the state fantasy ––
the impossibility of absolute monopoly over legitimate violence or the impossibility of 
capturing/dominating the whole. Goudsblom (2001) puts it more explicitly, “monopolies 
of violence are always contested, and pacification is never complete” (746). Hence, there 
is always an active competition for power within modern state formations. In other words, 
for Benjamin, like Foucault (2003) “politics is war continued by other means” (23).  This 
war is waged both among the ruling elites themselves and against the people whose 
activities contribute to de-legitimizing and de-mystifying state power.  
As I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, the people who challenge the existing 
ruling elites’ attempts to monopolize violence are considered enemies of the state. These 
enemies may be either powerful figures who wish to declare their own sovereignty (either 
at the local or at the central level) without challenging the existing forms of relations of 
domination and exploitation or who those who challenge the very foundation of the 
existing political order. In Chapter III, for instance, I demonstrate how some generals and 
admirals who had been considered the protectors and representatives of the state are now 
accused of “crimes against the state” as the former ruling elites have gradually been 
replaced with new ones. I claim that internal enemies do not become internal enemies 
simply because they consider the representatives of the state as illegitimate or simply 
because they are minorities. They become internal enemies due to practices that challenge 
the authority of the representatives of the state. Accordingly, rather than focusing on the 
beliefs and ethnic, religious or racial identities of those who are considered internal 
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enemies, I focus on their practices. In other words, I do not simply say that Narova 
residents have been targeted to police violence because they belong to an unorthodox 
religious sect and because they are sympathetic to socialist ideas and ideals. Rather, I 
question what kinds of practices turn this population into internal enemies. In Chapter II, I 
describe traditional Alevi local law making and law maintaining practices. In Chapter V, I 
discuss Narova’s socialist youth’s attempts to provide law and order in the neighborhood. 
I conclude that practices which deactivate the authority of the police and the state’s law 
enforcers have been influential in Alevi communities’ and Narova residents’ 
stigmatization as internal enemies.  In other words, I argue that a significant number of 
Narova youth are accused of “crimes against the state” due to their local lawmaking and 
law-maintaining practices, which turns them into rivals of the state at the local scale. 
 
The Great Criminal and the “artificial balance theory”  
The Marxist organization THKP-C9 (People of Turkey’s Liberation Party/Front) has 
been highly influential within the socialist tradition in Turkey. The ideas of Mahir Cayan, 
one of the founders of the THKP-C, have inspired many other subsequent socialist 
organizations, including the PKK. Mahir Cayan’s argument, known as the “artificial 
balance theory” is similar in some respects to Benjamin’s concept of the great criminal. 
For Cayan, there is an artificial balance between the state, which he views as an apparatus 
of the ruling class, and the people. According to Cayan, the state -–– seemingly all-
powerful-–– in fact does not possess a monopoly over violence and is much less powerful 
than are the people. In other words, the state’s powerful appearance is based on an 
artificial balance. For Cayan, the reason the state appears as a power over the people is 
because of the social services it provides and its uses of violence. In order to contest this 
power or (in more Marxian anthropological terms) to demystify the state, people must be 
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shown that the state is not as strong as it appears. Hence, for Cayan, armed propaganda 
activities, which are selectively directed at those who represent the state and its imperialist 
and capitalist allies, such as policemen, high rank soldiers, banks and US consulates, will 
show that the state cannot control or prevent violence directed at its representatives. This 
demonstration would prove that the state actually does not have a monopoly over violence. 
For Cayan, such acts reveal the vulnerability of the state apparatus and give people the 
courage to side with revolutionaries. That is to say, the working classes are potentially on 
the side of revolutionaries would see that the state is not an all-powerful entity and would 
participate in the revolutionary organizations/movement. Cayan-inspired groups gained 
popular support in Narova and in other Alevi populated neighborhoods during the 1990s. 
Accordingly, in Chapter IV, I demonstrate that one of the reasons why Narova and other 
Alevi populated neighborhoods turned into militarized zones in the 1990s, was these 
groups’ active attempt to demystify the state.  
 
 The Great Criminal and territorial sovereignty 
As Vandergeest and Pelusa (1995) point out, scholars who have focused on the 
spatial/territorial extent of sovereignty often link the state’s control over territory to the 
drawing and protection of external boundaries, and repressing rivals who challenge these 
boundaries, whether external enemies or imaginary or real separatists (42). Vandergeest 
and Pelusa (1995) demonstrate that state territoriality is also about effecting, influencing, 
or controlling people and relationships by delineating and declaring control over a 
geographic area (43). In this dissertation I aim to answer the following questions: What 
happens if there are non-state groups who are not separatist and who do not seek 
individual benefits and gains, yet have their own territorial control, hence security 
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mechanisms? What happens if there are actors independent from the state that demarcate 
and declare control over a specific territory? 
This situation is, indeed, familiar to us from the context of less-centralized state 
formations or empires. Vandergeest and Pelusa (1995), in their historical work on the 
formation of a nation-state in Thailand, illustrate how respected local leaders and notables, 
who once controlled specific territories, were deemed bandits and internal enemies during 
the process of founding a centralized nation-state in Thailand. They argue that 
consequently state territoriality is also about eliminating the power and territorial control 
of local powers within the boundaries of a nation-state. The case is similar to the Ottoman 
situation. Ungor’s (2012) recent and path-breaking work on the modern state formation 
process in Turkey situates Armenian genocide and the massacres of Assyrians and Kurds 
in the context of building modern territorial sovereignty. His work demonstrates that the 
history of the Turkish nation-state is, in part, the history of several waves of violence 
against various ethnic and religious groups such as Armenians, Kurds and Jews who lived 
under a relatively autonomous rule during the Ottoman era. He argues that in the process 
of building a nation-state, Turkish ruling elites considered Armenian, Assyrian and 
Kurdish local notables as obstacles. These notables and the populations who supported 
them were declared enemies of the state. Studies on nation-state formation processes in 
general point out that local authorities, due to their ability to control territories through 
legitimate violence, were considered threats against their own sovereign power. Thus they 
were demonized during central state formation processes. As I illustrate in Chapters II and 
IV, local leaders or any other organized group who can control the territories and the 
people in them by using violence legitimately are rivals, hence the most dangerous 
enemies of the centralized state. In Chapter III, I discuss how the local power holders or 
local ruling elites who once had control over certain territories were deemed as bandits 
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and internal enemies during the formation process of the Republic. In Chapter V, I focus 
on attempts by Narova's youth to gain territorial control of their neighbourhood. In 
Chapter V, I illustrate how these attempts ended before the anti-terror law. 
 
War on terror/ Law on Terror  
Today, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the USA, the fantasy of terror has 
become a global phenomenon. The feelings of emergency provoked by the fantasies 
and/or fear of terror have given rise to the development of the need for extraordinary legal 
instruments such as emergency laws and powers that contribute to the resurgence of 
totalitarian, repressive forms of governance all around the world10 (Aretxaga 2005, Diken 
and Laustsen 2005, Feldman 1991, Zulaika and Douglass 1996). In this process, law has 
emerged as the privileged sphere of the counter-terror policies. As much as a “distant and 
overwhelming force,” the law is also as Bourdieu (1986) argues, a field, an arena of 
structured, socially patterned activity and practice. For Bourdieu, law is a historical and 
social construction produced in part by legal agents in competition with other agents. In 
other words, for Bourdieu (1986), law is grounded in the “juridical field,” “the site of a 
competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law” (817). The law is relatively 
autonomous and it is not always shaped according to the interest of those who hold 
political power. In a similar vein, Nader (2002) from an anthropological point of view, 
emphasizes the idea that law is often not a neutral regulator of power but instead the 
vehicle by which different parties attempt to gain and maintain control and legitimization 
of a given social unit.    
In this dissertation, however, I argue that regardless of the differences between the 
agents competing for a “monopoly of the right to determine law,” Turkey’s history of 
juridical or extra-juridical political violence has been more continuous than discontinuous 
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since the late 19th century, since the beginning of the central state formation process. 
Current legal regulations and new anti-terror laws, contribute to the corrosion of the 
military’s political power, granting police with enormous power within the juridical field. 
In Chapter VI, analyzing the current anti-terror law of Turkey, I discuss how the juridical 
field in the case of anti-terror law becomes the showground of police power in Turkey. 
Accordingly, in Chapter V, I focus on the cases of a group of terror suspects from Narova 
to illustrate the operation of the anti-terror law on the ground.  
Bourdieu (1986) points out the “neutralization effect” of the law and argues that 
the very operation of law is based on a high degree of concealment. The seemingly 
neutral, impersonal and normative language of the agents of the juridical field create the 
impression that law is separate from politics, thus from social, historical and material 
relations that inform the power struggles that takes place within the juridical field. In other 
words, the law creates the impression that there is an opposition between the “rule of law” 
and “rule of man.” Similarly Merry (1992) argues, “law as an ideology contributes to the 
social construction of the world as fair and just and at the same time provides a language 
and forums for resisting that order” (85). However, drawing on the operation of anti-terror 
law in Turkey, I illustrate that the law does not always have a neutralization effect. On the 
contrary, the agents of the juridical field actively attempt to demonstrate that the “rule of 
law” is indeed the “rule of man.”  
In sum, I utilize Benjamin’s concept of the great criminal in this dissertation to I 
argue that the fantasy of the state, which is translated into attempts to monopolize violence 
and law within the territories of nation-state is productive of its rivals. The people do not 
always experience the state as a legitimate body. For some populations, especially those 
that are subjected to domination and exploitation, the reproductive effect of the fantasy of 
the state is visible. This visibility, which gives rise to counter-state projects, turns certain 
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groups of people into enemies and/or rivals of the state. Pointing to the processes and 
relations that led Narova residents’ rivalry and enmity with the police/state, I examine 
various operations, manifestations and techniques of power that contributed to the 
containment and management of Narova residents. I argue that what turns the state into a 
real and material entity in Narova residents’ everyday experiences are the sovereign 
performances of the police. In deploying the concept of the sovereign, I am inspired by 
Schmitt’s conceptualization of the sovereign. As I argued above, for Schmitt the sovereign 
is located at the lawless sphere (threshold) of the law. Following Schmitt, I argue that the 
ability to commit crimes and the “right to kill” without liability are performances of 
sovereignty. For Schmitt, the sovereign is a necessary and inevitable component of social 
order.   
Diverging from Schmitt at this point, I argue that the sovereign is not an inevitable 
component of the social order but is an inevitable component of the societies based on 
relations of domination and exploitation. Furthermore, in Schmitt’s theory, the sovereign 
emerges as an a-historical, even natural and god-like figure. I argue that the sovereign is 
not an abstract, ghostly figure over and above individuals. The sovereign does not actually 
exist. Sovereignty/the sovereign is an effect of the performances of sovereignty ––
performed by a group of people, who are devoted to the reproduction of existing relations 
of exploitation and domination. In other words, I argue that in addition to producing 
legitimacy and consent, relations of domination and exploitation have been maintained 
through the performance of sovereignty, which give the impression that that there is a 
sovereign granted with the power of unrestricted violence.   
 In examining the performance of sovereignty I focus on two spheres: Spatial and 
legal manifestations of sovereignty. I demonstrate that manifestations of unrestricted 
violence and injustice in these two spheres contribute to the normalization and 
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naturalization of violence among certain groups of people. The militarized spatial control 
of spaces occupied by actually or potentially resisting populations, turning violence into 
an everyday reality, marks the bodies and souls of people. Violence inscribed in space 
does not only control people but also transform their subjectivities and social relations. 
Manifestations of violence and sovereignty within the sphere of law are another privileged 
instrument of domination and exploitation. This is precisely because the law promises 
justice. My analysis of lawlessness manifested within the sphere of law will demonstrate 
both the mystifying and demystifying effects of law.  
Finally, I argue that the fantasy of the state cannot be grasped without examining 
the effects and subjectivities this fantasy has been productive of. Drawing on 
psychoanalytical theory, I illustrate how the manifestation of sovereign violence 
reproduces the fantasy of the state and the desire to perform “stately” violence by the 
young radicals who fight against the state.  
The arguments and insights of three European Jews, Arendt, Benjamin and Kafka, 
are diffused into this dissertation. Their influence on my writing is not a coincidence. I 
believe there are a lot of commonalities between the Alevis of Turkey who were born into 
the stories of injustice and massacres their ancestors were subjected to, and Jews in 
Germany, as the symptoms of Christian Europe.  
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter I, introduces the field sites and discusses the research methods. Discussing 
how Narova residents directed my research, I explain why I chose not to focus on Alevi 
cultural identity but on the issues of crime, police violence and “stately practices.” I also 
elaborate on the difficulties of writing on violence and conducting a research in a 
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neighborhood where the undercover police, revolutionary youth and gangs are important 
segments of social life.  
In Chapter II, I focus on the Alevi religio-cultural identity to point out the 
historical Alevi practices/habitus11 and beliefs that turned Alevis into constant targets of 
political violence. Demonstrating how the Alevi community has remained at the margins 
of law and order imposed by central authorities for centuries, I point out traditional and 
extra-legal Alevi lawmaking and law maintaining practices that later survived in the big 
cities in the form of revolutionary people’s courts. I approach these practices as an Alevi 
habitus, a centuries long structured structure. Due to the absence of sufficient research on 
traditional Alevi lawmaking practices, I argue that these practices may still be informative 
of Narova youth’s attempts to deactivate the police power in the neighborhood. This 
chapter also discusses the ways in which the Alevi community has been an integral 
component of Turkey’s socialist movement and examines the emergence of Alevi-
populated working class neighborhoods in Istanbul during the 1970s. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the establishment of Narova and local lawmaking and law maintaining practices 
in Narova of the 1970s.  
 Chapter III provides an outline of the Turkish ruling elite's war against the 
populations whom they consider “enemies of the state.” The chapter briefly discusses how 
the local ruling elite, once notable intermediary powers, and the populations who consider 
their law and violence as legitimate, became internal enemies during the central state 
formation process that began in the 19th century. This chapter also examines Turkey’s 
martial laws and discusses how militarized rule has been integral to Turkey’s allegedly 
democratic order. Finally, the chapter focuses on the ongoing terror operation against high 
rank military officers and describes the replacement of the military’s political power with 
that of the police. 
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In Chapter IV, I discuss the ways in which Narova turned into a state of emergency 
zone during the early 1990s. Pointing out how Narova became one of the centers of the 
revitalizing socialist left during the 1990s, I illustrate the ways in which Narova has been 
separated from its surrounding areas through militarized spatial techniques and stigmatized 
as a dangerous and/or enemy zone in the views of the general public. I argue that militarized 
spatial control is not only about managing and controlling unruly populations in the present, 
but shapes and transforms the future.  
  This chapter illustrates various performances of sovereignty and discusses how the 
state is experienced and subjectivized in Narova. Approaching violence as a relation 
transformative of social relations, I demonstrate how such performances have contributed 
to normalization of violence, the weakening of historical social support networks and the 
culture of solidarity among residents. I argue that the segregation of Narova, by 
“imprisoning” the residents into this isolated place, set the ground for intimate violent 
encounters with the police. Such encounters have been productive of the mimetic relation 
between the police and the revolutionary youth.  
In Chapter V, I examine the ways in which the criminalization of Narova youth 
and introduction of criminal gangs in the neighborhood had transformed social relations in 
Narova since the early 2000s. Discussing how Narova residents perceive the state as an 
enemy responsible for the criminalization of the neighborhood, I focus on crime 
prevention campaigns organized by Narova youth. I illustrate how Narova youth, in in 
their attempts to end crime in the neighborhoods, also attempted to deactivate the power of 
the police and establish their own law and order in the neighborhood. These attempts, 
which turned hundreds of Narova youth into the rivals of the state and/or great criminals, 
lead to their confinement as terrorist suspects and convicts. In analyzing the relationship of 
rivalry between Narova's youth and the police, I point out how historical Alevi 
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fears/fantasies of eradication were informative of young Narova residents’ desire to 
eliminate the police’s power. I also discuss how this desire was translated into mimetic 
practices of police power by Narova youth.  
 In Chapter VI, I focus on the case of a group of anti-crime activists who ended up 
in prison after being accused of beating an undercover policeman and seizing his gun 
under orders from a terrorist organization. This chapter examines the implementation of 
anti-terror laws on the ground. First of all, I analyze Turkey’s current anti-terror laws to 
illustrate how the current government manifests its totalitarian tendencies within the legal 
sphere. I demonstrate that the anti-terror trials operate as the showground of the police’s 
sovereign power within the juridical field. In other words, I demonstrate how the sphere of 
law serves as the ground for demonstrating the violence and injustice immanent in law. I 
also argue that the current anti-terror law creates a group of “undesirables,” categories of 
people outside the protection of the law (cf. Arendt 1973) by depriving them of their 
juridical rights. Finally, I claim that on the one hand, violence and injustice manifested in 
the courtrooms demystifies the law in the eyes of terrorist suspects and of the audience of 
terror trials by showing them that the rule of law is indeed the rule of human agents. 
However, on the other hand, the revelation of the sovereign, a group of people who want 
to maintain relations of domination and exploitation and who decide on the exception 
within the sphere of law, also has a mystifying effect. Such a manifestation of injustice 
worms itself into courtrooms, trials, and dark and cold cells, making one feel entrapped in 
the Kafkaesque labyrinths of the law, and gives rise to the perceptions of injustice and 
violence as an ill-fate. Needless to say, fate belongs to the domain12 of the sacred. 
Accordingly, as injustice is perceived as an inevitable fate, the revelation of the men in the 
law also contributes to the mystification of power. That is to say, as the law of men 
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manifests that men of law do not obey and cannot be restricted by the law, the state is 
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1 Sunnism is the dominant, Orthodox form of Islam. 
 
2 Since the concept of terror is deeply contested, I would like the use it in quotation marks. However, in order to 
make it easier to read, hereafter I will not use quotation marks. Please read the concepts of terror, terrorism and 
terrorist as if they were in quotation marks. 
 
3 Translation mine. 
 
4 A recent dispute that took place in Turkey between a policeman and a deputy from the Kurdish party, BDP, is 
highly symptomatic of the connection I attempted to describe above. The police intervened in a peace 
demonstration organized by the pro-Kurdish Party, BDP, in August 7, 2011 and started to hit the demonstrators 
with their batons. During the police’s aggressive attack, Idris Baluken’s, a Kurdish deputy, eyeglasses were 
broken. He went to the policeman who broke his eyeglasses and told him that he broke his eyeglass. Before the 
policeman could say a word, his chief came and told the policeman not to talk to “such persons” and that “those 
kinds of people” were “not to be spoken to.”  The deputy got angry and yelled at the policeman saying: “What 
are you saying? I am a deputy!  I am a representative of the people.” And the policeman yelled back at him: “ If 
you are deputy, I am the state! ” Information available at: http://www.dha.com.tr/sen-milletvekiliysen-ben-de-
devletim_218543.html Last Accessed: May 15, 2013. 
 
5 Marxist social scientist Neocleous (2006), in his article on the emergency rules as a part of the normal order in 
capitalist societies, attracts our attention to the difference between the concepts of emergency and exception.  
Pointing out that the etymological roots of emergency derives from the verb to emerge, he argues that as the 
verb "emerge" connotes "the process of coming forth, issuing from concealment, obscurity, or confinement,” the 
state of emergency actually indicates the normality of the emergency rules and policies. Neocleous criticizes 
Schmitt by arguing that Schmitt sees the state of exception as opposed to the normal order. However, as I shall 
discuss, I agree with Agamben’s reading of Schmitt, which argues that exception is the very constitutive of 
normalcy. In other words, Agamben (1998, 2002, 2004) demonstrates that exception is not external to the norm. 
 
6 Agamben (2002) illustrates that in developing his notion of the sovereign and state of exception Schmitt was 
influenced by Benjamin’s article OCV. 
 
7 The sovereign, according to Schmitt, is a person, a Hitler-like ruler. I, however, imagine the sovereign as a 
monster-like figure and sovereignty as a place that is attempted to be occupied by various people or groups of 
people who engage in monstrous acts in their claims for sovereignty and therefore who eventually turn into 
monsters/monster-like persons.  That is why, I refer to the sovereign as it instead of referring as she or he.  
 
8 In a similar vein, Das (2007) illustrates that the potentiality of violence is the actuality of it. As she 
demonstrates, in order it to constitute “the ecology of fear in everyday life” violence doesn’t have to be 
actualized in events (9).  
 
9 THKP-C, established at the beginning of the 1970s, has been one of the most influential socialist organizations 
within the socialist tradition in Turkey. The leading founders of the organization were killed in 1972 after they 
kidnapped a NATO radar technician. The THKP-C does not exist anymore but there are a number of socialist 
organizations, which splintered off from the THKP-C tradition. 
 
10 See for instance, Muller’s interview with Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court Vice President, Winfried 
Hassemer about the need for developing extraordinary legal instruments in Germany’s war on terror (Muller 
2004).  
 
11 For Bourdieu, habitus is recognized as an embodiment of structure. “The habitus is not only a structuring 
structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure” (Bourdieu, 
1989, p. 170). The habitus, structured structure by experience, operates like a generative grammar of behaviors. 
The individuals see and make meaning of the world through the glasses of their habitus. 	  




 Ethnographers have noted that ethnographic research and ethnographic writing are 
always subjective, fragmentary and partial (Clifford 1986, Clifford and Marcus 1986, 
Scheper-Hughes 1983, Marcus 1986, 1988). What ethnographers see and what they do not 
see, what they hear and what they do not hear in the “field” is closely related to their own 
personal and cultural histories. As Geertz (1998) argues, we listen to some voices and 
ignore others. Each ethnographer writes her/his own story. Each ethnographer translates 
what she/he witnessed and heard into her/his own language. In this translation process, 
there are always some voices, some stories, some characters and images left outside either 
consciously or unconsciously. During my research and writing processes, I also ignored 
some voices and stories. I cannot write about what kind of stories and voices I 
unconsciously ignored. However, while discussing my ethnographic experiences I also 
want to point out what I chose to leave out of my research and this dissertation.  
I conducted two years of fieldwork in Istanbul, Turkey. The first period of my 
research (October 2010-September 2011) took place in Narova, the pseudonym of a 
working class Alevi neighborhood. The second period of my research (September 2011- 
August 2012) continued with additional sites: the Specially Authorized Assize Courts, 
which specialize in “crimes against the state;” the non-governmental Turkish Human 
Rights Foundation, which investigates state violence, and Mannheim, Germany, where 
former Narova residents seek asylum from extrajudicial and (more recently) legal state 
violence in Turkey. 
 
 Fieldwork in Narova: Culture talk and divide and rule 
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This study is not the first to be conducted in an Alevi-populated working class 
neighborhood of Istanbul. However, anthropologists and sociologists who have conducted 
research in Alevi-populated working class neighborhoods have mainly chosen to write 
about the Alevis’ cultural differences, such as Alevi religious rituals, their communal ties, 
family relations, etc. (Alatas 2011, Coskun 2003, Dubetsky 1977, White 1996). Others, 
have written about the culture of poverty in these neighborhoods (Erder 1996, 1997, White 
2004). I decided not to contribute to a literature that emphasizes cultural differences of the 
Alevi community, a community that has been the cultural other of the Orthodox Muslim 
community in Turkey for centuries. In other words, I intentionally avoided any stories and 
narratives that would attract attention to the cultural identity of Narova residents. One of 
the most crucial reasons behind this decision was, as I illustrate below, the reluctance of 
Narova residents to being defined with reference to their religio-cultural identity.  
Today, anthropologists rightly underline that culture is not the collection of the 
essential characteristics of a given community. It rather is a product of historico-material 
relations and processes (Abu-Lughod 1991, Clifford and Marcus 1986, Herzfeld 2000, 
Marcus and Fischer 1999). However, as Mamdani (1996, 2002) warns us, talking about 
cultural differences is deeply rooted in colonial history. The notion of culture attracts 
attention to a group’s real or imaginary differences and obscures the historical and 
material processes formative of collective identities. As Mamdani (2002) puts it, “culture 
talk dehistoricizes the construction of political identities” (766). It effectively contributes 
to the legitimization of the relations and processes that turn certain groups into the targets 
of colonial and/or imperial projects.  
One of the most repeated expressions I heard from Narova residents during my 
fieldwork in Narova was “divide and rule,” a phrase familiar to us from the history of 
colonialism. Many Narova residents of various ages underlined that the division of people 
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along ethnic and religious lines is a technique of governance. In effect, many people in 
Narova told me that they did not consider themselves Alevis or that they did not like to 
emphasize their Alevi identity. Instead, they argued that they believed in the unity of 
humankind. The sixty-two-year-old construction worker Ibrahim’s words summarize the 
Narova residents’ general attitude towards religious differences and what they mean by 
“divide and rule” polices. He says, 
 state always likes to divide people. They tell Sunnis “look at Alevis, they do not go 
to mosque.” They do it to make Sunnis dislike Alevis. Why? What happens if a Sunni 
worker gets along well with an Alevi worker? They would stand united against the 
boss! Right?  The bosses of course do not want it. It is the same everywhere. I went to 
Erbil to work there. It is the same there. The Arabs hate the Kurds; The Kurds hate 
the Arabs. And what happens then? What happens when people hate each other? It is 
good for the interests of the rulers, of the rich, of the bosses...They want it that way. 
So, my dear daughter, I am an Alevi, yes. But before that I am a human being. It is 
the state that wants to divide us into Alevis and Sunnis, Turks and Kurds…It is for 
their interest. The rich own the state. It is the bosses’ state. It is the bosses’ world! 
And they want to divide us. 
 
During my fieldwork in Narova, many old and young people, like Ibrahim, gave 
me informal lectures about the ways in which “states” divide people according to their 
religious and ethnic identities. For them, such divisions have always made it easier for 
states, bosses and the bourgeoisie to rule people by creating and provoking enmity among 
people from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. I see a correspondence between 
Mamdani’s warning about the effects of “culture talk” and Narova residents’ emphasis on 
“divide and rule” policies. I interpret their arguments about the insignificance of religious 
identities and their emphasis on the “divide and rule” strategy as their resistance to being 
seen as cultural Others. I take their comments on religio-cultural differences as an 
intervention in this research and I respect their intervention. Hence, instead of focusing on 
the themes related to Alevi culture and history which, I came to believe, is a very thought-
provoking topic, I chose to put institutionalized political violence at the core of this 
dissertation. However, this does not mean that I ignored Alevi culture and history in 
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understanding the experience of the Narova residents In Chapter I, I elaborate on the Alevi 
belief system and Alevi history. I outline several waves of anti-Alevi massacres and 
pogroms that have been influential in the formation of the Alevi collective identity. I point 
out traditional Alevi habitus of providing law and order at the local base and question its 
relation to recent local lawmaking and law maintenance activities of the Narova youth.  
As I explained in the preface, in my very first visit to the neighborhood, I decided 
that I would focus on violence in Narova. In addition to my initial decision, my 
preliminary interviews and informal chats with Narova residents have also been influential 
in my final decision about writing on violence. During the initial stages of my research, in 
our daily conversations, I asked Narova residents general questions about the 
neighborhood, such as:  How would you define Narova? What are the most important 
problems of the neighborhood? How would you define the youth of this neighborhood?  
How would you describe the transformation of the neighborhood over the years? While 
talking about Narova’s past and present, the residents mostly repeated three actors: the 
police, the criminals and the revolutionaries. In effect, these three actors occupy a central 
place in this dissertation.  
Conducting research in a neighborhood where its residents consider criminals, 
police and revolutionaries as the most dominant figures in the everyday life is a difficult 
task. I felt that spending time with these three figures, especially with the police and 
criminals, would put me in danger. But how would I write about them without actually 
spending time with them? Intuitively, I found a way. I did not get close to them and I tried 
to avoid spending time with them. Yet, I stayed around them by going to the neighborhood 
regularly and spending time in the public spaces such as cafés and parks where I could 
have spontaneous encounters with all three groups. I never went to the parks and cafés 
alone. There was always at least one person with me from the neighborhood. The 
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company of residents, who have more information about the neighborhood, has protected 
me from risky encounters. 
 The people who helped me most were a group of young people who ran an 
education co-op in the neighborhood. Because the neighborhood was under constant 
police surveillance, I did not reside there. I worked as a volunteer teacher in an education 
co-op in the neighborhood for a year, and this co-op became the center of my life in 
Narova.  Although the people who work in this co-op were members of a Marxist 
organization, the organization had not yet attracted the attention of the police. That is to 
say, while members of other organizations had been continuous targets of police violence, 
there are no single Narova residents from this organization who were taken into custody or 
subjected to arbitrary police violence. Hence, the co-op provided me with a relatively safe 
refuge in the neighborhood while those who were more visibly politically engaged were 
under the threat of imprisonment as terrorists. Moreover, being a teacher-researcher 
enabled me to be a part of the everyday life in the neighborhood and to observe daily 
events and experiences relevant to my research. These included a) residents’ encounters 
with the representatives of the state, b) various manifestations and performances of 
sovereignty, c) the ways in which the residents make meaning of these manifestations and 
performances, d) operations of spatial control, e) feelings that emerged within the context 
of the neighborhood, and f) everyday responses to the atmosphere of fear and violence in 
the neighborhood.   
 
  The police 
The police, first and foremost, have been the most dominant figure of this research. 
Since the establishment of the neighborhood there has been no police station in the 
neighborhood.  Besides, unless a police operation is taking place, it is impossible to see a 
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police officer with his/her official clothes in Narova. Moreover, there are no police cars to 
be seen in the neighborhood. On an ordinary day in Narova, the police are present in the 
neighborhood either as undercover officers or in their akreps. During the days of 
demonstrations or house raids thousands of police accompanied by tanks and helicopters 
pour into the neighborhood. As I elaborate on Chapter III, akreps and house raids give the 
impression that Narova is a war zone, a place of anticipated violence. As Arendt (1973) 
argues, in totalitarian countries where the secret police appear as a figure controlling social 
relations, “mutual suspicion,  […] permeates all social relationships […] and creates an 
all-pervasive atmosphere even outside the special purview of the secret police” (430).  
Similarly, in Narova the presence of the undercover police officers makes the police 
present everywhere in the neighborhood. It makes everyone suspicious of everyone else. 
For instance, when I decided to conduct a fieldwork in Narova, the people familiar with 
the neighborhood warned me to keep in mind that anyone in the neighborhood could 
easily be an undercover police officer or collaborating with the police. In effect, from the 
very beginning of my fieldwork in Narova, the ghost of the police and of the violence they 
carry with them was always with me.  
I did not talk to a single police officer during my fieldwork in Narova.  I thought 
that any person who chose to go to a neighborhood as stigmatized as Narova and build a 
rapport with the residents there would be considered suspicious by police officers.  
Besides, I had already heard that the police were forcing a lot of Narova residents to spy 
on other residents. Knowing that these kinds of police attitudes are not uncommon in 
Turkey, I ignored talking to the police. I thought that if I informed the police about my 
fieldwork, they might want me to collaborate with them or to prove my loyalty to them by 
providing them with information about the residents. By not going to the police office, I 
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avoided the police’s possible demand for collaboration. However, this also means that I 
missed the opportunity to listen to their side of the story. 
 A few months after I started to do my fieldwork, I realized that undercover 
policemen had been following me for some time. As I discuss in Chapter III, when I 
realized that I was being followed, I felt that my life was in danger. The day I noticed that 
undercover policemen were following me, I talked to my lawyer friends. They told me that 
if the police let me realize that they were following me, it meant that they were not 
interested in the data I was gathering, but that they wanted to scare me. They advised me 
to continue going to the neighborhood to show the police that I had nothing to hide or to 
be scared of. I also informed the people in the co-op about the situation. Their suggestion 
was similar. I followed their advice. I continued to go to the neighborhood and to conduct 
interviews. The police continued to follow me and probably listened to my telephone 
conversations. I tried to ignore my fear as much as I could. 
The police constitute a key figure in Alevi communities in Istanbul. As I elaborate 
on in Chapter I, since they left their villages in the 1960s, Alevis have been targets of a 
series of nationalist and Islamist pogroms and police violence.  Moreover, after the great 
Alevi massacre took place in the 16th century, Alevi communities retreated to isolated 
areas away from the reach of the soldiers and state law enforcement. As I discuss in the 
following chapter, as Alevis lived clandestinely, under the threat of destruction by soldiers 
for centuries, secrecy is key to Alevi culture. Accordingly, Narova resident were always 
very careful when talking to me. They did not let me learn any information that could be 
used against them. Thinking that any secret insider information might possibly put me in 
danger, I also had no interest in learning anything more than what the police already knew. 
I conducted eighty in-depth interviews with women and men whose ages were between 
eighteen and seventy-eight, and who had lived in the neighborhood for more than ten 
	  	   40	  
years. Except for two people, all of the informants let me tape record the interviews. 
However, all of the interviews comprised two phases: recorded conversations and 
conversations off the record. 
 Although I did not willingly include the police in my fieldwork, the figure of the 
police was always present during the research and writing processes of this dissertation. I 
did not request official consent from the police while conducting my research, but 
nevertheless I feel that I was unofficially forced to act according to their consent. Thinking 
retrospectively, I now understand that there was an unspoken deal between the police and 
me: I would stay away from the criminals and some radical revolutionary groups1 and they 
would not intervene in my research. In other words, they would not intervene in my 
business as long as I would not try to learn about the alleged gang and police collaboration 
or about their relation to various radical revolutionary groups organized in the 
neighborhood. I now realize that I took being followed by the undercover policemen as a 
warning reminding me of the limits of my research and telling me that I was not free to 
talk to whomever I wanted to. As a result, I tried to see the neighborhood with the eyes of 
the police and created a danger scale in my mind. I categorized people according to their 
potential to put my research and my personal safety at risk. Criminals and members of 
radical revolutionary organizations constituted the most risky groups.  
 
The revolutionaries  
  Narova residents refer to the members of legal or illegal socialist organizations as 
revolutionaries. Most of the revolutionaries are between the ages of fifteen and thirty. This 
is mainly because members of a socialist organization are easy targets for police violence 
and repression. Hence, many revolutionaries either go to prison or must eventually leave 
the country. Those who cannot or do not leave must manage the constant fear of being 
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imprisoned, kidnapped or tortured. They usually end their political activities as they grow 
older. For the young people in Narova, being a revolutionary is more than just an 
individual choice. It is part of the culture they were born into. For instance, while 
explaining to me why he became a revolutionary, Hakan, a twenty-two year-old young 
man, told me how he did not have much of a choice: 
 Why I became a revolutionary? Actually, when I was younger, when I was a 
teenager, I was not very interested in politics. Well, all of the young people in my 
family, such as my elder brothers, my uncle’s daughters, my uncle’s sons, they were 
all revolutionaries. But I was apolitical. Do you know when exactly I decided to be a 
revolutionary?  You know the neighborhood association, right?  I decided to be a 
revolutionary on the day when the police organized an operation against the 
association. Those people, those who ended up in prison did nothing wrong, they 
simply tried to protect this neighborhood. They wanted to prevent crime.  When I saw 
that the association’s building, which had always been packed with people before the 
operation, I decided to work for the association. I was preparing for the university 
exam then. I stopped working for the exam. And I volunteered to work in the 
association. If you are born in Narova, you have three choices. If you are lucky 
enough, you will get into college and leave the neighborhood and never come back 
again. Chances for that are very low. Your second option is to work with the gangs. 
You will sell drugs, use drugs, steal cars, whatever. If you want to stay clean, if you 
want to listen to your conscience you will be a revolutionary. It doesn't stop there 
though. If you decided to be a revolutionary then you have two paths in front of you. 
You will end up in prison or escape to Europe or you will quit politics and become a 
depressed alcoholic. This neighborhood is full of depressed alcoholics. I am ready to 
be put in prison. I don’t mind that. They can come and take me any time. 
    
During my fieldwork in Narova, I often caught myself thinking like Hakan. I felt 
that there were not many options in front of someone born and raised in Narova. If she/he 
is lucky enough to get into a good school she/he can have a relatively secure life. 
However, in Turkey the university entrance exam strongly favors the more privileged 
classes. In order to get into a good school, one has to take private classes while preparing 
for the university entrance exam. This makes it much harder for working class kids to 
receive a good college education. Hence, being a criminal or revolutionary appear as more 
likely options for the youth of Narova.    
As I illustrate throughout this dissertation, there are various legal and illegal 
Marxist-Leninist organizations organized in Narova. Some of these organizations are in 
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favor of armed struggle and they sometimes engage in violent attacks against business 
people, police, soldiers, banks, U.S. consulates, etc.  There are also many legal 
associations in the neighborhood in which members of illegal organizations work. The 
offices of these associations usually function as café houses where people gather together, 
have tea, discuss politics and spend time together. These offices are under constant police 
surveillance. Besides, according to the rumors circulating in the neighborhood, there are 
always police spies working these associations. During my fieldwork, I avoided going to 
these offices and spending time with the members of illegal organizations. First of all, I 
thought the people there would suspect me of being a police spy. If I went to these places 
regularly, I would have felt the need to prove to them that I was not collaborating with the 
police. Besides, if I went to these places more than once, the police, in turn, would suspect 
me of working with those revolutionary groups. Hence, I could not find a better option 
than that of not going to these places more than once or twice and not spending time with 
the people that are usually there.  
 
 The Criminals 
According to the residents, the gang leaders come from elsewhere and the people 
working for them are a composite group. Some of them are residents and some also come 
from outside Narova. I had no interest in meeting with the gang leaders or gang members 
in general. Having conducted a study on this issue before, I felt that talking to the gang 
members would jeopardize the research. However, I spontaneously met with six young 
people, whom I later learned were drug addicts and engaged in crime in order to finance 
their drug consumption. I had long conversations with these people about the issue of 
crime and life in general in the neighborhood. However, as I thought that criminals might 
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be connected to various different actors, such as the police, gangs and revolutionary 
groups, I wanted to stay away from them in general. 
 
Interviews with political refugees and asylum seekers in Germany 
I spent a month in Mannheim (June 2012) and conducted interviews with ten former 
revolutionaries from Narova and similar neighborhoods. One of these “interviewees” was 
a very good friend of mine whom I had not had the chance to see for thirteen years.  I had 
two objectives: i) to trace the history of the 1990s by talking to former residents from that 
period, and ii) to understand more recent changes in political violence by talking to radical 
revolutionaries who had recently left Turkey due to long prison sentences. The interviews 
focused on several themes: a) the processes of their political engagements and 
radicalization, b) imaginaries and fantasies that are shaped within the context of the 
neighborhood and that inform activists’ political motivations and practices, c) their 
encounters with those whom they perceive as the representatives of the state, d) their 
imaginations and fantasies of the state, and e) their narrations of the neighborhood in the 
90s.   
However, the stories I heard there were very hard to listen to. Especially, listening to 
my friend’s story in a very detailed way made me feel extremely depressed. Although these 
stories have been influential in shaping the dissertation and developing my arguments, I 
could not find a way to directly integrate those stories into the dissertation. 
  
Archival research at the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TIHV) 
Established in 1990, the TIHV is a non-governmental organization that advocates for 
the survivors of human rights abuses and keeps the records of these “state crimes.” As the 
first researcher to conduct archival research at the TIHV, I examined the human rights 
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abuse complaints of socialists from 1991 to 2011. These complaints include detailed 
descriptions of the events from the moment the “victims” are taken into custody or 
kidnapped by paramilitary forces. Their accounts shed light on the extent of the police 
control in the Alevi neighborhoods during the 90s and 2000s. These anonymous files, which 
also include detailed notes of the TIHV psychologists’ sessions with the “victims,” show 
how state violence in Turkey is employed selectively against certain ethnic and religious 
groups (especially against Kurds and Alevis) and the working class. Yet, these documents 
were also very depressing and I could not find the courage to go back to these documents 
and incorporate them into the dissertation. As I mentioned in the preface, violence is sticky, 
it permeates the body and soul. While I was reading the TIHV documents, I had terrible 
nightmares about police and prisons. Plus, during the process another big wave of terror 
operations started and I felt that the police could appear at my door at any time. I spent 
months waking up every morning at 5 a.m., the operation time, and waiting for the police to 
break in my door, get into the house and lean a gun against my forehead. As there were 
many other people feeling the same way, in this process the Istanbul Bar Association 
organized public lectures to tell people what to do in case of a house raid. These 
developments, needless to say, increased my fear and anxiety. Hence, I did not dare to open 
that baggage while writing the dissertation. Like the interviews I conducted in Germany, 
TIHV documents have also been influential in shaping the dissertation and developing my 
arguments. Yet, I also could not manage to directly integrate the data I gathered from TIHV 
into the dissertation. 
  
Observations in the Specially Authorized Assize Courts 
  The Specially Authorized Assize Courts are charged with handling “crimes against 
the state.” With 12,897 terror convicts in 2011 and with ongoing “terror operations,” 
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courtrooms have become epicenters of the performances of the state and the police since the 
2006 anti-terror law. With such a dramatic shift from the extralegal enforcement of state 
violence of the 1990s, these courts offer a critical site for research on the transformation of 
state power in Turkey. In addition to following the cases and hearings of fourteen terrorist 
suspects from Narova, I attended eight other hearings related to terror crimes. My 
observations on these hearings focused on understanding: a) the operation of the anti-terror 
law, b) performances and affirmations (cf. Derrida 1992) made in the courtrooms regarding 
state sovereignty, c) encounters between the state and its “enemies,” d) effects of these 
encounters on terror suspects and on their families and friends, and d) the ways in which 
terrorist suspects and their friends and families make meaning of the state performances 
taking place in the courtrooms. 
    In sum, as I point out in the preface, in spite of its difficulties, the reason I wanted 
to complete this dissertation is the debt I carried as a witness. As Isbell (2009) underlines 
in her article on the difficulties of writing about violence, being witness to violence 
burdens one with a debt. I suppose the burden of debt was more important to me than my 
fears and the desire to escape from what I had witnessed. However, while writing this 
dissertation I often felt that I had lost my way and my voice. When I tried to distance 
myself from what I had witnessed I felt guilty for being distant; when I did not distance 
myself enough I lost my voice as an anthropologist. As Ghassem-Fachandi (2009) argues, 
“the special authority established by the ethnographer of violence can unsettle a sensitive 
balance, a sound academic composure, an assumed distance to and disinterest in the object 
of study” (6). Accordingly, my writing process has also been a process of the struggle to 
find a balanced academic language, which would not colonize the voice of Narova 
residents. This is one of the reasons why I first and foremost wanted to focus on the 
police/state violence against Narova residents. I did not yet feel equipped to handle other 
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issues, such as the deep root of “intimate pathologies of power” (cf. Scheper-Hughes 
1993) in the neighborhood, although they sound more appealing anthropologically. 
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1 I call revolutionary Marxist-Leninist groups that are pro-violence and whose members engage in violent 
actions (i.e. bombing, assassinations, etc.) radical revolutionary groups. 
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CHAPTER II 
Alevis: A community at the margins of central authorities 
 
This chapter focuses on the Alevi community in Turkey and on their belief system. I 
discuss the ways in which the ruling elite has seen Alevi community as a threat against 
“national security.” I also discuss Alevi communities’ sympathy with the leftist politics in 
Turkey and the emergence of Alevi working class neighborhoods as shelters for urban 
guerrillas in Turkey. Alevism historically refers to a heterodox, syncretic faith with a mix of 
mystical Sufi Islam, polytheist beliefs of Mesopotamia and Central Asia, Shi’ite Islam and 
Christianity (Melikoff 1998, Markussen 2010, Yildiz and Verkuyten 2011). Alevis are the 
second largest religious group after Sunni1 Muslims in Turkey. They are ethnically Turkish 
or Kurdish2 and mostly inhabit Eastern and central Turkey. Since the Ottoman era, they 
have been stigmatized as infidels and perverts. Due to this stigmatization, Alevis still tend 
to hide their identity. Thus, the exact size of the Alevi population in Turkey is still 
unknown. Different sources range from at least 10 per cent to over a quarter of the total 
population3 (Erman and Goker 2000: 99). Aringberg-Laanatza (1998) demonstrates that 
“the roots of Alevism have to be sought in the context where a mingling process took place 
in large areas of Anatolia between abandoned Christian communities and Muslim Turkish 
and Kurdish tribes” (46).  Since the 16th century, when the Ottoman state elite adopted 
Sunnism as the state religion, Alevis have been regarded as heretics whose beliefs diverged 
from the path of true Islam. Moreover, poor and rebellious “heterodox” Anatolian peasants’ 
sympathy with the Safavid state, the neighbor and enemy of the Ottoman state, has been 
influential in the ongoing stigmatization of Alevi communities as internal and potential 
enemies. As they were seen as internal enemies during the Ottoman Empire where various 
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ethnic and religious communities enjoyed a relative autonomy, Alevis were not recognized 
as a minority group, thus neither enjoyed majority rights as Sunnis nor minority rights as 
non-Muslim communities. As Ottoman rulers and law have ignored their very presence, the 
Alevi communities developed their own extra-legal law and order mechanisms. 
Accordingly, in the following parts of this chapter I argue that in addition to Alevis’ 
centuries long stigmatization, Alevis underground and/or extra-legal law and order 
mechanisms contributed to their further stigmatization as well as their participation in leftist 
politics. In other words, in analyzing how being a leftist became part of Alevi identity, I 
argue that the ways in which Alevis’ distance from state law and authority and their habitus 
of local law and order making have been influential on the association of leftist identity 
with Alevi identity. 
There are four unique characteristics of the Alevi community in Turkey. First of all, 
Alevis were the first officially declared internal enemies of the Ottoman State. In fact the 
very categorization of Alevis as a distinct group coincides with their being declared internal 
enemies by the Ottoman Sultan. Second, although Alevis are Muslim, they do not follow all 
of the orders of the Quran. Third, Alevi communities lived out of reach of Ottoman soldiers 
and law enforcers, and had their own lawmakers and law enforcers for centuries. Fourth, 
Alevis are known for their active participation in leftist organizations.  
  This chapter focuses on these four characteristics of the Alevi community, and 
illustrates the ways in which Alevis have been the most constant targets of political 
violence in Turkey. I demonstrate that Alevis’ position at the margins of the central 
authorities, their distance from the law and the dictates of the Quran and to that of the 
central authorities and their traditional attempts to make and maintain their own law and 
order have been influential in their demonization by the Ottoman and Turkish central 
authorities as well as in their active participation in left-wing organizations. After briefly 
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introducing the Alevi belief system and illustrating the processes that contributed to the 
transformation of the Alevi community into the original internal enemies of the Ottoman 
State, I elaborate on Alevi traditional local courts, which existed in Alevi villages for 
centuries, as well as the establishment of people’s courts and committees in Alevi 
neighborhoods during the 1970s. Hence, this chapter specifically points out Alevi local 
law making and law maintaining practices, which possibly became a habitus among Alevi 
communities, transferred from generation to generation. Accordingly, this chapter is not 
only designed to provide4 insight into Alevi culture and identity but also to provide 
background for what will be discussed in Chapter V, which focuses on alternative law and 
order techniques developed by Narova youth in the mid-2000s.  
 
Alevism and the law and orders of Quran 
Although we cannot speak of a common Alevi belief system, there are still some 
common beliefs among the communities who call themselves Alevi. First of all, all Alevis 
consider themselves Muslims and they believe that the prophet Mohammed is the 
representative of God. However, their religious practices and beliefs differ significantly from 
Sunni and Shi’ite interpretations of Islam. Similar to the Shi’ites, Alevis venerate Ali, the 
cousin of the Prophet Mohammed. Nevertheless, unlike Shi’ites and Sunnis they do not 
practice the Islamic duties ordered in Quran. Instead of the Quran, the Alevi belief system is 
largely inspired by the philosophy of Haci Bektashi Veli, a 13th century dervish. Although he 
was a Muslim philosopher, Haci Bektashi Veli was not trained in a religious school and did 
not agree with some common Islamic practices. He developed a version of Islam that 
synthesized Christian and Muslim religious practices. According to Bektashi philosophy, 
love, not a sovereign God, is the root and cause of all existence (Bilici 1998). The value of an 
individual is to be judged not by her/his piety as is taught in Orthodox Muslim doctrine but 
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by the love she/he bears (Melikoff 1998). Bektashism emphasizes the social and more 
egalitarian aspects of Islam. It is in favor of a “city of consensus,” where everything is shared 
and all property held in common (Bilici 1998). The categorical imperative of this philosophy 
is contained in the expression eline, diline, beline sahip ol, meaning: control your hands (do 
not steal), control your tongue (do not lie) and control your loins (do not commit adultery). In 
brief, basic principles of Bektashi philosophy are more concerned with peace keeping than 
showing reverence to the God and its alleged representatives in the word (Cornell 2006).  
Alevis do not accept sharia law, the law of the Quran. They, accordingly, reject the 
religious duties described by the Quran as conditions of being a Muslim.5 In addition, 
unlike other Muslim groups, they do not accept the mosque as a place of worship and 
therefore do not attend mosque. They, instead practice their religious ceremonies either in 
private houses or in larger houses called cem evi (gathering house). As different from 
Sunni and Shi’ite forms of prayer, which are performed individually in various kneeling 
positions, Alevi prayers take the form of an ecstatic whirling dance called semah 
performed by men and women together. There is no requirement for women to wear a veil 
during the prayer. Furthermore, radically different from Sunni and Shi’te traditions, 
drinking alcohol during or after the semah is a part of a religious ritual among some Alevi 
communities (Bozkurt 1990, Öztürkmen 2005, Tambar 2010). 
The price Alevis have had to pay for their critical stance against the dictates of the 
Quran has been a heavy one. For refusing the law of the Father/God, they have been 
accused of breaking the incest taboo, the “universal” and “natural law” of humanity. They 
have been stigmatized as perverts who participate in orgies with their parents, children and 
siblings during cem gatherings. However, it was not until the 16th century that the Alevi 
community’s rejection of the sharia law was considered a sign of heresy. In other words, it 
was not until they rebelled against another Father, the Ottoman Sultan, that they were 
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accused of breaking the allegedly universal law of the humanity, and thus considered as 
the illegitimate and or/undesired members of the Muslim community. Ottoman stigmas 
associated with Alevis still survive in the shape of rumors, prejudices and deprecatory 
judgments (Altunsu 2007, Erdemir et.al 2013, Sirin 2013, Zeidan 1999). For instance, in 
Turkey there is a stereotypical belief called “the candle went off” (mum sondu). According 
to this belief Alevis turn of all the lights and engage in incestuous relationships during 
semah. 
 
Alevis: against the Ottoman Sultan 
When the Turkish migration to/invasion of Anatolia started in 1071, the majority of 
the Anatolian population was Christian. The Turkish tribes were heterogeneous in terms of 
their religious believes. Some were shamanistic and the others believed in various 
interpretations of Islam. Until the 16th century, there had been no clear-cut separation of 
heterodoxy from the orthodoxy in the Ottoman State (Kafadar 1995). Until then the 
Ottoman rulers “did not need to correct the Islam of [their] subjects” (Kafadar 1995:72). 
The orthodoxy and heterodoxy schism dates back to the establishment of the Safavid State 
near the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16th century. 
Around 1500, Shah Ismail founded a new state ruling the Eastern Anatolia, 
Azerbaijan, and Iran. As the leader of a Shi’ite mystical religious order, he sought 
supporters in Anatolia and contacted local religious and/or spiritual leaders. The early 16th 
century was also an era of peasant discontent in Anatolia. The poor peasants of Anatolia 
were discontent with the Ottoman State’s harsh taxation and land expropriation policies. 
Nomads were also unhappy about Ottoman rule as the Ottoman government was forcing 
them to leave their traditional life styles and to settle down. Accordingly, the early 1500s 
witnessed a series of peasant and nomad revolts in Anatolia. The Shah was seen as a 
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messiah who would bring justice by some of the Anatolian peasants. These peasants and 
nomads, finding the Shah’s call for building a more just society attractive, sided with the 
Shah Ismail. They fought against the Ottoman soldiers beside the Shah’s army 
(Karolewski 2008). The revolts were suppressed with the killing of around fifty thousand 
peasants and nomads. In this process, around fifteen thousand people from Anatolia left 
for the Safavid State to live under the rule of Shah Ismail6 (Öz 1992).   
After the suppression of the revolts, Ottoman rulers adopted legalistic Sunnism7 as 
Ottoman state doctrine (Karolewski 2008). These revolts were the starting point of anti-
Alevi attitudes in the Ottoman Empire (Karolewski 2008, Shindeldecker 1998). The very 
designation of Alevis as a distinct religious group dates back to these revolts. In order to 
refer to the followers of the Shah Ismail in the Ottoman lands, they coined the term 
Kizilbas (red head).8 In Ottoman documents, Kizilbas9 is used in a pejorative sense to 
mean “heretics,” “heretic rebels” and “allies of the Safavids” (Aksoy 2008, Melikoff 1998, 
Olsson et.al 1998). The Sultan of the time, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Sultan Yavuz), registered 
all the Kizilbas on Ottoman soil and obtained two fetvas, formal religious ordinances, by 
influential theologians, condemning Kizilbas and sanctioning their persecution (Imber 
1979, Karolewski 2008, Kehl-Bodrogi 2003). The fetvas declared, “a Muslim’s individual 
duty was to kill Kizilbases” and that Kizilbases are “even worse than infidels” (Sahin 
2001:35). Additionally, with these fetvas Ottoman rulers pronounced themselves “the 
defenders of Sunni Islam against the Safavid Shi’a State and the related heterodox sects 
and orders” (Sahin 2001: 35). Sultan Yavuz killed more than forty thousand Kizilbases in 
the Ottoman lands (Ergul 2012, Lowry 2013, Parlar 2005). Following severe persecution 
and massacres, “Kizilbas went underground using dissimulation as a means for self-
protection” (Sahin 2001:40). They retreated to isolated rural areas, usually infertile, 
mountainous, hard-to-reach regions and turned more and more inward, developing their 
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unique structures and doctrines.10 In addition, many Alevis assimilated into Sunnism and 
relinquished their heterodox beliefs (Karolewski 2008).   
  As Erdemir (2008) demonstrates, the memory of Sultan Yavuz’s massacre still 
informs the Alevi collective identity in Turkey. In addition, Ottoman-Safavid conflict has 
informed, hence legitimized, the anti-Alevi attitudes in modern Turkey. For instance, the 
Muslim youth who participated in the violent attacks against the Alevis during the 1960s 
and 1970s, referred to the conflict by chanting “[k]eep history in mind. You used to say 
Shah, Shah… Now you no longer go to the Shah but to communism. We will prevent this” 
(Bozkurt 2000:98).  Moreover, recent debates about the name of a third bridge to be built 
over the Bosporus brought Sultan Yavuz’s massacre back into the memories of Alevis 
once again. Prime Minister Erdogan, in May 29, 2013, announced the government’s 
decision to name the third bridge after Yavuz Sultan Selim. Reacting to criticism from the 
Alevi community, Erdogan argued that Sultan Yavuz was an excellent warrior and that it 
was an honor for him to announce that the bridge would be named after such a brilliant 
commander.11 
Studies on Alevis have shown that Kizilbas groups disappeared from the scene 
until the 19th century and they lived in a state of isolation (Karolewski 2008, Melikoff 
1998, Sahin 2001, Zeidan 1999). Thus, we cannot learn if there were any encounters 
between Ottoman state officials, such as tax collectors, law-enforcers and soldiers, and 
Alevis between the 16th and 19th centuries. There is only one small-scale study conducted 
on official attitudes towards the Alevi community in that period (Öz 1995). This research 
is a collection of Ottoman official orders about the Alevi community. According to this 
study, the fetva announced during the Sultan Yavuz era remained in effect until the 19th 
century. The study demonstrates that there were incidents where some Ottoman subjects 
wrote to the Sultan, informing him that they had encountered Alevis. In such cases, the 
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Sultans ordered them to kill those persons after they made certain that they were Alevis. 
However, this study does not provide any information about whether Ottoman soldiers and 
law enforcers actually visited Alevi villages or not. 
 In the 19th century, during the years of Ottoman modernization, Sultan 
Abdulhamid II developed assimilationist policies targeting heterodox Muslim 
communities such as Kizilbases, Yezidis and Nusayris. The Abdulhamid II government 
financed the construction of mosques in the villages populated by Alevis. Sunni Imams 
were appointed in these mosques in order to teach Kizilbases the “true path to Islam” 
(Deringil 1998).12 The founders of the Republic of Turkey and their followers inherited 
both Abulhamid II’s assimilationist policies and Sultan Yavuz’s destructive policies 
against Kizilbases.  
 
Dersim Massacre 
As I discuss in the following chapter, the founders of the Republic of Turkey were 
intolerant of local power holders. The founding years of the Republic of Turkey witnessed 
several waves of violence against communities that had been ruled autonomously for 
centuries. As I demonstrate in Chapter III, in the 1930s, a decade after the establishment of 
the new state, the Turkish army gained territorial control in all parts of Turkey except 
Dersim, the sole exclusively Alevi-populated province of Turkey.13 In order to bring 
Dersim effectively under the authority of the central government, the Turkish founding 
elites committed one of the greatest massacres in the history of the Republic of Turkey.  
 In their attempt to monopolize violence and law in Dersim, the government of the 
time placed Dersim under a military governor in 1935. In addition, thousands of citizens 
from Dersim were deported and resettled in western Turkey. However, in spite of the 
deportations and the military rule, the Turkish army did not succeed in taking control in 
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Dersim.14 The tribes of Dersim, which “had never been subdued by any previous 
government,” (Van Bruinessen 1994:2) were reluctant to give up in the face of the Turkish 
army’s interventions in the region. They organized a series of rebellions against the 
government. In 1938, after two years of clashes between the soldiers and local militias, 
Dersim was air bombed.15 Around 13,000 people from Dersim lost their lives due to the 
air bombings and a further 3,470 people were deported to western provinces (Van 
Bruinessen 1994:2).16 Before the Dersim Massacre, the Gendarme General Chiefdom 
prepared a “Dersim Report.” This report clearly demonstrates that the founders of the 
Republic inherited the anti-Alevi attitudes of the Ottoman era and considered the Alevis 
internal enemies. The Report defined Alevism as a major threat to Turkishness and 
argued,“Kizilbas does not like Sunni Muslims, feeds a hostility to Sunnis” and, thus 
“Kizilbas is the enemy of Sunnis” (cited in Sahin 2001: 36).  
 
Assimilationist policies targeting Alevis in Modern Turkey 
 The founders of the Republic of Turkey declared that their aim was to build a 
modern, secular nation-state. As they believed that the principles of secularism were the 
best guarantors of putting an end to the discrimination they have faced for centuries, Alevi 
communities welcomed the establishment of the Republic (Krisztina-Bodrogi 2003). 
Studies on secularism in Turkey demonstrate that secularism of the founding elites not 
only aimed to restrict the political role of religion but also to bring religion under the 
control of the central authority (Berkes 1964, Gole 1996, Keyman 2007, Mardin 1981). In 
their attempts to take control of religious affairs, the founding elites prohibited popular 
interpretations of Islam and encouraged “a new nationalist, modernized version of Sunni 
Islam” (Parla and Davison 2008: 64). They closed popular religious centers and shrines 
used by both Sunni and Alevi brotherhoods, suppressed unorthodox influential dervish or 
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mystical orders, abolished locally-based religious education and executed esteemed 
unorthodox local religious leaders (Acikel and Ates 2011: 723).  
The new ruling elites did not recognize Alevis as an official minority group and 
they continue not to be so recognized.17 As Kurban (2003) notes, the Alevis’ not being 
recognized as an official minority “effectively [has] exclude[d] the Alevis from the 
protection of rights granted to other religious minorities” (Kurban 2003:182). Alevi 
religious institutions do not enjoy legal status in Turkey. For instance, although it is legal 
to open churches and synagogues, it is still illegal to open a cem house as a place of 
worship in Turkey.18 Additionally, throughout different periods in the history of modern 
Turkey, various governments continued the tradition of Abdulhamid II by opening 
mosques in Alevi villages (Kiesser 2002, Krisztina-Bodrogi 1993 et.al 1997). For 
instance, soon after the coup of 1980, the Directory of Religious Affairs built hundreds of 
new mosques, and appointed imams in Alevi towns. In those years, in many central 
Anatolian villages Alevis were given the choice between allowing a mosque to be built or 
being deprived of basic amenities such as roads, clean water and schools (Cakır and Bozan 
2005). It was not until 2011, under intense pressure from the EU on the issue,19 that either 
history or the religious course books mentioned Alevis.20 In brief, as Kurban (2003) notes 
“the state involvement in religious affairs not only exclude[d] Alevis from public space in 
which to practice and teach their religion, but also trie[d] to ‘bring the Alevis into the 
Sunni fold’ (Van Bruinessen 1996)” (187). 
Alevis’ attempts to gain public visibility have been suppressed by a series of 
violent nationalist and Islamist attacks. For instance, one of the first Alevi festivals 
organized to celebrate Alevi cultural values ended with a massacre in 1993. In July 1993, 
Alevis organized a festival commemorating Pir Sultan Abdal, the Alevi poet-rebel of the 
16th century. An angry mob chanting Islamist slogans attacked the hotel, where many 
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Alevi intellectuals and artists were staying during the festival. The crowd set the building 
on fire and thirty-seven people lost their lives. Today, with the exception of just one 
lawyer, all of the lawyers who defended those responsible for the deaths are now members 
of the governing party, the AKP. Eight of these lawyers are deputies in parliament. To 
make things worse, one of the lawyers of the mob organizers, Sevket Kazan served as 
Minister of Justice in 1996 and 1997 (Kose 2010). As I discuss in Chapter VI, the ongoing 
violence in Narova gives rise to the perception that violence is an inevitable fate among 
Alevi youth. Needless to say, the examples above have been influential in the 
development of such perceptions.  
 
Habitus of local law making: Cem gatherings as local courts 
As students of Alevism argue, Alevis’ rejection of sharia law, their unorthodox 
beliefs and practices and their revolt against the Ottoman state are the reasons behind the 
continuing anti-Alevi attitudes in Turkey (Benhabib and Isiksel 2006, Gunes-Ayata 1992, 
Karalowski 2008, Vorhoff 2003). However, I think that there is a less visible reason 
behind continuing anti-Alevi policies that remains unexplored by scholars. Local 
lawmaking and law-maintaining practices of Alevi communities, which has been 
transferred through generations, have been influential in their demonization by the ruling 
elites. To support this hypothesis, I argue that local lawmaking and law-maintaining 
practices are deeply structured in Alevi culture. These practices have become a habitus of 
the community. This habitus, preventing Ottoman and Turkish law enforcers from 
intervening in the Alevi community, contributed to their stigmatization by the ruling elites. 
Unfortunately, there are no thoroughly-researched and analyzed studies on Alevi local 
lawmaking and law-maintaining practices.21 However, oral history projects and 
anthropological studies on rural Alevi communities illustrate that Alevi communities 
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traditionally had their own law and order mechanisms that rendered certain aspects of the 
central law, especially those related to maintaining everyday order, inapplicable among 
Alevi communities (Bozkurt 1998, Shakland 2007, Yıldırım 2010). According to these 
studies, and according to the interviews I conducted in Narova, local religious men called 
dedes22 actively eschewed appealing to Ottoman and Turkish officials and their courts, 
trying instead to “keep the community going without appealing to the state security forces 
and without state support.” (Bozkurt 1998:85). Cem gatherings had functioned as a “local 
court,” where people discussed and resolved their problems under the guidance of the 
dedes. Hence, dede not only lead the religious ceremonies, but they used to have the 
judicial authority to settle disputes and issue punishments in local settings. In other words, 
dedes had local/ autonomous law enforcement, law preserving and punishment roles. As 
Shakland (2010) puts it, Alevism is “a system of thought which claims legal authority” 
(35). Alevis rarely identify with the state, and seek to define their social order according to 
their own tradition. Rather than following the Quran as the book of law, Alevis’ 
authoritative account is based on the book called Buyruk23 (Yıldırım 2010; Shankland 
2010; Karakaya-Stump 2010). There are multiple different copies of Buyruk and as 
Karakaya-Stump 2010 notes, these texts are not treated as a prime resource but rather as 
an aide-me´moire. Besides, the Buyruk does not offer detailed and exact information about 
punishment (Yıldırım 2010). Hence, Alevi law enforcement is not only autonomous from 
the central state but Alevi law enforcers also have certain autonomy within the Alevi 
community, as there are various interpretations of the Alevi law.   
Yıldırım (2010),24 in his study on Alevi legal systems,25 demonstrates that law 
enforcers of the central authorities had traditionally been considered outsiders among Alevi 
communities. One had to avoid sharing any information with the “outsiders’ judiciary.” If a 
community member committed a crime, Alevis traditionally hid it from the Ottoman and 
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Turkish law enforcers and applied their own judgment and punishment processes in solving 
the case.  Accordingly, one of the biggest crimes within Alevi communities was appealing to 
the state’s courts, to the “outside court.” Anyone who went to the state court instead of going 
to the traditional courts would be excluded from the community. Unfortunately, there are no 
anthropological studies on the operation of the local courts in the villages. In addition, there 
are no studies which analyze the ways in which cem gatherings had challenged the Ottoman 
and Turkish central authorities. Acknowledging that this subject requires further research, I 
still want to make some comments on the challenging effects of the local courts. As I 
demonstrate throughout this dissertation, law is affirmative of power. Law as a “distant but 
overwhelming” (cf. Das and Poole 2004) power addresses the power holders. Alevi local 
courts held in cem houses, by preventing Ottoman and Turkish soldiers, police and judiciary 
from intervening in the Alevi community might have stood as an obstacle in front of the 
central authorities’ affirmation of their power among the Alevi community. This is probably 
why Ottoman rulers were strictly against the cem gatherings.26 Moreover, this is probably one 
of the reasons why opening a cem house as a place of worship is still illegal in Turkey.  
Yildirim (2010) argues that cem gatherings doubling as local courts survived until 
the early 1970s, until rural-to-urban migration and left-wing politicization led to the 
breakdown of the dede system27 (see also Camuroglu 1997, Masscard 2012). However, the 
1970s witnessed the establishment of new kinds of local courts in the newly emerging 
Alevi populated working class neighborhoods of the big cities. These were the local courts 
established by Alevi youth, who rapidly filled the ranks of socialist organizations when 
they arrived in big cities. 
 
Alevis and Leftist politics 
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Alevis have been known for their support of leftist organizations since the early 1960s when 
socialist movement became popular in Turkey. In fact, as Markussen (2012) argues, being a 
leftist became a part of the Alevi identity by the 1960s and it continues to be so. Before 
pointing out how Alevis began to take active part in socialist organizations, I discuss the 
emergence working class neighborhoods in Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s. These years 
were the years of rapid urbanization in Turkey. In these years, the technological innovations 
in the rural areas decreased the need for agricultural labor. Thousands lost their jobs and 
migrated to big cities in search of jobs in the newly established factories28  (Senyapili 198, 
Keyder 1987). In the absence of any state or factory sponsored worker housing projects, the 
new dwellers of the city constructed their own makeshift shanty houses called gecekondu.29 
In a short time, gecekondu neighborhoods flourished in Turkey's large urban areas.30 The 
building of gecekondu neighborhoods at first faced strong opposition from the government. 
However, as the rural migrants provided a cheap means of cutting the labor deficit at the 
time, they gradually began to be accepted. The massive and rapid proletarianization of the 
city contributed to the development of the socialist movement (Yonucu 2008). Soon after 
their establishment, gecekondu neighborhoods became the centers of the socialist 
mobilization and hundreds of thousands of gecekondu residents were organized under 
revolutionary Marxist organizations (Aksoy 2008, Aslan 2004, Gonen and Yonucu 2011, 
Yonucu 2008). Although Marxist organizations gained support in many of the gecekondu 
neighborhoods, the main centers of the urban guerrilla struggle were Alevi-populated 
gecekondu neighborhoods. Studies of the relationship between leftist organizations and 
Alevis demonstrate that in addition to their working-class identity there are other reasons 
behind Alevis’ sympathy for leftist politics (Aksoy 2008, Jongerden 2003, Van Bruinessen 
1996). According to these studies, the memory of the massacres of Alevis is one of the main 
reasons underlying this sympathy. Socialist and communist criticism of state domination 
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easily gained the support of Alevis who saw themselves as victims of state domination 
(Yildiz and Verkuyten 2011). Moreover, socialist and communist discourses, which 
criticized religion in general, but more importantly Sunni Islam in particular,31 was another 
aspect that made leftist calls to action attractive to Alevis. In addition, as Van Bruinessen 
(1996) argues “the radical left, perceiving in the Alevi rebellions of the past proto-
communist movements, saw the Alevis as its natural allies” (9) and invested resources in 
gaining supporters from the Alevi population. The Alevi identification with left-wing 
movements contributed to their further stigmatization as internal enemies (Acikel and Ates 
2011, Markussen 2012).  
After the massacres of the 16th century it wasn’t until the 1960s that Alevis began to 
leave their remote and isolated villages and move to towns populated by Sunni Muslims.32 
Some Alevis directly migrated to big industrial cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. Others 
migrated to the Sunni towns close to their villages. However, these towns were not safe 
places for Alevis. As Alevis became engaged with socialist politics, they were perceived as 
a security threat to “the religious, ethnic, and political identity of the nation” (Dressler 
2008: 285). Alevis, along with Kurds and communists, were labeled as one of the three 
main threats to national security in the official discourse (Erdemir 2004).33 Accordingly, 
they became the targets of nationalist and Islamist attacks. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
small Anatolian towns and cities such as Malatya, Corum, Sivas, Tokat and Maras 
witnessed a series of anti-Alevi pogroms organized by Islamists and nationalists. As a result 
of these pogroms, several hundred Alevis were killed and thousands of shops and houses 
owned by Alevis were destroyed. There was also an economic dimension to the pogroms. 
As Alevis began to be successful in business, Sunni populations considered Alevis as their 
rivals. The stigmatization of Alevis as communists and atheists paved the way for local 
business people to eliminate their economic rivals under the pretext of defending the 
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country from the “communist threat” (Bozarslan 2003, Oktem 2008, Smith 2005). Military 
officials and some high-ranking bureaucrats at the time interpreted these pogroms as 
spontaneous acts motivated by “understandable” religious and nationalist sentiments of the 
citizens (Van Bruinessen 2000). Consequently, punishments received by the organizers and 
participants of the pogroms were disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses.34 The Alevi 
community interpreted these pogroms and government officials’ responses to them as 
evidence of the continuation of “the state’s hostility” against Alevis (Bozarslan 2003). 
Hence, such pogroms contributed to the Alevis’ further distancing themselves from what 
they have perceived as the state and to increasing Alevi participation in leftist organizations. 
As a result of the pogroms, thousands of Alevis migrated to big industrial cities, where they 
could build their own gecekondu houses and live with their relatives and fellow villagers 
(Aksoy 2008).   
 
Emergence of Working Class Alevi Populated neighborhoods 
As studies of gecekondu neighborhoods in Turkey demonstrate, familial ties are 
influential in rural migrants’ decisions about where to settle in the city. Rural migrants 
usually move to places where their relatives or fellow-villagers have already settled in 
(Erder 1997, Erman 1998, Fliche 2009, Tugal 2009). This is particularly true of Alevis. In 
order to find a secure place in the city, Alevi migrants moved to the gecekondu areas, 
where some of their relatives or fellow-villagers had already settled. In time, they built 
new gecekondu neighborhoods, which predominantly consist of Alevis.35 These 
neighborhoods were built with the help of the socialist college students. All of my 
informants who were socialist college students in the 1970s told me that they considered 
the Alevi community as the most oppressed group in Turkey. They, therefore, felt it was 
their responsibility to help Alevi migrants find shelter in the city. Additionally, shortly 
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after they moved to the city, young Alevi migrants joined socialist organizations. This, 
consequently, made the socialist college youth more aware of the housing problems of 
Alevis. 
Construction of these neighborhoods faced strong opposition from the government. 
The second half of the 1970s, witnessed the establishment of a number of gecekondu 
neighborhoods, such as 1 Mayis,36 Gazi, Guzeltepe, Nurtepe, Cayan,37 Gulsuyu, Armutlu 
and Okmeydani, associated with Alevis and socialist organizations. Throughout the 1970s, 
these neighborhoods witnessed a constant fight between the soldiers who came to 
demolish the houses and the people who wanted to protect their houses. The soldiers went 
to these neighbourhoods so frequently that, as a middle aged Narova resident Ihsan relates, 
even the children were taking part in the fight against the soldiers. Ihsan tells his story: 
When I was a small kid, my friends and I used to go and play in the empty land at the 
outskirts of the neighborhood. We sometimes would hear the sounds of panzers 
driving towards the neighborhood. They were coming to demolish our houses. We 
would start running towards the neighborhood, shouting ‘the state is coming!’ The 
women of the neighborhood, who heard our voices, would start collecting stones to 
throw at the panzers.  We kids were also collecting stones to throw at the soldiers. 
 
As Ihsan’s words illustrate, in these neighbourhoods, from the very beginning the state has 
been experienced as an external force with destructive capacities against which one has to 
protect herself/himself. 
 In addition to the government’s continuous attempts to demolish the 
neighbourhoods, these neighborhoods were not officially recognized until the early 1980s. 
Thus, until the 1980s, there were no schools, no hospitals and no police stations, and no 
government-sponsored infrastructural services, such as water, electricity, sewage, etc., in 
these neighborhoods. With the absence of any government sponsored infrastructural and 
social services, the socialist students and professionals occupied the place left empty by 
the government. Urban planning students helped the residents in urban planning-related 
issues, doctors and medical students provided the residents with free health care services 
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and education students and teachers provided the residents with alternative education. The 
lack of any government sponsored social and infrastructural services and regular attacks 
by soldiers, which sometimes resulted in the killings of the residents,38 further reinforced 
the perceptions that the state was against Alevis. As I illustrate in Chapter V, this 
perception still continues today.  
 
Alternative Local Security:  Revolutionary People’s Committee  
Soon after the establishment of Narova and other predominantly Alevi neighbourhoods, 
the residents established people’s committees and people’s courts attached to these 
committees. The members of the people’s committees were elected mostly, if not 
exclusively, among male Narova residents.39 Yasin, a 72-year-old male Narova resident 
explains why they felt the need to form a people’s committee in the neighborhood: 
The soldiers were coming to the neighbourhood to demolish our houses. We had to 
stand together against the state. The state [soldiers] killed the people who wanted 
to protect their houses. But we were organized. We got together and discussed what 
had to be done. We had to stand united. Otherwise, they would not let us stay here. 
They did not want us in here. We decided to form a public committee. We also had 
to defend ourselves against fascist attacks. The residents of the neighbourhood next 
to ours were all fascists. They were watching the neighbourhood and when they 
caught us alone, they would beat us. The state was behind them. The state has 
always been behind them! Nothing has changed! Similar things were happening in 
other Alevi neighbourhoods.  Anyway, we got together and talked about what to 
do. Most of us were already organized. We decided to form a committee to defend 
ourselves. All of the revolutionary organizations organized in this neighbourhood 
had representatives in the committee.  
  
As the citation above illustrates, the people’s committees were formed first and foremost for 
security reasons. 40As the government did not officially recognize the neighbourhood, there 
were no police stations in the neighbourhood. In the absence of any police to keep the 
peace, the residents of Narova and of similar neighbourhoods formed their own local 
policing groups. Additionally, the presence of the police would not have made them feel 
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more secure. For instance, when I asked Yasin whether the police were helping them in the 
case of “fascist” attacks, he got angry and said:  
 
Police! What police? Where on earth did you see that the police helped the 
revolutionaries?  The police are against the revolutionaries. Police mean the state, the 
bourgeois state. Police protect the bourgeoisie and the state, not the poor, not the 
revolutionaries. Police only bring trouble to the poor. 
 
 Yasin’s response to my question about the police is representative of Narova residents’ 
views of the police. In the very first weeks of my fieldwork in Narova, I learned not to use 
the words police and help in the same sentence. I learned that police represent nothing but 
violence in Narova.  
In order to protect themselves from the violence of soldiers41 and “fascists,” 
people’s committees formed volunteer neighbourhood patrolling groups, consisting of 
young male residents most of whom were members of socialist organizations. Soon after 
the formation of these committees, Narova and similar neighbourhoods began to be known 
as liberated zones––zones liberated from the police, hence state control. These groups 
watched the peripheries of the neighbourhoods. They would check if there were any 
soldiers, unknown groups or strangers coming towards the neighbourhood. If they saw any 
unfamiliar people approaching to the neighbourhood they would investigate them before 
they let them in. This was because they were afraid that any stranger could be an 
undercover policeman or a member of the national intelligence agency who came to the 
neighbourhood to collect information about the revolutionary organizations. The only non-
residents who were allowed to go to Narova and similar neighbourhoods were either the 
relatives of the residents or members of revolutionary organizations known by the 
residents. Although Narova residents do not want to talk about the issue, there are rumours 
that the People’s Committee killed five right-wing soldiers. When faced with larger 
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groups and soldiers, the patrolling groups would blow their whistles and the community 
would gather to stand united against the attacks.   
Although Narova residents were reluctant to talk about violent acts committed by 
these neighbourhood patrolling groups, there are rumours that these groups committed acts 
of violence while trying to protect their neighbourhoods.42 For instance, Aslan (2004) in 
his study on the establishment of the May Day neighbourhood argues that there were 
rumours that some members of the people’s committee killed five right-wing workers who 
wanted to enter the neighbourhood. Aslan argues that the right-wing newspapers 
fabricated the story. These newspapers’ aim was to turn public opinion against the 
neighbourhood. However, many middle-aged socialists today admit that the use of 
violence among socialist communities was common during the 1970s.   
We can argue that the Alevis, who went underground and lived isolated lives to 
protect themselves from Ottoman soldiers for centuries, continued to live in a similar way, 
only this time in the big cities of Turkey. The overlap of the socialist struggle’s demands 
to go underground and the continuation of anti-Alevi attitudes furthered the isolation of 
Alevis in urban areas throughout the 1970s. However, we cannot claim that Alevis lived in 
total isolation in those years. As I argued above, revolutionary college students and 
professionals regularly visited these neighbourhoods to help the residents to improve their 
living conditions. In addition, these students organized political discussions and artistic 
activities, such as performances, plays, and concerts in these places. Thus, Alevi-
populated working-class neighbourhoods were also places that allowed encounters 
between the middle class – and even the upper class – and the working class Alevis in the 
1970s.  
In addition to protecting the neighbourhood from possible attacks the committee 
also established people’s courts. These courts functioned as places where the internal 
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disputes among the residents were solved. In line with the Alevi local court tradition, the 
residents, instead of going to the state courts, would take their problems to the people’s 
courts organized by the people’s committees. For instance, if someone stole something 
from her/his neighbour, the neighbour would go to the members of the local committee 
and the committee members would assemble a public court. Although people’s courts 
were ideally open to the participation of all residents,43 all of the elderly Narova residents I 
interviewed argued that they were actually led by nine or ten men, all of whom were 
representatives of various socialist organizations. The courts were open to the participation 
of all residents. However, the decision-making process was hierarchically organized. 
Those who led the courts made the decisions. 
 These public courts also had alternative punishment techniques. For instance, if 
someone had stolen something from a neighbour she/he first had to inform the audience 
about the motivation for his/her criminal act. According to the explanation s/he provides, 
s/he either would be warned about not committing such a crime again or was told to return 
twice as much as the value of the stolen thing.  Or, if a man had beaten his wife he had to 
stay away from the house he shares with his wife and children for a week.44 As I discuss in 
Chapter VI, alternative internal security and punishment techniques still continue in the 
neighbourhood. Hence, from the beginning of its establishment the residents of Narova 
and other Alevi-populated neighbourhoods developed their own local law and punishment 
mechanisms that emerged as an alternative to that of the central authority.  
As studies on Alevi engagement in left-wing politics demonstrate, when Alevi 
migrants —especially younger generations— devoted themselves to revolutionary Marxist 
ideologies they pushed religious and identity issues aside. Arguing that in order to be a 
good socialist one has to be an atheist, they did not make claims based on their Alevi 
	  	   69	  
identity (Melikoff and Kehl Bodrogi 1997, Seufert 1997, Carkoglu and Bilgili 2011). This 
attitude still continues among the socialist youth of Narova.  
 Nevertheless, many senior residents who have witnessed the operation of the 
people’s courts confused the people’s court of the 1970s with the Alevi local courts that 
were held in the villages. When I asked about the operation of the people’s court in the 
neighborhood, some residents argued that the original people’s courts took place in the 
villages and suggested that I go to the villages and interview the seniors there. It is also 
worth noting that all of the people’s courts established in the working class neighborhoods 
during the 1970s were established in Alevi neighborhoods. I believe that the establishment 
of people’s courts exclusively in Alevi-populated neighborhoods and Narova residents’ 
confusing of these two courts are more than coincidences. Although there were similarities 
between traditional Alevi and the people’s courts, the founders of the courts ignore and/or 
deny these similarities, probably because they wanted to be associated with the socialist 
tradition more than the Alevi tradition. Although the people’s courts were established with 
reference to socialist ideals, Alevi local court tradition and the practices shaped around 
this tradition might have been influential in establishing these courts. In other words, 
Alevi migrants’ attempts to provide law and order in their new social settings during the 
1970s may be due to their inherited cultural practices and institutions. Such practices, 
which have survived to this day, can be seen as an Alevi habitus—a centuries long, 
embodied “structured structure” (Bourdieu 1985).  
  The people’s committees and the courts were abolished after the coup of 1980.  
Members of these committees as well as many other Narova residents were either 
imprisoned or had to leave the country. The coup suppressed political mobilization all 
around the country. In the 1980s, the government brought infrastructural services to Narova 
and other neighborhoods alike and opened schools and hospitals in these neighborhoods. As 
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the socialist organizations began to reorganize in these neighborhoods during the 1990s, 
these neighborhoods gradually turned into state of emergency zones. In Chapter VI, I 
discuss the ways in which Narova became a state of emergency zone. However, before that, 
in order to situate my arguments in a broader political and historical context, in the 
following chapter I illustrate how violence and state of emergency policies are integral to 
the tradition of rule in Turkey.  
 
 Conclusion  
This chapter focuses on the Alevi religio-cultural identity and point out historical 
Alevi practices/habitus and beliefs that turned Alevis into constant targets of political 
violence. I argued that the first step of Alevis' stigmatization as internal enemies took 
place when Ottoman rulers adopted legalist Sunnism as the state religion as opposed to the 
Shi’ite order in the Safavid State, the enemy-neighbor of the Ottoman state. In this process 
the poor peasants of Anatolia, who had more synthetic beliefs and who sided with the 
Safavid state and rebelled against the Ottoman rulers due to the harsh taxation policies of 
the Ottoman state, were labeled as heretics who threatened the security of Ottoman 
subjects. The Sultan Yavuz massacre against this allegedly heretical population has been 
influential in the Kizilbas/Alevi retreat to mountainous isolated areas, which paved the 
way for the underground/illegal law and order making processes among Alevi 
communities. I demonstrate that Alevi communities left their isolated villages only in the 
1960s, almost 500 hundred years after the retreat. Alevis, who became workers in the big 
cities of Turkey in the 1960s, received support from young revolutionary middle class 
militants, and eventually became integral to leftist politics in Turkey. In time, being a 
leftist became an inseparable part of the Alevi identity.  
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In addition, while demonstrating how Alevi communities have remained at the 
margins of the law and orders of the central authorities for centuries, I pointed out the 
traditional Alevi lawmaking and law maintaining practices that later survived in the big 
cities in the form of revolutionary people’s courts. I approach these practices as an Alevi 
habitus, a centuries long, embodied “structured structure.” I argue that these practices still 
inform attempts on the part of Narova youth to deactivate police power and provide their 
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1 Sunnism is the dominant, Orthodox form of Islam. 
 
2 Although a significant percent of Alevi communities are Kurdish speaking, the Kurdish speaking Alevis, do 
not consider themselves as Kurds in general. In other words they experience Kurdishness and Aleviness as two 
mutually exclusive identities. See Van Bruinessen 1996, Leezenberg 2003. 
 
3 According to the official records of Turkish Statistics Institute, the population of Turkey was 75.627.384 in 
2012. Information available at 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Start.do;jsessionid=fdKJRW3Qb0ddJgvZKgzv2m8pJSMC64hm3WpHrh7kcTNy61s7T
QtJ!1324812529.  Last accessed: May 16, 2013.  
 
 
5 According to the Quran, the conditions of being a Muslim are: 1) Believing in God and Muhammad as the 
messenger of the God 2) Praying daily 3) Fasting in the month of Ramadan 4) Alms giving 5) Pilgrimage to 
Mecca. Alevis only observe the first one.   
 
6 One of the most repeated themes in traditional Alevi songs is the longing for going to the Shah. 
 
7 Until then, the law and order in Ottoman lands were maintained through local customary laws. With the 
adoption of sharia law, Ottoman subjects were subjected to a dual legal system until the 19th century. 
Community related matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance were solved within the community under 
the guidance of the customary laws of each community. However, criminal offenses related to maintenance of 
social order, such as thievery, murder, and banditry, were subjected to the sharia law regardless of the ethnic, 
religious or communal identity of the accused.   
 
8 The term Kizilbas was drawn from the red headpiece with twelve gores commemorating the Twelve Imams, 
who were considered holy figures according to Shi’ite beliefs. The red headpiece was used to show allegiance to 
the Shah by Ottoman peasants (Faroqhi 2006). 
 
9 The term Kizilbas was replaced by the term Alevi in the 1920s. Today, Alevis use Kizilbas and Alevi 
interchangeably (Dressler 2013). 
 
10 These villages were mostly located in the hard-to-reach areas of Kurdish or Turkish-Sunni populated towns. 
They not only were located away from the Sunni populated villages but also from one another. Today, in 
Anatolia, Alevi villages are still located at isolated and mountainous areas. 
 
11 Radikal, May 30, 2013.  
 
12 Unfortunately there are no studies on the Kizilbases’ reactions to Abdulhamid II’s assimilationist policies. 	  
13 Dersim also once had a significant Armenian population. However, after the Armenian genocide of 1915 
there were no Armenians left in the region. While a significant number of Dersim Armenians were killed during 
the genocide, the remaining ones converted to Alevism and hid their Armenian past (Deringil 2009, Van 
Bruinessen 1988). Dersim was the only exclusively Alevi populated province in the 1930s. 
 
14 In addition to the presence of well-armed tribal leaders, the other reason that Dersim remained inaccessible to 
Turkish soldiers was the location of the province. 
 
15 One of the pilots who air bombed Dersim was Sabiha Gokcen. Sabiha Gokcen was the adopted daughter of 
Ataturk and the first woman pilot of Turkey. She was actually a daughter of an Armenian family killed during 
the genocide (Kieser 2002). One of the two airports in Istanbul is named after Sabiha Gokcen. 
 
16 These people had to carry a special ID, which indicated that they were from the Dersim province of Turkey. 
As Van Bruinessen (1994) argues  “Even today, a person whose identity card shows that he was born in Tunceli 
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will be treated with suspicion and antipathy by officials and will not easily find employment.” (12). See also 
Secor 2004. 
 
17 The definition of the concepts of minority and minority rights in Turkey is based on the Treaty of Lausanne 
signed, between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes on one side, and Turkey on the other. As Oran (2007) argues, “[w]hen the League of Nations was 
formed after the First World War, a tripartite criterion was employed to define minorities in racial, linguistic and 
religious terms. Minorities fitting into any of these three categories were granted not only equal rights with the 
majority but also internationally guaranteed rights that did not apply to the majority (e.g., building their own 
schools and using their own language). […] However, the Turkish delegation in Lausanne did not accept the full 
criterion as applicable to Turkey; it recognized only ‘non-Muslims’ as constituting a minority and had this 
position accepted at the Conference.” (35). 
 
18 The first cem house with official recognition was not opened until 2007.  However, this cem house was 
opened as a cultural center, not as a place of worship (Carkoğlu and Bilgili 2011). 
 
19 With Turkey’s full accession in process, the European Union (EU) got involved in the Alevi question and 
produced progress reports criticizing the government’s unwillingness to recognize the Alevis’ cultural-religious 
rights. The EU, together with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), urged the government to end 
discrimination against Alevis (Acikel and Ates 2011). Although Alevism is now being introduced in religion 
books, the inclusion of Alevism in these books remains a mere gesture, as these books do not provide much 
information on Alevism. 
 
20 Religious instruction was originally introduced in schools in the 1940s. At first, children belonging to families 
who wished their children to attend religious instruction lessons had to bring a letter from their parents. This 
was later switched around when the 1982 constitution made it compulsory in all primary and middle schools. 
Non-Muslim students have the right to skip compulsory religion classes, Alevi students have to participate in 
the religion classes as Alevis are considered Muslims (Kuru 2007). 
 
21 Alevi local lawmaking and law-maintaining practices are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Besides, the 
Alevi legal system is neither thoroughly researched nor analyzed. Hence, it would not be correct to make a point 
about Alevi lawmaking and law-preserving practices. However, as local lawmaking processes and practices 
among Alevi youth are directly related to the subject matter of this dissertation I find it important to note that 
local lawmaking practices have been a distinctive feature integral to Alevi community.
 
22 Dede means grandfather in Turkish.  They are religious leaders, who are believed to be the descendants of the 
prophet Muhammad.  Traditionally dedes are considered superior to all men and women in Alevi 
communities.  They are also accepted as the source of knowledge as well as an intellectual leader (Caha 2004).
 
23 Buyruk means command in English. 
 
24 Yildirim is the first researcher who wrote about the Alevi legal system. However, his study does not provide a 
detailed analysis of Alevi legal systems and the ways in which they operated on the ground. 
 
25 Alevis do not have a common guidebook on the maintenance of the social order. Instead, there are different 
customary laws based on local or tribal tradition. Dede, instead of following the rules/laws shared by all Alevis, 
based his judgment on the custorory law (Caha 2004). However, Yildirim (2010) notes that Alevi communities’ 
customory laws were more or less the same.    
 
26 Cem gatherings were not allowed in the Ottoman era. Thus, these gatherings were held secretly and outsiders 
were never allowed to participate in these gatherings. As the studies on Alevi culture argue, this secrecy also 
contributed to the strengthening of stigmas associated with Alevis. 
 
27 As Bozkurt (1998) demonstrates, the authority of the dedes began to decline in the 1970s. With the adoption 
of left-wing views by Alevi youth, dedes began to be regarded as part of the system of exploitation” (86). 
 
28 During the second half of the 1950s, the population of the cities of Turkey rose 80.2% (Senyapili 1981:13) 
and one of every 10 villagers had migrated to big cities (Keyder 1987:131). Moreover, in this period, the 
number of workers who worked in factories that employed more than ten people rose from 163.000 to 324.000 
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(Keyder 1987:136).
 
29 Gecekondu literally means “perched on at night.” The term was coined by the gecekondu people themselves. 
Gecekondu shows the way in which gecekondu people at that time were naming, describing, and hence owning 
their own settlement experiences. As Karpat (1976) notes, during the 1950s and 1960s “[i]t has not been unusual 
to see empty hills covered over a single night with a great number of shacks in which tens of thousands of 
people moved with their belongings in a matter of hours” (15). 
 
30 The number of the gecekondus in Turkey: 1955: 50,000; 1960: 240,000; 1965: 430,000 1970: 600,000; 1980: 
950,000 (Payne 1984:181). 
 
31 Leftists have been particularly critical of Sunni Islam in Turkey as it has been the dominant form of Islam. 
 
32 As I discuss in the following chapter, due to the territorial control policies of the government some Alevis 
were forced to leave their villages and resettled in the Western parts of Turkey during the early 1930s. 
 
33 As Erdemir (2004) points out, the official Cold War slogan identified 3Ks, the Kurds (Kürtler), communists 
(komünistler) and the Alevis (Kizilbas), as the main threats to national security in Turkey. 
 
34 For instance, the organizers of the Maras pogrom of 1978, in which Sunni Muslims killed 107 Alevis and 
destroyed 500 houses and shops owned by Alevis, did not stay in prison for more than fifteen years (Sahin 
2001).    
 
35 The non-Alevi residents were working-class Sunni Muslims who were members of various socialist 
organizations. 
 
36 The name of the neighborhood comes from the workers' day celebrations, which traditionally take place on 
the first day of May. 
 
37 Cayan Neighborhood is named after the young revolutionary leader who was killed by the soldiers in 1972. 
 
38 In September 2, 1977, the soldiers who went to 1 Mayis Neighborhood to demolish gecekondu houses killed 
15 gecekondu dwellers (Aslan 2004). For a documentary on the event see: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kjd_blCUw0  Last accessed : August 15, 2013.  
 
39 Here, I have to note that although Bektashi philosophy emphasizes women’s equality to men, in practice 
Alevi families and communities are still structured around patriarchal relations.  See Erman (2001) for the 
patriarchal relations within the Alevi community.  
 
40 See Aslan (2004) on the neighborhood patrolling practices of the People’s Committee in 1 Mayis 
Neighborhood during the 1970s.  Aslan demonstrates that in 1 Mayis Neighborhood, too, the people’s 
committee was mainly concerned with providing security, hence with neighborhood patrolling. 
 
41 As I illustrate in the following chapter, until the 1990s, the military was in charge of the problems related to 
“internal enemies.” 
 
42 None of the elder residents of Narova wanted to talk about this issue. A 69-year-old resident told me that he 
did not want to talk about the issue because “there is no statue of limitations when it comes to political crimes in 
Turkey.” His response implies that the people’s committee in Narova engaged in violent acts. It is also 
important to note that this man considers the criminal acts, such as beating the “fascist” or threatening the 
strangers, as political crimes because leftists committed them. However, there may be one more assumption 
hidden in his argument. As I illustrate in Chapter III, being Alevi or Kurdish is considered suspect by the state’s 
security forces. We can argue that he considers such criminal acts as political crimes maybe not only because 
those who committed crime were leftist but also because they were Alevis. That is to say, in a country like 
Turkey where Alevis are generally treated as if they were guilty of wrongdoing during their encounters with 
police or the soldiers, Alevis may feel that their very presence is a political crime. Thus, a criminal act 
committed by an Alevi to defend the existence/ the very being of his community might as well be perceived as a 
political crime in this man’s mind.   
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43 According to the Bektashi philosophy, all crimes committed are committed against the community. Hence, 
the trial had to take place in front of all community members and the decision about the punishment had to be 
taken with the participation of all adult villagers.  Thus, Alevi local courts also took place with the participation 
of all villagers.   
 
44 Yildirim  (2010) shows that the logic of punishment is similar in Alevi community courts. 
 
 
	  	   76	  
 
Chapter III 
The History of Modern Turkey as the History of Emergency Rules 
 
“The Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor 
of the Republic in Turkey, which is a secular, social, and 
lawful state.” 
 Ismail Hakki Karadayi, Ex-Chief of Staff .1 
 
 “The police are the guarantor of the regime” 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister.2 
 
  
The ruling elites, who are committed to the maintenance of the idea of a unified 
powerful state (cf. Abrams 1977), actively and continuously wage war against those who 
actually or potentially delegitimize and demystify the power attributed to the state. Police 
institutions, military organizations and emergency laws have been used instrumentally 
against those who challenge the authority of the ruling elites of capitalist countries who 
are committed to perpetuating a paradigm of domination and exploitation. This chapter 
provides an outline of the Turkish ruling elites’ war against populations whom they 
consider “enemies of the state.” 
 The traditional Ottoman way of rule, which was based on the rule of the Ottoman 
territories through intermediary local powers, could not survive the era of nationalism. The 
late Ottoman rulers, who attempted to build a centralized nation state, and their successors 
saw the ethno-religiously diverse Ottoman society as an obstacle to the building of a more 
centralized modern state. Hence, in their attempts to modernize the state, the late Ottoman 
ruling elite and the Turkish nationalist elite attempted to take the territories occupied by 
non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups under their direct control through force. The forceful 
policies, which included violent destruction of the masses, led to the perception by various 
minority populations that the state is an alien and aggressive enemy. Due to the absence of 
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any reconciliatory politics, the Turkish state remained an illegitimate external force in 
some population’s minds and souls, such as Armenians, Alevis, Jews and Kurds, who 
experienced the state as a violent and aggressive enemy. Accordingly, since the 
establishment of the Republic, the Turkish ruling elites have maintained their power 
through the use of force and emergency laws that systematically and continuously suspend 
citizens’ most basic rights. In other words, modern Turkey’s history of violence has been 
more continuous than discontinuous, as the state has not considered legitimate by a 
significant percent of population. Accordingly, this chapter outlines the forceful and 
destructive policies of the Turkish ruling elite against minority populations such as 
Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, Jews and Kurds, as well as provide an outline of 
lawmaking and law maintaining violence in the history of Turkey.  
The chapter has three aims. The first aim is to demonstrate the Turkish founding 
elites’ attempts to monopolize violence by eliminating local power holders from the 
nation-state building process. I briefly illustrate how the Turkish founding elites attempted 
to establish territorial sovereignty in the Eastern provinces through a program of violence 
targeting Armenian, Assyrian and Kurdish populations, who had been ruled autonomously 
by local power holders for centuries. I specifically focus on the Eastern Provinces, because 
violence against these populations is symptomatic of the Turkish ruling elites’ attempts to 
establish territorial sovereignty in territories where they previously had no military power. 
In other words, these cases shed light on the continuing practices of the Turkish ruling 
elites when they encounter local power holders who challenge the authority of the state. 
The second aim is to provide an overview of the roles of military and emergency 
laws in Turkish political life. I illustrate how the capitalist nation-state formation process 
of Turkey has been maintained through a series of emergency laws that perpetuated 
martial law. Today, as the citations above indicate, the power of the police as an institution 
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has gradually replaced the privileged political status of the military. Accordingly, the third 
aim of the chapter is to point out the current power struggle between the high-ranking 
military officers who represent the secular founding elite and the police. 
 
Attempts to establish a centralized modern state in the Ottoman Era  
The Turkish modern nation state formation project, which was aimed at “eliminating 
and neutralizing” (Tilly 1985: 174) local powers within the imaginary national territories, 
goes back to the 19th century. Until the 19th century, various ethnic and religious 
communities, such as Armenians, Jew, Kurds and Assyrians, had autonomous self-
governance, which by and large depended on their own customary laws and preserved the 
administrative autonomy of the local ruling elites. By the 19th century, however, under the 
influence of growing nationalist movements and spirit across Europe, some Ottoman 
subjects began to organize their own nationalist independence movements against the 
Empire. By the end of the 1800s the Ottoman Empire had lost a significant portion of its 
Balkan territory, which had been under Ottoman rule for over 500 years (Erickson 2003). 
In their effort to restore their power and to protect the remaining territories, the Ottoman 
rulers strived to build a centralized state, which would bring all Ottoman subjects under 
direct Ottoman authority (Quartet 2005). However, their attempts to establish direct rule 
were not welcomed by some religious and ethnic communities, such as Armenians and 
Kurds, or by their local power holders, who had enjoyed semi-autonomous rule for 
centuries.  
In Ottoman cities and towns the monopoly of violence was often sufficient. But in 
the highland areas of the East, especially where Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians resided, 
the empire faced a series obstacles in establishing a monopoly over violence (Barkey 
2007). In these areas, the Ottoman army first attempted to take the Kurdish territories 
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under their control. However, in the Eastern provinces there were a number of tribes who 
were “able to mobilize both quantitatively and qualitatively superior resources and means 
of violence” (Ungor 2012: 747). While trying to take local Kurdish groups under their 
control, the Ottoman rulers faced another threat. This threat was the internationalization of 
the Armenian Question (Bloxham 2005). In 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed by 
The Ottoman Empire and Russia. Under this treaty, Armenian land and people came into 
the Russian sphere of influence. Afraid of the Russian-Armenian alliance and possible 
Armenian nationalist movements, the Ottomans began to consider the Armenians as the 
most important obstacle to Ottoman territorial sovereignty in the eastern provinces. In 
their fight against Armenians they “radicalized Kurdish leaders out of a fear of Armenian 
demands for political power over the eastern provinces” (Ungor 2012: 749). In this 
process, the Kurds who became afraid that the Armenians would take over control of the 
Eastern territories with military support from western imperialist powers began to fight 
against the Armenians. In 1890 The Ottoman army established a special army of Kurdish 
militias called the Hamidiye Corps (named after the Sultan Abdulhamid). With the 
establishment of the Hamidiye Corps, Kurds dismantled the Armenian local power- 
holders and took control over the Armenian territories (Deringil 1998, 12009). The 
Armenians who experienced the new Kurdish authority in their lands as an external and 
brutal force formed guerrilla units and revolted against the Ottoman-Kurdish authority.3 
The tension between the Ottoman-Kurdish rule and Armenian masses resulted in genocide 
against the Armenians. In order to pacify Armenian forces the Law of Expulsion was 
introduced in May 1915. According to this law, which specifically targeted the Armenian 
community, the whole Armenian community would be moved from their homes and 
relocated. Around one and a half million Armenians died during the deportation (Akcam 
2006, Astourian 1998, Dadrian 1989). Furthermore, between the years 1909 and 1915, 
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thousands of Assyrians who also inhabited Eastern Turkey were unlawfully killed by 
Turkish and Kurdish soldiers or were deported, leading to their death. In sum, Ottoman 
rulers who could take the Armenian and Assyrian territories under their own control, in 
the end, attempted to establish a monopoly over violence in the Armenian lands by 
destroying the Armenian community.  
Although the Armenian genocide took place during Ottoman rule, it is important to 
note that speaking about the atrocities committed against Armenians is still one of the 
biggest political taboos in Turkey. Despite the historical data that proves that the 1915 
mass deportations amounted to genocide, neither the founders of the Republic nor their 
successors accepted that Armenians were subjected to such violence in Turkey.4 The 
denial of the Armenian genocide by the founding elites and the contemporary ruling elites 
is symptomatic of the continuities between the late Ottoman rule and the modern 
Republic. 
 
Establishing the Modern Turkish Nation 
Ottoman authority was replaced by a new, young, western-educated ruling elites 
who mostly came from military backgrounds and who identified themselves as Turks. The 
aim of this new ruling elite was not only to control and maintain a monopoly over violence 
in the former Ottoman territories but also to create a Turkish nation-state. The elite not 
only saw local power holders as an obstacle to the realization of their aims but also they 
considered all minority populations a threat to the “nation's well being.” Hence, for them 
ethno-religiously diverse society inherited from the Ottoman Empire had to be turned into 
a homogenous national community (Cagatay 2004). In their attempts to turn the ethno-
religiously diverse lands into a homogenous territory they followed four main paths: 1) 
Destruction of the populations who did not accept direct state control 2) Forced 
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assimilation policies 3) Population Exchange 4) Emergency Laws. In the following section 
I unpack these policies. 
First of all, the Armenian genocide did not enable the Ottoman rulers and their 
successors to gain control over the eastern provinces. After the genocide, Kurdish local 
leaders stood as an obstacle to the Ottoman government’s authority in the region. After the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire a few years after the genocide, the new ruling elites continued 
the Ottoman attempts to take the Eastern provinces under the direct control of the new 
state. Kurdish tribal leaders, who became the sole power in the Eastern provinces after the 
Armenian genocide and Assyrian massacres, were declared bandits and enemies of the 
state by the new elite. In a parliament meeting in 1925, it was asserted that the “system of 
the sultanate had always neglected the east […] and left this place under the authority and 
influence of usurpers” and that local authorities in the Eastern provinces had to be 
destroyed (Cited in Yegen 1999: 561). Turkish rulers’ attempts to eliminate the local 
Kurdish leaders were met with a series of large- and small-scale Kurdish revolts. The 
biggest Kurdish revolt, organized under the leadership of well-respected Kurdish tribal 
and religious leader Sheikh Said in the city of Diyarbakir was violently suppressed in 
1925. Ten thousand Kurdish civilians were killed by air bombings and thousands more 
were deported to the Western parts of the country. The leaders of the uprisings were killed 
after being tried in emergency courts named Courts of Independence, established to judge 
the internal enemies who allegedly threatened the imaginary “national unity.”   
Very similar to the law of expulsion, which aimed expel Armenians from their 
homelands; the government enacted the Law on Resettlement, in 1934. According to this 
law, Kurdish people who lived in the Kurdish region would be resettled in Turkish 
districts, where they could be assimilated. As I have argued in the Introduction, the 
“monopolies of violence are always contested and pacification is never complete” 
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(Goudsblom 2001).  Graeber (2011) argues the sovereign is always external to the 
populations and the war between the sovereign and the people is a war that the sovereign 
can never truly win. Accordingly, the war between the Kurdish people and the Turkish 
army still continues. The Turkish military, after waves of violent attacks against the 
Kurdish population, is still struggling to establish territorial sovereignty in the Kurdish 
provinces of Turkey. 
Second, Turkey’s nation-building process involved the negation of the ethno-
religious plurality of the society.  “The ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the 
society were considered as a source of instability and a barrier to progress”  (Zeydanlioglu 
2010: 70). The “national unity” was to be achieved through forced cultural assimilation. 
Zeydanlioglu’s citation of Turkey’s second president, Ismet Inonu, describes this policy in 
the following words: 
We are frankly nationalists and nationalism is our only factor of 
cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have 
no kind of influence. Our duty is to Turkify non-Turks in the 
Turkish homeland no matter what happens. We will destroy 
those elements that oppose Turks or Turkism (5). 
  
Accordingly, the presence of ethnic minorities has been denied, and until very recently non-
Turks have been forced to hide their identities and to claim that they were Turks. For 
instance, until very recently the expression of Kurdish ethnic identity and culture has 
consistently been met with both political and legal prosecution. Today, Turkey’s ethnic 
minorities have begun to affirm their identities and announce their differences publicly. If 
one reason behind this positive change is the EU pressure on the government the second 
reason is the inspirational example of the Kurdish struggle. However, as I illustrate below, it 
was harder for the ruling elite to forcibly assimilate the non-Muslims into Turkishness.  
The non-Muslim populations were forced to leave the country by different means. 
For instance, signing a population exchange treaty with Greece in June 30, 1923, the 
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parliament initiated the deportation of 1.5 million of Greek citizens from Turkey (Akcam 
2007). Moreover, on November 11th 1942, the Turkish legislature passed the Capital Tax 
Law (Ahmad 2002). According to the law, committees were formed to determine the 
amount of taxes that the country’s citizens would be obliged to pay. The taxpayers were 
divided into four categories: Muslim, non-Muslims, those Converted to Islam and foreigner. 
The rate at which those non-Muslim-Turkish professionals, merchants, and industrialists 
were to be taxed was set at four times that of their Muslim counterparts. In the event that 
they were unable to pay the full amounts assessed, they would be legally obligated to work 
off their outstanding debt through physical labor. This consequently led to the massive 
migration of the remaining non-Muslim populations from Turkey (Bali 2011). Additionally, 
state-sponsored anti-Jewish riots and looting of June-July 1934, and again state sponsored 
nationalist anti-Christian and Jewish riots of September 6-7, 1955, were also influential in 
non-Muslim migration from Turkey (Bali 2011). Hence, from the very beginning the 
Turkish ruling elites have been influential in creating and fostering enmity between the 
Turkish population and non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities.  
Finally, as I discuss below, emergency laws have been a constitutive part of Turkish 
“democracy” since the establishment of the Republic. Immediately after the formation of 
the first parliament in 1920, parliament granted the government and the president with 
exceptional powers and declared war against “internal enemies” such as Kurdish local 
authorities, unorthodox Muslim dervishes and brotherhoods, socialists and communists, 
non-Muslim ethnic minorities and many others (Barkey and Fuller 1997, Urhan and Celik 
2010). In its fight against these internal enemies the first parliament enacted a series of 
emergency laws and established a number of institutions that were given emergency 
powers. 
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Military Rule and emergency laws in Turkey 
From the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 to 1950, the country was 
ruled by a single party, the CHP (Republican People’s Party). The CHP mostly consisted 
of former military men. The military has been an integral part of politics in Turkey's rule 
(Harris 1965). Since the establishment of the constitutional order, the operation of the 
constitution has been suspended by a series of emergency laws that military officers were 
granted, bestowing them with exceptional power. These laws paved the way to the 
emergence of institutions such as the National Unity Committee (NUC), National Security 
Council (NSC) and State Security Courts (SSC) that enabled military officials to intervene 
in the government and in the judiciary. Among the most significant of these institutions 
were the Independence Tribunals, the equivalent of the French Committee of Public 
Safety.5 These trials granted local judges with enormous powers and led to the arbitrary 
execution of tens of thousands of people across the country between 1922 and 1927.6 In 
addition, the Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu), which was 
enacted in 1925 and remained in force until 1929, provided the government with 
enormous powers through the declaration of martial law in order to prevent possible social 
opposition and to contain all existing forms of political opposition. The law authorized the 
government to prohibit any organization or publication leading to rebellion or violation of 
the country’s social order and security, and to send the accused to the Independence 
Tribunals7 (Ahmad 2002, Kadioglu 1996, Zurcher 1996). The Law of Maintenance of 
Order and the Independence Tribunals led to the silencing of political opposition and 
enabled the CHP to rule the country for 27 years. The party that came to power after the 
CHP, the Democratic Party (DP), a center-right party, remained in power for 10 years 
until the military intervention of 1960.  
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As a result of the relatively more liberal atmosphere that followed CHP rule, the 
1950s witnessed the emergence of various socialist organizations, organized mainly by 
college students and trade unions.8 However, although the DP government emphasized 
civil liberties and organizational rights when they first came to power, the DP’s “policies 
practically emulated the preceding single-party period” (Urhan and Celik 2010:10). In 
response to increasing political mobilization, the DP proclaimed martial law in Ankara 
and Istanbul, where the socialist students and workers were found in greatest numbers. 
The army, arguing that the DP was not capable of governing the country, carried out a 
coup on 27 May 1960. After the coup, the army held de facto political power and formed a 
committee called the National Unity Committee (NUC), which consisted of 38 military 
men, and was responsible for drafting a new constitution (Narli 2000). The NUC 
introduced a new constitution in 1961. This constitution bestowed extensive powers upon 
the army, rendering it the most powerful institution in the country, with more powers than 
any body of elected officials. It initiated the establishment of the National Security 
Council (NSC), which consisted of high rank military officials functioned as a second 
cabinet in addition to the council of ministers. The NSC was designed to “serve as a 
platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security” (Cizre-
Sakallioglu 1997:157). In the following years, the NSC gradually extended its influence 
over government policy and became a powerful regulator (Karaosmanoglu 2000).  
The end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s was the period in which socialist 
mobilization and the labor movement reached their peak in Turkey (Karpat 1964, Samim 
1981, Lipovsky 1992, Yonucu 2008). Worker and student demonstrations with hundreds 
of thousands of participants dominated the public arena throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Workers Party of Turkey (TIP), a socialist party established in 1961, got 3% of the 
vote in 1965 elections and won 15 seats in parliament. The Revolutionary Youth 
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Federation (Dev-Genc),9 an umbrella-type Marxist youth organization founded in 1965, 
gained hundreds of thousands of supporters all across the county. The Dev-Genc Journal’s 
circulation reached about 100,000 in the 1970s (Muftuoglu 2011). In 1967, Confederation 
of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) was established. In 1970, only three years after its 
establishment, the total number of its registered members reached more than 100,000 
(Urhan and Celik 2010: 9). In response to the increasingly strong socialist movement, the 
Turkish military submitted a memorandum on March 12th 1971, which caused the 
government to resign10 (Burak 2011).  
In March 1971, a new government was formed without the existing parties. This 
new government declared martial law in eleven provinces.11 In 1973, the 1961 constitution 
was amended. With the amendments the primary function of the NSC was extended to 
making recommendations to the government (Lombardi 1997, Nye 1977, Narli 2000). In 
the same year, the SSCs were established and entrusted with “the task of trying the crimes 
related directly to the national security and crimes against the republic [.]” (Yildiz 2012: 
25). In these courts, military judges could try civilians for crimes related directly to 
“national security” (Ozbudun 2003). With the establishment of these courts, significant 
judicial authority was given to the military in prosecuting political crimes (Benhabib and 
Isiksel 2006). 
The new regulations, however, did not end socialist mobilization in Turkey. 
Instead, the socialist youth established their own guerrilla units and moved further from 
university-based struggles toward rural and urban guerrilla struggles (Aksoy 2008, 
Aydinoglu 2007, Bozkurt 2008, Savran 2010). In 1980, in order to suppress socialist 
mobilization, the military took control and declared a national state of emergency 
(Karabelias 1999, Mavioglu 2006). Between the years 1980 and 1983, a military 
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government ruled the country. In this process, the military government restricted freedoms 
and curbed basic rights. As a result of the coup,  
a total of 650,000 people were detained and most suspects were either beaten 
or tortured. Over 500 people died while in detention as a result of torture, 
85,000 people were placed on trial mainly in relation to thought crimes. 
1,683,000 people were officially listed in police files as suspects, 348,000 
people were banned from traveling abroad, 15,509 people were fired from 
their jobs for political reasons, 114,000 books were seized and burned, 937 
films were banned, 2,729 writers, translators, journalists and actors were put 
on trial for expressing their opinions. A few months after the coup, a total of 
171 prisoners across the country were reported to have died (Zeydanlioglu 
2008: 69). 
 
          Although the military regime lasted for three years, the new constitution, introduced 
in 1982, institutionalizing the NSC as the most decisive leg of executive decision-making, 
strengthened the place of the military in governing the country (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1997). 
According to the new constitution, the NCS’s recommendations would be given priority 
consideration by the council of ministers. Until the 2003 amendments to the constitution, 
the NSC remained as a regulative force, which could intervene in various fields, including 
education and media. Until 2003, it could intervene in determining the curriculum in 
schools, regulating television stations’ broadcasting hours, abolishing the penal immunity 
of Kurdish members of parliament, closing down certain television stations, suggesting the 
formation of electoral alignments between political parties, stating the substance of laws 
on terror, and so on (Burak 2001).  
 
State of Emergency Rule in the Kurdish Region 
After the 1980 coup led to the disappearance of the revolutionary left from the 
public scene, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)12 emerged as the only radical left-wing 
organization surviving the repression that followed the coup. The PKK was not only a 
guerrilla organization but also a representative of Kurdish mass mobilization, which 
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gained the popular support of Kurdish workers and peasants (Bozarslan 2001, Ergil 2000, 
White 1999). The Turkish army and the police did not only fight with PKK militants in the 
mountains; Kurdish towns and cities were turned into war zones as well. One of the most 
significant techniques the ruling elites developed in their fight against the Kurdish 
movement was the isolation of the region from the rest of Turkey. The isolation of the 
region was achieved through strict militarized spatial control and through the 
concentration of violence in these isolated territories. The concentration of violence in the 
Kurdish region was enabled by the state of emergency rule within the predominantly 
Kurdish provinces of between 1987 and 2002. According to the state of emergency law, 
the “[c]ouncil of ministers were granted the authority to issue decrees having the force of 
law on any matter without adhering to the normal legislative procedure set out in the 
constitution13” (Hughes 2006: 80). The emergency law granting the emergency governor 
with enormous powers led to the suspension of most basic human rights in the region. The 
emergency governor possessed martial law-type powers, with no provision for 
independent judicial review of his actions (Muller and Linzey 2007: 16). Accordingly, the 
state of emergency rule in the region was characterized by an oppressive military 
presence, checkpoints, curfews, lack of access to the courts, prohibition of any kind of 
assembly, prohibitions and limitations on the distribution of publications or broadcasting, 
searches of persons and of their property, mandatory carrying of identity cards, etc. 
(Magnarella 1994, Celik 2005, Hughes 2006). In addition, very similar to the indirect rule 
of the British colonial policies,14 the state of emergency government formed “village 
guard” units, consisting of local armed men. In addition to the presence of Turkish soldiers 
and police in the region, the emergency governor attempted to control the Kurdish region 
indirectly through arming villagers selectively. The Kurdish villagers who resisted being 
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village guards were confronted with forced evictions and violence (Jongerden 2001, Ayata 
and Yukseker 2005).15 
The testimonies of Kurds and journalists who worked in the region portray the 
Kurdish region of the 1990s and early 2000s as a place of pure state terror and violence in 
which the only law was lawlessness (Cemal 2003, Jongerden 2007, Tuzcuoglu 2011, 
Oktem 2011). Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were subjected to the arbitrary violence of 
security forces and thousands were killed, kidnapped and disappeared. More than a million 
Kurds had to leave their hometowns and villages due to forced evacuation by the 
government, including the burning of thousands of villages by village guards throughout 
the 1990s.16 Although the state of emergency law was lifted in 2002, and although the 
PKK and the current government are currently in the process of negotiation, serious 
human rights violations have continued in the Kurdish region.17 The village guards have 
remained armed and active despite being officially disbanded with the lifting of the state 
of emergency, “operating in a legal vacuum, outside any higher authority and with total 
impunity” (Hughes 2006). 
 
Post-1980 transformation of the police institution 
As the studies on police power in Turkey illustrate, the coup not only increased the 
power of the already powerful military but also increased the power of the police (Berksoy 
2007, 2010, Demirbilek 2011, Gonen 2011, Uysal 2010). Until the coup, The Turkish 
National Police Department (TNPD) remained as a small scale organization whose power 
was incomparable to that of the army. However, the TNPD’s power increased 
substantially with the introduction of series of regulations that paved the way for arbitrary 
and flexible uses of police power (Berksoy 2007). The bill titled the “Re-organization and 
Modernization Project of the General Directorate of Security” (EM-RE-MO), enacted in 
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1980, increased the police's authority by expanding their search and seizure capacities and 
by implementing the right to shoot those who do not obey a command to stop by security 
forces. In this process, the TNDP’s share in the investment expenditures of general budget 
rose from 10% in 1982 to 37% in 1986 (Gonen 2011). In accordance with its extended 
budget, the TNPD has added new equipment and weaponry and increased the number of 
police personnel drastically since the 1980s. The number of police personnel was 13,500 
in 1960, 50,000 in 1980, and reached approximately 170,000 in 2006 and 229, 965 in 2011 
(Gonen 2011). 
Moreover, two highly militarized police units were established soon after the coup: 
Rapid Action Forces (Cevik Kuvvet, RAF) and Special Operations Unit (Ozel Harekat 
Birimi, SOU) (Uysal 2010). The RAF, established in 1982, has been responsible for urban 
unrest and social movements. Having been recruited from the members of the Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP),18 the RAF members are notorious for their aggressive attacks 
against civilians and disproportionate use of force, including even killing civilians during 
political demonstrations (Berksoy 2007, Gonen 2011). The SOU, established in 1983, was 
formed as a paramilitary unit equipped with special technology and weaponry, and trained 
in guerrilla warfare. The SOU has been responsible for large-scale human rights abuses, 
including the disappearance and extra-juridical killings of thousands of activists (Unver 
2009). 
 The increase in police power went hand in hand with the political homogenization 
of the police department, ensured by a strict personnel-hiring strategy. Since the coup, 
personnel selection, recruitment, appointments, disciplinary penalties and promotions have 
depended on the political views of the police personnel and their families (Uysal 2006, 
Caglar 2003, Tugal 2007). As Caglar (1993) in his dissertation on the recruitment process 
within the TNPD illustrates, background investigation for recruitment was specifically 
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designed to eliminate applicants who were sympathetic to leftist ideas. Leftist police 
officers were expelled from the TNPD immediately after the coup.19 Instead, “hardline 
nationalists and Islamists were recruited in their place” (Tugal 2007:12). Moreover, during 
the 1990s, followers of the U.S based cleric Fethullah Gulen, a nationalist-Muslim cleric 
who until recently had close ties with the current AKP government, acquired considerable 
influence in the TNPD (Gonen 2011).20 Consequently, since the mid-1980s, the TNPD 
became an overtly nationalist-Islamist organization.  
The post-1980 increase in police power was not without tension. Thanks to attempts 
by human rights organizations to publicize police violence in Turkey, the global human 
rights community became aware of the scale of police violence in Turkey in the 1990s. 
The European Union (EU) considered the Turkish police’s systemic human rights abuses 
and the absence of punishment for police violence as an obstacle for Turkeys’ EU 
membership.21 At the early stage of the changes a set of amendments was introduced to 
the Law on Criminal Procedure (CMUK) in 1992. These amendments were pushed by the 
EU and aimed to eliminate the police’s use of arbitrary power and improve the conditions 
of arrest, detention and interrogation (Magnerella 1994). However, the amendments 
brought up by the CMUK did little to curb abuses of police power.  On the contrary, 
during the 1990s illegal and arbitrary uses of police power, especially against Kurdish 
activists, reached its peak. During those years, “disappearances,”22 extra-juridical political 
executions, kidnappings and illegal detentions23 emerged as the new patterns of police 
violence (Sik 2012).  
These years are known as the years of the “deep state” in the political history of 
Turkey. This term is used to describe “the executive power that clandestinely operates as a 
part of the state to do illegal action” (Sabuktay 2012:2). The term was widely circulated in 
the media after the Susurluk Event of 1996. This was a well-known car accident, which 
	  	   92	  
revealed that a high-rank police officer, Abdullah Catli, an internationally sought-after 
mafia leader known as Yesil, a former police deputy, Huseyin Kocadag and Sedat Bucak, 
the head of a “village guard” unit, were traveling together in the same car. The accident 
was widely seen by the public as evidence of close ties between bureaucrats and criminal 
gangs (Soyler 2013). 
 
 The AKP government: Police Versus Military 
Since 2002, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), the Muslim counterpart of 
Christian democrats has been the governing party of Turkey. As part of the EU 
harmonization process, the AKP pushed through some democratic reforms between 2002 
and 2005, including abolition of the death penalty and a clampdown on the police's use of 
torture, the release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of expression (Akca and 
Balta-Paker 2012). In this process, illegal detentions, disappearances, kidnappings were 
largely put to an end.  In addition, in 2003, in line with the Seventh EU Harmonization 
Package (Law No. 4963), the government, made significant amendments to the structure, 
role, and functions of the NSC. The NSC was transformed from an executive decision-
making board into an advisory board, the majority of its members became civilians and 
the chairmanship of the NSC was given to a civilian. Furthermore, after the July 2007 
elections, the AKP began to challenge the political power of the military directly through a 
series of trials, publicly known as Ergenekon trials.  
The military, remaining committed to the secular CHP tradition, has considered the 
AKP government a threat to the secular foundations of the Republic. Accordingly military 
officials undertook actions ranging from coup attempts to the promotion of anti-AKP 
public campaigns when the AKP came to power. The Ergenekon trial was based on 
allegations of a planned military coup against the AKP government. Since 2008, several 
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waves of arrests have resulted in charges against military officers, including high-ranking 
generals and admirals who have been accused of being the members of an alleged terrorist 
organization, Ergenekon. As of January 2013, there are 404 military officers, 58 of whom 
are generals and admirals that have been tried in the Ergenekon case.24 These trials can be 
seen as the declaration of the AKP’s war against the army. In other words, they are 
symptomatic of the competition for the monopoly over the right to control the law and 
violence between the military and the police.  
 Those who are accused of being Ergenekon members are also responsible for the 
large-scale human rights abuses that took place during the 1990s. Many of them are also 
among the organizers of the coup of 1980. While at first sight, the Ergenekon trials might 
be considered as a democratic move towards demilitarization of the political sphere, when 
we look at the operations of these trials we can easily say that AKP’s concern is not 
democratization but consolidation of its power. No military officials have been judged for 
violating human rights and none of the perpetrators of the coup of 1980 were prosecuted. 
In addition, the amendment of the anti-terror law in June 2006 and the police law, Law on 
Police Duties and Powers (PVSK), passed in July 2007, hint at the authoritarian 
tendencies of the AKP government. Both of these amendments, which granted the police 
with exceptional powers, confirm the police institution’s evaluation that is now found in 
many critiques: an institutionalization of the “police state” (Gonen 2011). 
The amended PVSK increased the authority of the police agencies at the expense of 
oversight mechanisms and citizens’ rights and liberties (Demirbilek 2011, Gokcenay 2011, 
Gonen 2011). It reduced restrictions regarding the police’s use of lethal force, expanded 
the police’s search-an-seizure capabilities and permitted the use of force and firearms “to 
the extent of causing serious threat to the right to live” (Gokcenay 2011: 196). Following 
these amendments, reported cases of infringement of citizens’ rights and liberties as well 
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as the police’s disproportionate use of force significantly increased.25 Moreover, after the 
PVSK, the police began to publicly display its power. Since 2007, the police’s use of 
disproportionate and excessive force during peaceful demonstrations has increased 
drastically. Demonstrations organized by Kurds and socialists often end with violent 
police attacks including rubber bullets and gas bombs. 
As I illustrate in detail in the Chapter VI, the amended anti-terror laws, grant the 
police enormous latitude in taking action against political crimes or crimes related to the 
“security of the state.” This law declares the police to be the lawmaker beyond the law. 
The judicial proceedings, accompanied by massive displays of force on the part of the 
police, replete with armed riot squads, highlight the connection between the law and 
police. In addition, their various interventions in the judicial process also make the police 
force highly visible within the juridical sphere. 
   
Conclusion  
In sum, this chapter illustrates how military interventions, including the destruction 
of populations and the declaration of emergency law, have been integral in the tradition of 
rule in Turkey. I conclude that modern Turkey’s history of violence has been more 
continuous than discontinuous. The Turkish ruling elites, no matter how competitive they 
have been among themselves, continuously wage a war against certain populations who do 
not consider state power and violence legitimate. The continuity of the emergency laws 
demonstrates that the neither the founding elites nor their successors could have gained the 
full consent of the populace. The externality and brutality of the Turkish state have always 
kept the resistance movement active and alive in Turkey. I also argue that the emphasis on 
the police as the sole organ of power destroys the distinction between internal and external 
enemies. When the police become “the guarantor” of the regime, all citizens become 
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potential enemies. Or, to put it in Agamben’s words,  “the police now becomes politics, 
and the care of life coincides with the fight against the enemy” (Agamben 1998: 47). The 
police’s domination of public life is a colonial project; it is an attempt to colonize the 
political space and turn it into a police space. In the following sections, I illustrate how the 
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  1 Cited in Burak 2011:143. 
 
2 Cited in Aydin 2012:24. 
 
3   The first Armenian uprising against the Kurdish-Ottoman dominion took place in Adana in 1909. In response 
to the uprising, thousands of Armenian dwellings were torched and around thirty thousand Armenians were 
killed.  This massacre did not pacify Armenian guerrilla units. On the contrary, it contributed to the growing of 
Armenian nationalist sentiments. Many more Armenian youth volunteered to participate in the guerrilla units 
after the massacre (Dadrian 1993, 1994, Ungor and Polatel 2011). 
 
4 Many Kurdish intellectuals and the representatives of the Kurdish movement, however, accept the Kurdish 
role in Armenian genocide. In February 2013, Ahmet Turk, a prominent Kurdish politician and a member of the 
pro-Kurdish party BDP, publicly apologized for the Kurdish role in the Armenian genocide. Information 
available at: http://www.aina.org/news/20130204195340.htm. Last accessed June 21, 2013. During my visit to 
Kurdish region in June 2013, many young Kurds told me apologetically about their great grandparents’ role in 
the genocide and massacres. They told that their great grandparents confessed that they participated in the 
killings of the Armenians. According to these young people, Ottoman soldiers and bureaucrats convinced their 
great grandparents that Armenians were extremely dangerous and that they would go to heaven if they killed 
Armenians. 
 
5 The Committee of Public Safety was formed during the reign of terror (1793-1784) in France. It was a de 
facto executive government aimed at eliminating the rivals of the Jacobins and suppressing internal uprisings 
(Palmer 1941). 
 
6 Archival research on the independence tribunals is not allowed. Only one historian, Professor Aybars, has been 
allowed to examine the archival documents related to these tribunals. According to Aybars (1975) 59,164 
people were tried in these courts between 1920 and 1927. 19,630 of the tried were executed while the rest were 
sentenced to heavy punishments (Aybars 1975). However, oral histories and memoirs on the Independence 
Tribunals point out the arbitrary executions of these courts and indicate that the total number of executions was 
far more than indicated in Aybars’s work (Adak 2003, Ahmad 2002, Akcam 1999, Arakon 2011). The 
restrictions on archival research can also be interpreted as a way to hide the actual number of the executions. 
 
7 One of the three articles of Law of Maintenance Order read: “The head of the government -with the approval 
of the president- is entitled to ban any organization, provocation, encouragement and 
publications aimed at reactionism, rebellion, and disruption of the social order, social peace, security and public 
order. The government may hand over persons suspected of these actions to the Independence Tribunals” 
(Elmas and Kurban 2011:5). 
 
8 In 1952, Turk-Is, the Labor Unions Confederation of Turkey, was established. 
9 Throughout the second half of the 1960s, Dev-Genc functioned as an organizer of the meetings and land 
occupations of peasants and small producers across the country. It also contributed to working class actions such 
as factory occupations, strikes and meetings (Bozkurt 2008).  
 
10 In 1971, the government party was a center-right party, the Justice Party. 
 
11 Six of these cities (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli, Zonguldak, Eskisehir) are located in Western Turkey. A 
significant percent of the population in these cities consisted of industrialized labor force in the 1970s. Three of 
them (Adana Diyarbakir, Siirt) are located in the relatively industrialized parts of Eastern Turkey. The socialist 
organizations gained popular support in the Kurdish region during the 1960s and 1970s. The founding members 
of the PKK were all organized in Marxist-Leninist organizations before they founded the PKK. And, the last 
one is Hatay, located at the Syrian border of Turkey, inhabited by Arab Alevis. Leftist organizations are still 
powerful in Hatay (Nye 1977). 
 
12 PKK, a guerrilla organization, began to organize in the late 1970s, fighting against the Turkish State for 
cultural and political rights for the Kurds in Turkey. The founders of the PKK were former members of the 
THKP/C. The PKK first emerged as Marxist Leninist guerrilla organization, which aimed to establish a 
communist federal state in the Middle East. Later in the 1990s, the party removed the communist symbols of 
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hammer and sickle from the party flag and opened itself to religious Kurds and the Kurdish bourgeoisie.  See: 
Marcus 2007. 
 
13 Article 4 of the State of Emergency Law. 
 
14 For a discussion on the indirect rule of British colonialism that attempted to control and contain colonized 
populations through arming some local men see: Crowder 1964, Mamdani 1996.  
 
15 It is widely reported that village guards were responsible for committing serious human rights violations 
during the conflict. Some were involved in the forced evacuation of villagers, drug trafficking, rape, corruption, 
and theft. Village guards have been rarely investigated or brought to justice (Hughes 2006, Jongerden 2001). 
 
16 These people ended up as tenants in shantytown areas of big cities. According to the Turkey Migration and 
Internally Displaced Population Survey, between 1991 and 2000, 1,201,200 Kurdish people were displaced 
from the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey for security reasons (Yilmaz, 2006, p. 18). 
 
17 Heavy police and soldier presence in the region still continues. In addition to this, the soldiers and police 
continue to attack civilians. For instance, in December 2011, 28 Kurdish civilians were killed in Roboski, a 
Kurdish town near the Syrian border, as a result of aerial bombardment of the town by Turkish air force. While 
the AKP chairman Huseyin Celik argued that “it was an operational accident”, the Prime minister did not 
apologize for the event. To make things worse, hundreds of people who wanted to march in Roboski were 
subjected to police violence. Information available at: http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/143200-timeline-
what-happened-in-roboski Last accessed: July 24, 2013.   
 
18 The MHP is known as a pro-fascist party with Islamist sentiments (Gonen 2011). Members of the MHP have 
participated in numerous assaults and pogroms against Kurds, Alevis and socialists. 
 
19 Leftist police officers were organized in the Police Association, Pol-Der (Demirbilek 2011). 
 
20 As Avci (2010) a former Istanbul chief of police, suggests that because it would be much harder to gain 
power within the overtly secular army, the Fettullah organization strategically invested in getting organized in 
the TNDP by the 1980s. Ahmet Sik, a socialist journalist was arrested as a terror suspect in 2010, because he 
wrote a book about the Fethullah organization within the TNPD. He was put in prison before he published his 
work. Hanefi Avci is also in prison on charges of terrorism. 
 
21 According to research conducted by Center for Truth, Justice and Memory the number of “enforced 
disappeared” since 1990 is 1,353. It reached a peak in the period from1993 to 1998, with the year 1994 
recording 518 as “gone missing.”  Information available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-321036-
enforced-disappearances-a-wound-still-wide-open.html Last accessed: July 18, 2013. 
 
22 According to TIHV there were 1258 extra-judicial political executions between the years 1991 and 2001 in 
Turkey. Information available at: http://ob.nubati.net/wiki/Extra-judicial_Executions. Last accessed: March 1, 
2013. 
 
23 Illegal detentions were taking place in two ways: 1) by kidnapping activists and taking them to places such as 
empty buildings and forests, and interrogating and torturing them there. 2) by not filing any arrest report and 
denying the arrest even if the arrested was taken into custody by legal police forces and was kept in a police 
office (Taqi 2000). 
 
24 Information available at http://sozcu.com.tr/2013/gundem/turkiyede-kac-asker-tutuklu.html. Last accessed 
August 1, 2013.  
 
25 For instance, between 2007 and 2009, a total of 416 police brutality and torture cases were recorded and 53 
people were killed by the police (Bianet, June 17, 2009). 
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 “In those years [the 1990s] terrible things were happening” 1 
 
“They turned this neighborhood into Gaza. In 1993, in 
1994, in 1995, in 1996 the Special Operation Units were 
walking on rooftops.”2 
 
It was March 12, 1995, in the Gazi Neighborhood of Istanbul, where mostly 
working class Alevi people live. The neighborhood was known as a place in which radical 
Marxist organizations were powerful. An unknown gunman fired upon a coffee house 
frequented by Alevis. An Alevi dede was killed and many Alevis were wounded. Word 
spread quickly, and thousands of Gazi residents took to the streets of Gazi in protest. 
Believing that the police were responsible for the shooting, they started to march towards 
the neighborhood police station. That night, the police shot and killed a demonstrator. The 
next day, hundreds of people, most of them Alevis and socialists, came to Gazi to join its 
residents in their protest. Rioting continued in the following days, with the police and their 
gunmen firing into the crowd, killing another 18 people and severely beating many others 
(Dural 1995, Marcus 1996).3 The streets of Gazi turned into a war zone, evoking scenes of 
the state of emergency rule in the Kurdish region of Turkey.  
Except for Hanefi Avci,4 the then head of the Istanbul police department, all of the 
other high ranking police and military officers, as well as the Governor himself, had 
argued that the unrest was symptomatic of the religious tension between Alevis and 
Sunnis. Hanefi Avci, however, argued that the police did not think of the neighborhood as 
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an Alevi neighborhood but as a hotbed of revolutionary organizations. In line with the 
security officers’ arguments, the newspapers reduced the issue to an issue of religion. 
However, as Marcus (1996) demonstrates, Gazi residents’ reaction to the coffee house 
shooting and their subsequent march towards the police station arose from long-term 
tensions between Gazi residents and the police forces.  
Residents of Gazi were routinely subjected to arbitrary police violence, which 
included torture, kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and legal and illegal 
detentions during the 1990s. As several Gazi residents I interviewed told me, during those 
years, dozens of young socialists from Gazi were kidnapped and found severely wounded, 
and even dead, along nearby highways days after being kidnapped. Additionally, a 35 
year-old well-respected socialist from Gazi was killed while in custody at the Gazi police 
station two months before the coffee house shooting. Thus, the tension between the police 
and Gazi residents was already at its peak at the time of the event. Hence, Gazi residents’ 
reaction to the shooting was symptomatic of the long-term tension between them and the 
police. 
   On March 15th 1998, the 3rd anniversary of the Gazi Events, I decided to participate 
in a march organized to protest the killings. A friend of mine from Gazi told me that the 
entrance to the neighborhood would be closed during the day of the protest and that I 
should go there the night before the event. I remember asking myself: How could the 
entrance to a neighborhood be closed? It was not as though it had gates. Following the 
suggestion of my friend, I went there the night before the protest and stayed with his 
family. I still remember the dinner conversation about what the police would do the next 
day. Listening to the conversation, which portrayed the police as a violent enemy, capable 
of anything, I realized that the next day would be an exceptional day for me.  
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I still cannot forget what I saw when I stepped out from the house the next day. 
The rooftops of the neighborhood were occupied by masked policemen pointing their 
rifles towards the street, blurring the line between terrorism and policing (Aretxaga 2005). 
Masked policemen with heavy arms were also standing at street entrances. The presence 
of these faceless black figures told us that the only law in Gazi that day was the law of the 
Police—the untouchable, god-like side of the law, which has the right to decide to kill or 
let live (Foucault 2003). I was full of fear. I thought I might easily die that day. The 
policemen of the Turkish State were there, during the anniversary of the killing of 
innocent people by police forces, reminding us that death is never far away, but an 
immanent possibility. I wanted to run away, to flee the neighborhood. However, I realized 
that it was impossible. I overheard that there had been clashes between police and people 
who wanted to enter the neighborhood. Watching a military tank chasing a group of youth 
I understood how the entrance of a neighborhood could be closed. I saw the gates of the 
neighborhood, and the gatekeepers. I was stuck there. The “gates” were under the control 
of armed men.  
On September 2011, in Narova, a friend’s father took me to an education co-op run 
by a group of young people. We sat on the balcony, drinking tea and chatting. I saw a 
small white military tank pass by. The back door of the tank was half open, and there was 
a policeman sitting in the back, holding his rifle. Surprised, I asked what had happened 
that day. Something exceptional must have had happened – exceptional enough to bring 
tanks to the neighborhood. A young man, smiling at my “naivety,” replied: “Nothing. This 
place is the Gaza of Istanbul. They are always here.” From that moment on, I would be 
surprised by many things I saw and by many stories I heard. My new friends would 
always find me naïve, and tell me that the Turkish state, which according to them is an 
enemy, an inherently violent and aggressive entity, would of course be brutal and violent. 
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That is how the enemy behaves. How could I expect otherwise?  In my very first day in 
Narova, I realized that what I witnessed on March 1998 in Gazi was not exceptional for 
some inhabitants of Istanbul. It was the norm. 
As I discuss in Chapter I, Narova and similar neighborhoods were known as 
liberated zones---zones free of the state hence police control--- during the 1970s.  As 
opposed to this image, two common terms used by Narova residents to describe Narova in 
the 1990s are Gaza Strip and semi-open prison. Both Gaza and prison are places in which 
peoples’ movement are under heavy surveillance by security forces of all sorts: 
undercover and masked, legal and extra-legal. They both have boundaries or walls that 
separate them from surrounding areas. And both are known for brutal forms of violence 
and large-scale human rights abuses. Additionally, Gaza is a place under occupation by 
the military forces of a foreign country. 
In this chapter, I focus on the “state practices” that make Narova residents use the 
Gaza strip and semi-open prisons as analogies to describe Narova of the 1990s. Although 
some of these practices (i.e. identity checks at checkpoints, kidnappings, illegal 
detentions) are not applied anymore, some others (i.e. house raids, the constant presence 
of armored vehicles, undercover police surveillance) are still present. Thus, this chapter 
not only provides insight about the state practices of the 1990s but also of today. Scholars 
who critically reflect on the relationship between space and sovereignty argue that 
militarized control of territory is key to establishing and maintaining state power (Elden 
2009, Fanon 1968, Lefebvre 2003, Newman 1989, Mbembe and Rendall 2000). Mbembe 
(2003), for instance, in his analysis of Gaza, following Fanon, argues that space is the raw 
material of sovereignty. For him one of the key dynamics of Israeli attempts to 
demonstrate and construct their sovereign power in Gaza is territorial fragmentation; 
creation of a collection of isolated zones and population enclaves physically disconnected 
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from one another. He explains that the objective of this process is twofold: to render any 
movement impossible and to implement separation along the model of the apartheid state. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that in their attempts to assert state power in Narova —one 
of the centres of the revitalizing revolutionary left in the 1990s— the Turkish police also 
turned Narova into an isolated space, separated from its surrounding areas. Accordingly, I 
illustrate the ways in which Narova has been separated from the surrounding area through 
militarized spatial techniques and stigmatized as a dangerous zone in the eyes of the 
general public. 
As I discuss in the Introduction, sovereignty, like the state, is a fiction and a 
tentative, unstable and ambiguous project, which is made real through “ritualized, 
everyday confirmations of  […] violence” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:7). Sovereignty has 
to be performed publicly to prove its existence. In the places, inhabited by  “internal 
enemies,” state sovereignty is constituted of performative displays of police or military 
violence and power (Butler 1997, Coronil and Skurski 2006, Taussig 1992, Feldman 1991, 
Aretxaga 2005).  Accordingly, this chapter also demonstrates various performances of 
sovereignty contributed to the materialization of the Turkish state as an enemy force in 
Narova.  Jimeno (2001) argues that violence transforms existing relationships. 
Accordingly, when I discuss performances of sovereignty in Narova I also illustrate how 
violent state practices effect social relations in Narova. Most particularly, I demonstrate 
how such practices have contributed to the normalization of violence, the weakening of 
historical social support networks and solidarity among residents. Since one of the main 
reasons behind systematic police violence in Narova during the 1990s was the popular 
support that revolutionary organizations regained in the neighborhood, I start with brief 
discussion of the revitalization of the revolutionary left in the 1990s.  
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Revitalization of the Revolutionary Left in the 1990s 
As I discuss in Chapter II, after the coup of 1980, hundreds of thousands of socialists 
in Turkey were imprisoned, tortured and forced to leave the country. The coup pacified the 
socialist movement during the 1980s. However, it did not succeed in preventing the 
socialists from reorganizing. By the late 1980s, with the release of revolutionaries from 
prisons, the socialists began to reorganize. Demonstrations in the spring of 19895 saw the 
participation of around six hundred thousand workers. The coal miners’ march, attended 
by forty-two thousand miners, general strikes in several factories, and mass campus 
occupations of the early 1990s were the harbingers of a socialist revival in the country 
(Arslan 2006). Consequently, in the early 1990s, a number of new socialist and communist 
parties were founded. Among the reorganizing left there were two main tendencies. On the 
one hand, there were radical, illegal Marxist organizations in favor of urban guerrilla 
struggle as well as organization of the masses. These included the Revolutionary Left 
(Dev-Sol),6 Marxist Leninist Communist Party (MLKP),7 Workers and Peasant Liberation 
Army of Turkey (TIKKO),8  etc. On the other hand, legal socialist parties were established 
such as Freedom and Solidarity Party (ODP),9  Labor Party (EMEP)10 and  Socialist Power 
Party (SIP). 11 
Among the newly emerging revolutionary organizations, Dev-Sol gained the most 
popular support.12 Dev-Sol’s policies were fundamentally influenced by Cayan’s “artificial 
balance theory” and “armed propaganda strategy.”  This strategy also influenced other 
illegal groups that emerged in the 1990s. Accordingly, the early 1990s witnessed a series 
of armed attacks selectively targeting those who represent the state, such as soldiers, 
police officers and members of intelligence agencies. The following list of Dev-Sol 
assassinations and assassination attempts in 1990 gives a sense of the targets of illegal 
revolutionary organizations during the 1990s:13 
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1. January 30 1990: The policeman Mehmet Kazım Cakmakci was shot to death. This 
policeman murdered Mehmet Akif Dalci, aged 18, during the May Day 
demonstrations of 1989. 
2. August 26, 1990: Dev-Sol militants attempted to assassinate Adnan Ozbey, a retired 
army major who had served at Metris Military Prison, notorious for the torture of 
political prisoners.  
3. September 22, 1990: A member of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) was 
killed. 
4. October 30, 1990: Bayrampasa Prison Judge, known for his support of police 
torture, was shot to death.  
5. December 18, 1990: Another member of the MIT, Ferdi Tamer, was shot to death.14 
 
 
Narova residents who lived in the neighborhood during the 1990s told me that Dev-
Sol was the revolutionary organization that enjoyed the most support in their 
neighborhood during the 1990s. According to their narratives, every year on May Day, 
Narova residents rented around 70 or 80 buses to go to the demonstrations. As each bus 
takes around 50 people, around 3500 people participated in these demonstrations from 
Narova during the 1990s. According to a number of residents, half of these buses were 
filled with those who were sympathetic to Dev-Sol/DHKP-C. After 1995, I participated in 
all of the May Day demonstrations in Istanbul until 2005. DHKP-C was always among the 
most crowded groups in these demonstrations.15 Dev-Sol and other groups were also 
organizing demonstrations and political activities in other neighborhoods. A picture of 
Narova in the 1990s emerging from the accounts of Narova residents can be described as 
follows: On the one hand, a series of mass street demonstrations organized by various 
legal and illegal socialist organizations on numerous current political issues ranging from 
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Palestine to the economy, from the hunger strikes of political prisoners16 to the problem of 
education were taking place; on the other hand students and workers were organizing 
reading and discussion groups at their schools and workplaces and were actively trying to 
recruit people. A number of young people from Narova, who were high school students 
during the 1990s, told me that there was no single student in their school who was not 
affiliated with a socialist legal or illegal organization in someway.  
Studies on political violence often find that those who consider themselves victims 
of state violence and who believe that their collective suffering is unrecognized, may 
engage in vengeful activities as a redress (Wilson 2000, Gunther 2001, Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2002). As Goldstein (2003) puts it, for such populations “revenge is a stand-in 
for a legal system that is absent or dysfunctional” (2003: 189). Hence, it is no coincidence 
that in the absence of a peace and reconciliation process after the brutal coup, and in the 
context of continuing police and military violence, Cayan’s strategy gained sympathy 
among the working class —especially among working class Alevis, who have been 
subjected to police and military violence since the Ottoman era. In other words, the 
political assassinations that marked the political atmosphere of the early 1990s, met the 
thousands’ desire for revenge.17 
In addition to satisfying the desire for revenge, these organizations’ calls for justice 
also helped increase their rise in popularity in the 1990s. Like the great criminal, Cayan 
and his followers claimed not to use violence for their own benefit and gain, but with the 
aim of abolishing an unjust order and establishing a new one.18 The presence of these 
organizations was perceived as a threat against the “security of the state” by the ruling 
elites. They threatened  “state security” in three ways.  First of all, their armed attacks 
exposed areas the “state” did not control. Hence, these attacks contributed to the 
demystification of the state, as they showed the state to be less powerful than it claimed. 
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Second, the journals published by these groups and the discussions based on these journals 
and socialist activity were also effective in delegitimizing the state. These journals along 
with other socialist texts contributed to the development of a critical perspective on the 
capitalist state. This is probably why employees of socialist journals were among the most 
common targets of police violence. Finally, their aspiration to forcibly demolish the 
existing order and to build a new one was a way to declare themselves as rivals of the 
state. As these rivals gained support among the masses, the ruling elites attempted to 
“reactivate [their] political potency, which ha[d] been suspended by the ‘terrorist’ 
act”  (Feldman 1991: 89). In their attempts to reactivate their political potency, the Turkish 
ruling elites two main techniques: 1- militarized spatial control of neighborhoods 
inhabited by supporters of Dev-Sol and similar organizations, 2- spectacular displays of 
police violence.  
 
 Sovereignty and territorial control 
Fanon (1968), in his discussion of the spatial extents of sovereignty, describes the 
colonizer and the colonized as belonging to two distinct worlds. The colonial space as a 
manifestation of this distinction is divided into two; borders, posts and barracks being the 
main internal frontiers. For Fanon, the principles of the colonizers’ system work for the 
constitution of an atmosphere of obedience and prohibition around the colonized person in 
the colonized space. The atmosphere of obedience and prohibition is constituted through 
the continuous presence of the police and army in colonized spaces. As Mbembe (2003) 
argues, for Fanon the space is the raw material of sovereignty. Compartmentalization of 
the colonial space, contributing to the maintenance of the language of pure violence 
inscribed in this space, constitutes colonial sovereignty over the colonized. 
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Mbembe, (2003) demonstrating that militarized colonial spatial politics survived 
after “decolonization”, attracts our attention to the ongoing militarized rule in occupied 
Palestinian territories. In addition to Palestine, we can argue that the state of emergency 
rule in Turkey’s Kurdish region is another contemporary example of what Fanon 
describes. As I discuss in Chapter III, one of the most significant techniques the ruling 
elites of Turkey developed in their fight against the Kurdish movement was the isolation 
of the region from the rest of Turkey. The isolation of the region operated through strict 
militarized control of the region and through the concentration of violence in these 
isolated territories. Security forces surrounded Kurdish towns and villages and peoples’ 
moves were under strict military control. In addition, the movement/circulation of 
information about what had been going on in the region was also severely regulated. The 
news, which could provide public awareness about the region, was strictly censored and 
the Kurdish press was severely repressed.19 Police or counter-guerrilla violence against 
human rights activists was carried out with the aim of silencing witnesses who might 
communicate the scope of violence taking place in the region to the wider public. Hence, 
the isolation of the Kurdish region, preventing those living elsewhere from learning about 
it, facilitated a concentration of violence in specific territories. Moreover, the isolation of 
the region and restriction of information about the region contributed to the stigmatization 
of the Kurdish movement in the eyes of the Turkish public (see Cemal 2004,Oktem 2011, 
Danisman and Akin 2011).  
After having served as the state of emergency governor in the Kurdish region for 
four years, the Governor Hayri Kozakcioglu was appointed as the Governor of Istanbul in 
August 1991.20 Right after his appointment, Kozakcioglu declared that Istanbul, too, had 
become a city of emergency and that the city was in need of more police forces. In a press 
release the following year, Kozakcioglu argued that in order to solve the terror problem in 
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Istanbul, the government was developing special techniques. He announced that he would 
not share these techniques with the public, further explaining, however, that Istanbul’s 
police department would create pilot areas to test these new methods. He did not name the 
pilot areas. However, it is easy to surmise that Narova and many other predominantly 
Alevi populated working-class districts were among them. (Aslan 2004, Berksoy 2007). In 
this process, in Narova, like in other predominantly Alevi populated neighborhoods, police 
forces with the power to take anyone from the neighborhood at any time, cruising white 
Renault cars used to kidnap activists, identity checks, wandering panzers and house raids 
became a part of ordinary life. 
 
Checkpoints as the markers of Narova as a no- go area 
One of the most crucial developments that led to segregation of Narova and 
contributed to its separation from the surrounding areas was the construction of 
checkpoints at the entrances and exists of the neighborhood. By the early 1990s members 
of the Special Operation Units (SOU) located at the entrances and exits of the 
neighborhood began to check IDs. These identity checks, which were implemented rather 
unsystematically and arbitrarily, continued until the early 2000s. As I illustrate below, the 
checkpoints, first of all, drew the boundaries of the neighborhood and separated it from the 
surrounding areas. Secondly, the SOU members waiting at the checkpoints with their 
rifles, recalling the images of war zones ––zones of encounter with the enemy–– or of 
borders separating the homeland from alien territories, contributed to the stigmatization of 
the neighborhood as a “terrain of anticipated violence” (Jeganathan 2004:72), a no-go area 
and a place of strangers and/or enemy-like people. In other words, checkpoints, by 
reminding everyone of the possibility of violence and recalling the images of war and 
borders, in a country, which according to dominant nationalist discourses, is surrounded 
by enemy countries, contributed to the association of Narova with violence and to the 
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stigmatization of its residents as internal enemies. Hence, it is no coincidence that during 
the 1990s, even bus and cab drivers avoided going to the neighborhood, as they believed 
that it was not a safe place to go.  
The very presence of the checkpoints was enough to prevent non-residents from 
going to the neighborhood. However, those who were not discouraged by the checkpoints 
sometimes had to contend with police violence. A thirty year-old man name Ihsan who 
used to live in a neighborhood close to Narova told me why he stopped going to Narova in 
the 1990s: 
I used to go to Narova to take guitar lessons when I was a high school student. Once 
the policemen waiting at the checkpoint stopped me and asked me to show them my 
ID. One of them examined my ID and asked me where I lived. I told that I lived in 
the neighborhood nearby and that I came to Narova to take guitar lessons. The 
policeman, staring at me angrily, told me that I had to answer some questions at the 
police office. They put me in a car and took me to a police station. At the police 
station, another policeman interrogated me. I do not remember exactly what he asked. 
I was so scared. I was only 15 then. And it was the 1990s, you know… We were 
hearing all sorts of stories about torture and things like that. I was afraid that they 
would beat me. They didn’t. The policeman yelled at me, saying things like: “What 
are you doing in Narova? Don’t you know that that place is a terror den?” Then he 
told me that if I went to Narova again, they would kill me. I did not go to the 
neighborhood again. I later heard that the same thing happened to many people who 
wanted to go to the neighborhood. Later, for instance, a friend of mine was severely 
beaten at the same police station… 
  
 
The story above is one of the many similar stories I heard from non-residents who 
wished to enter the neighborhood at some point during the 1990s. As the story illustrates, 
in addition to the checkpoints, another technique of marking Narova as an enemy and/or 
foreign zone was to prevent encounters between Narova residents and other people. 
Ahmed (2013), in a very different context, in the context of women’s attempts to gain 
respectability to “stay safe” argues that “movement becomes a form of subject constitution 
[for women]: where ‘one’ goes or does not go determines what one ‘is’, or where one is 
seen to be, determines what one is seen to be”(33) (Emphasis in original). In the case of 
Narova, one can argue that by telling the non-residents to not to be seen in Narova, the 
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police were defining what Narova is: an exceptional place, from which a woman has to 
keep herself away. By not letting the non-residents in, the policemen were telling them 
that in order to remain citizens deserving of respect —citizens who do not deserve to be 
beaten, tortured and interrogated— one had not to be seen in Narova. In other words, 
according to the police, being seen in Narova made one a potential, even a deserving 
target of violence. Hence, the policemen waiting at the checkpoints actively separated 
those who were to be seen in Narova from those who were not. These separations, 
preventing everyday encounters between Narova residents and non-residents contributed 
to the stigmatization of Narova as a dangerous place filled with strange people or 
terrorists. 21 
 
The checkpoints as the markers of sovereignty 
As Sidaway (2003) argues, “the checkpoint is a technology of government, the 
embodiment of a claim to sovereign power—the practice of sovereignty” (165). The 
checkpoints surrounded by armed policeman remind the people of the police’s sovereign 
power, the power to use arbitrary and unrestricted power over life and death. Halime, a forty-
eight year old woman who has lived in the neighborhood for twenty-four years, tells how 
police located at the checkpoints were concerned with demonstrating their power:22 
 
 
Halime:  A lot of people from the neighborhood told me that there were policemen 
checking IDs at the entrances and exists of the neighborhood throughout the 1990s. 
Do you remember them?  
Halime: Ah…Those identity-checks… How can I forget them? It was a pain every 
single day.  
 
Me: Were they in the neighborhood every day? 
 
Halime: Well, almost every day. They were supposed to be here on the days of 
demonstrations. But according to the state, every day was a demonstration day in our 
neighborhood. If you wanted to go home, they would stop and frisk you. Then they 
would ask for your ID. You would show your ID. Before putting your ID back into 
your wallet, they would start searching you again and ask for your ID once again. 
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Then they would say that they wanted to search your identity in a more detailed way. 
That meant that they wanted to check your identity information stored at the GBT 
[General Information Gathering System]. 23It meant that they wanted to kill 
you.24You would wait with them until your identity information was faxed. It took at 
least half an hour. While you were waiting they would ask all sorts of silly questions, 
like, “what do you do?  Where are you coming from? Where did you get your coat? 
What is this? What is that?”  They did not even wait for the answers. They would just 
ask them to bother you. They knew that you had to answer their questions. You had 
to answer! Otherwise… They were enjoying it! They enjoyed it when you had to 
show them respect! And then after keeping you there for half an hour, they would tell 
you to go. Well, I think they did not even ask for the detailed identity information, 
they just told you that to make you wait there, to torture you. It is a psychological 
war!  It is the war of the state against the people! They show their power by 
humiliating you! The state sees us [socialists], as their enemies.  
 
 
Halime’s experience cited above, which took place in 1996, reflects the 
experiences of a large number of Narova residents I talked to. Like Halime, dozens of 
Narova residents complained about arbitrary interrogations and body searches and 
humiliating behaviors of the policemen at the checkpoints. Dozens of Narova residents 
told me that they were taken under custody from the checkpoints while going to their 
homes in the 1990s. Police custody meant further humiliation, torture and even death in 
those years. As Halime, and many other Narova residents observed, by asking arbitrary 
and seemingly silly questions, the policemen were indeed making it clear that 
interrogations were not done for security reasons; rather, for manifesting their power.  
 
 Checkpoints as the messengers of the state 
Jeganathan (2004) argues that the checkpoint is a location that “ties citizens to the 
state” (75). For him, people are subjected as enemies and friends of the state at the 
checkpoints. Government issued IDs in Turkey indicates one’s place of origin. As is 
commonly known in Turkey, the information about the place of origin in the ID cards 
turns ethnic and religious minorities into potential targets of police violence (Secor 2007). 
It is not unusual in Turkey that people are taken into custody just because of their places 
of origin. In Narova, too, a lot of people complained about police mistreatment and 
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harassment at checkpoints due to their places of origin. For instance, when I asked Halime 
what else she could tell me about the checkpoints she added that she had been humiliated 
several times because of her place of origin. She said that,  
   They look at your place of origin and they make comments about it.  “Oh you are 
from Tunceli? 25They don’t say Dersim, you know. They say Tunceli. Are you a 
terrorist? There is no single person who loves this state in Tunceli! All the people 
from Tunceli are traitors!” I know that a lot of people in this neighborhood were 
taken into custody and get tortured there just because they are from Tunceli. 
  
What Halime said was not new information to me. It is commonly known among left-wing 
circles in Turkey that if a person from Dersim is stopped by the police and asked to show 
his/her ID, it is most likely that he/she would end up in custody (See Chapter II for the 
significance of Dersim).  
 Secor (2007), citing the words of one of her Kurdish interlocutors from Turkey – 
“our sin, our guilt is being Kurdish” (45) – argues that “the ritual of the checkpoint and the 
showing of identification […] serve not to secure innocence before the law but to reproduce 
the stain of an abstract, unearned guilt” (45). For Secor, the identity checks in Turkey serve 
as the places of interpellation, in the Althusserian sense of the term. In these places, the 
police as representatives of state sovereignty convey to certain groups of people that they 
have an “unearned guilt.” They are guilty of being from the same region as the populations 
who once resisted or continue to resist the state. Accordingly, the checkpoints, by holding 
some “subjects in a relationship of guilt” (Secor 2007:27) give rise to the perception of a 
state subject, which intentionally uses violence against certain populations.  
While giving examples of mistreatment of Narova residents by the police, dozens 
of Narova residents all said the same thing: “ The state does not like us.”  For some, the 
state did not like them because they lived in a place like Narova. For others, the state did 
not like them because they were Alevis or they were Kurds. When I asked them why the 
state did not like Alevis, the replies were usually as the follows: Because “Alevis are 
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rebellious,” “ Alevis are revolutionaries,”  “Alevis are leftists,” or “Kurds are fighting for 
their rights,”  “It sees the Kurds as its enemies.”  I also asked them since when had the 
state has perceived them as such. For most of the Alevis, the answer was that the state had 
not liked them since the Ottoman era. Interestingly, even the young ones, who seemed 
proud of being ignorant about Alevi culture and history argued that the state has not liked 
Alevis since the Ottoman era. According to them, this was due to the fact that Alevis were 
revolutionaries even back then. In line with such beliefs, the discriminatory and violent 
police practices during the ID checks give the impression that there is a state subject over 
and above the ruling elites that has maintained similar attitudes toward Alevis since the 
Ottoman era. In other words, such practices make the minority populations think that there 
is a sovereign, a monstrous entity, that has occupied the realm of the state for centuries, 
transforming Turkey into an unsafe place for them. Such perception contributes to the 
normalization of police violence in targeted communities. For instance, after telling me 
that one of his friends were severely beaten by the police located at the checkpoints, Ihsan, 
the young man I cited above, added that “but he was from Diyarbakir, you know.” The 
“you know” implies that being beaten by the police is the expected fate of someone from 
Diyarbakir, a Kurdish town. 
Today, there are no checkpoints or ritualized identity checks in the neighborhood. 
But, panzers, akreps and undercover policemen still contribute to the separation of the 
neighborhood from the surrounding areas as well as give rise to the fantasies of the 
omnipotent state that wages a war against Narova residents.   
 
 
The Akrep and the Panzer  
The schools of Armutlu were police stations 
There were panzers laying in their playground 
The kids were growing up under the shadow of 
panzers  
The panzer took the child’s ball 
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The child ran to take her ball 
The panzer walked 
The child remained seven26 
 
Constantly strolling akreps and panzers have become part of the everyday life in 
Narova and in other predominantly Alevi populated neighborhoods since the early 1990s. 
The Turkish police, who stroll the neighborhood in these military vehicles, look more like 
soldiers than police. These military vehicles contribute to the perception of the Turkish 
state as a colonial occupational force in Narova residents’ eyes. A thirty-three years old 
young woman from Narova, Evrim, argues that: 
Erdogan, [the prime minister] talks about the violence in Palestine as if he has no clue 
about what has been taking place in this country. What is the difference between 
Gaza and Narova? Or, what is the difference between Gaza and Kurdistan? See, there 
are akreps all around. They come with helicopters to take five kids into custody! It is 
as if they are at war. The state sees us as their enemies. It is obvious!   
 
As I discuss in the Introduction, citing Foucault (1999), “politics is the continuation of war 
by other means” (23). The armed policemen, the checkpoints and military vehicles such as 
akreps and panzers make it clear to the internal enemies that there is a constant struggle 
between the ruling elites who want to maintain a certain order and those who pose a 
challenge to that order. 
Although the mere presence of these vehicles in the neighborhood was enough to 
remind the residents of the possibility of violence, these vehicles have been used in 
numerous violent acts. Among these acts, the most commonly known is the story of 
Sevcan, which took place in Armutlu, a predominantly Alevi neighborhood. As the lyrics 
of the song describe above, Sevcan, a seven-year-old kid, was run over by a panzer located 
at the school playground while trying to catch a ball in 1993. After this event, the people 
of Armutlu organized a demonstration in the neighborhood, which ended with the police 
attacking the residents. As it usually happens in Turkey, this act of protest against police 
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violence brought yet more police violence. The police made no apologies about the 
accident and the policeman who killed Sevcan was not put on trial (Iseri 2010). 
A similar event took place in Narova in 2006. According to witnesses, there was a 
demonstration against cell-type prisons in the neighborhood on December 10, 2006. Soon 
after the demonstration started, the policemen used tear gas on the demonstrators. Affected 
by the tear gas, the crowd began to run around. An akrep, driving fast, started to chase a 
young man among the demonstrators. The young man, running away from the akrep, 
entered a one-way street and got stuck there. He leaned against the wall of a shanty house. 
The akrep drove towards him, ran over his foot27 and went into the house.28 This is a well-
known story in the neighborhood. Alkan, who lived in that house, was among the people 
who told me this story. Alkan was 14 years old when the event took place. He was playing 
in front of the house when he saw the akrep chasing after the young man. As he told me, 
when the akrep went inside, his father was sitting on the couch and watching TV. He was 
completely shocked when he was hit by the akrep and started to yell at the policemen. The 
policemen got out of the akrep started to swear at the man. Alkan’s father went to the 
police office to file a complaint against the officer and to demand reparations. The 
policemen at the police station got angry and began yelling at him, telling him that if he 
did not leave he would be taken into custody. He was not allowed to sign a complaint and 
no reparations were provided to fix to house. His neighbors raised money for the repairs. 
 According to Alkan, the police’s behavior was entirely to be expected and 
completely normal. He said, “what do you expect? If you are from Narova you are already 
deemed guilty. The police would always treat you as if you committed a crime even 
though you are innocent. If you are from Narova you better stay away from the police.”  
As I wrote above, I heard this story from various residents. It is likely that these residents 
thought that this is a kind of story that would attract my attention—stories designed to 
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appeal to the anthropologist who sought stories about violence. Yet, like Alkan, other 
residents, too, after telling me the story, added that those kinds of things always happened 
in Narova and that there was nothing extraordinary about it. 
The violence of the state, embodied by the presence of the akreps and panzers does 
not only contribute to the appearance of the police as an omnipotent figure beyond the 
law, but also serves to normalize and render violence routine within the neighborhoods. 
The children, who socialize under the shadow of these vehicles, grow up thinking that 
police violence is natural and inevitable. Hume (2008), making a similar point in her work 
on violence in El Salvador, argues that widespread impunity not only “deepens mistrust of 
agents of the state” but also increases people's threshold for tolerating violence and 
transforms the perceptions of ordinary. For her in the places where arbitrary violence 
becomes a part of the routine, violence also becomes normalized. For the context of 
Narova, too, we can argue that akreps and all other reminders of violence, such as 




House raids have been a part of ordinary life in Narova since 1990. House raids, 
being another practice of the sovereign, have torn Narova's social fabric apart: the 
isolation of those within the community who are activists from those who are not 
politically engaged. They have been instrumental in stigmatizing Narova's politically 
active residents and in asserting state sovereignty in the neighborhood. Halime’s 
experience, for instance, is revealing in that it helps to better understand the operation and 
effects of house raids. She describes how her house was raided in in 1995, 
They [the policemen] were playing with our nerves every single day. Once, I was 
coming back from the office of the party [Socialist Power Party]. I guess the 
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undercover policemen were following me. They probably told the police at the 
checkpoints to stop me. I was on the bus with my friends. The police stopped the bus. 
They yelled my name and asked me to get out of the bus. Can you imagine that? The 
police stop the bus and yell your name! I asked, “What happened?” They told me that 
I had to go with them. Everybody in the bus started staring at me as if I was a 
terrorist. Imagine that policemen standing next to an akrep with rifles stop a bus and 
call a woman’s name and tell her to get out. What would you think of her? If you 
were not a political person [politically engaged], you would of course think that the 
woman is a terrorist! And they are doing it for that very reason. I mean to show you 
that they will make you a terrorist! 
Anyways, after I left the party office, I went shopping. I was carrying two 
plastic bags of fruits and vegetables. I got off the bus with those bags. They brought 
me into the akrep. They did not ask me anything on the way home. They knew where 
I lived. There were five or six policemen and me with my grocery bags! I was a 
terrorist carrying watermelon and grapes! Can you believe that? I must had been very 
dangerous with those bags! But you know, what if there was a bomb hidden in the 
watermelon? As soon as we got home, Cahit [her husband] showed up. It turned out 
that my friends on the bus had called and told him what had happened. When Cahit 
showed up at the front door [of their shanty house], they drew their guns. One held 
his gun to Cahit’s forehead. I started screaming: “He is my husband! Stop it!” You 
can’t imagine how loud I shouted. Standing at the door, Cahit started yelling , “What 
are you doing? Stop it!” He was experienced. He was not scared, he continued 
shouting at them… Everybody on the street started watching us. He yelled “I am a 
president of the X district organization of the Socialist Power Party! I am a member 
of a legal party!” The policeman turned to me, he said “why didn’t you tell me that?” 
Stupid! I said “you did not ask. If you did, why wouldn’t I?” [Long silence]. 
We became terrorists. Cahit turned to the neighbors, started shouting: “hey 
can you see it? Can you see how the police protect you! The police protect you from 
this terrorist! From your neighbor! See how dangerous she is!” They [the neighbors] 
began to think of you as a terrorist. Even your relatives become afraid of being seen 
with you. They think that if they are seen with you they might be perceived as the 
supporters of a terrorist. You are stigmatized. He [one of the policemen] started 
laughing, “we didn’t eat any watermelon. Why didn’t you serve us watermelon?”  I 
said “eat shit” on the inside. On the outside, I said, “take it, eat it, if you want.” Eat 
shit! Eat donkey shit!  
 
Deniz: It must have been very difficult… [Long silence] What did they do afterward? 
 
Halime: What could they do? They made their show and then they left! They didn’t 
take me into custody. Their aim was to annoy us! To show us their power! They want 
to tell the others to keep themselves away from socialist politics. 
 
 
 Halime’s story is neither an unusual story nor an example of the most brutal forms 
of police raids that took place in the neighborhood. It is actually among the most 
“peaceful” stories of house raid. House raids have been effective in silencing and 
depoliticizing the communities. First of all, as Halime’s case illustrates and as I have heard 
from many other Narova residents, the house raids have usually taken place as a public 
spectacle. In the case of Halime, by calling Halime by her name on the bus, the police 
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showed Halime and the other riders that they track and can identify “suspicious” people by 
name. They allowed various bystanders to become witnesses to the process. The people in 
the bus, the people on the street and finally her neighbors became witness to this spectacle 
of state violence and intimidation. As Foucault (1995) argues, “in the ceremonies of public 
execution, the main character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was 
required for the performance” (50). In a similar vein, Walter (1969) argues that the “main 
function of state terror is not only to punish acts of disobedience and resistance but also 
sap the potential for disobedience in advance and to break the power to resist” (19). These 
witnesses, indeed, as Halime noticed, were among the main characters of the story. As 
Halime explained, the police, by turning Halime’s alleged interrogation into a public 
spectacle, sent a message to the witnesses, which said that if they engaged in political 
activities, they too would face police violence as a result. Hence, one of the most 
important aims of house raids is to prevent potential disobedience by provoking fear and 
intimidation.  
     Second, the house raids contributed to the stigmatization of politically engaged people 
and lead to their isolation within the community. We can adopt Ahmed’s arguments that I 
cited above to the house raids as well. As the reader may remember, Ahmed (2013) argues 
that for women, where one goes determines what one is. In this context, we can argue that 
whom one is to be seen with determines who one is. As Halime states very clearly, the house 
raid was intended to send a clear message to her neighbors to not to be seen with Halime in 
order not to be labeled as a terrorist. Such acts turn people, even the relatives, into stranger to 
one another. When people become strangers to one another it is always easier to project an 
aura of danger on the other and justify violence against those who are recognized as 
potentially dangerous strangers (Ahmed 2013). Like Halime, many other Narova residents 
told me how their relationship with their neighbors and relatives had changed after their 
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houses were raided. Today, house raids usually take place with the participation of thousands 
of police forces accompanied by tanks and helicopters. Such raids create the impression that 
those, who are taken under custody are extremely dangerous–– too dangerous to be taken 
from their houses by a few policemen––and lead to further stigmatization and isolation of the 
politically engaged. Hence, it is no coincidence that Narova residents today often emphasize 
the erosion of the strong solidarity relations of the 1970s and 1990s. It is also no coincidence 
that as I have argued in the Introduction, “divide and rule” is one of the most repeated 
phrases in the neighborhood. They often argue that while the neighborhood was like a big 
family in the past, today people are like strangers to one another. They say that while in the 
past, if someone was subjected to police violence, all the residents would gather together to 
protect her/him. They argue that while in the past it was impossible for the police to gather 
information about the community, today no one can trust anyone else (see also Jimeno 2001, 
Hume 2008, Feldman 1991).  A seventy-three years old woman, after talking about the 
comradely relations of the past, summarized the transformation of the social relations that 
Narova residents complain about as follows:  
 in the 1970s, we used go to bed with our doors open. Some of us did not even have 
doors to their houses. Our houses were open to all. Now, we all have steel doors in 
our buildings. It is not only the house but also our hearts that have steel doors. As the 
years passed we all locked the doors of our hearts and turned inward. 
 
Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter VI, such police operations give rise to fantasies among 
young radicals where they are threatening enough to bring thousands of policemen to the 
neighborhood, yet these too further contribute to their marginalization.  
 
The undercover police as a Gatekeeper  
Although at the first glance, the neighborhood seems as a relatively safe and 
peaceful place, I, myself, always have a hard time feeling safe in the 
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neighborhood.  Constantly prowling akreps, surveillance cameras and the presence of 
undercover policemen, which make me think that any unfamiliar gaze directed my way 
could potentially be the gaze of the police, had always kept my fear alive while in the 
neighborhood; however, to my surprise Narova residents repeatedly told me how safe they 
felt in their neighborhood. In fact, many residents told me that even in the 1990s the only 
place they felt safe in Istanbul was in their neighborhood. Asya, a middle aged, activist 
woman, for instance, while telling me how she was feeling safer in the neighborhood in 
the 1990s, told that “at the very moment I stepped into the minibus that would take me to 
Narova, I began to feel relieved! Getting into that mini-bus was such a relief!” When I 
asked her why she felt safer in the neighborhood, she told me that there are always one or 
more familiar faces in the streets of Narova and “if something happens, there would 
always be people around to help.” I heard the exact same words from almost all of the 
Narova residents I talked to. When explaining why they feel safer in Narova, almost 
everyone I talked to, but more specifically the activists, told me that people knew each 
other in the neighborhood and “if something happened,” there were always friends, 
relatives and neighbors to help. 
For a long time, I thought that they felt safer in the neighborhood because seeing 
familiar faces at the streets made them feel at home in Istanbul, where as most of the 
residents argued that they feel like a refugee. For a while I did not question what they 
meant by “if something happened.” In retrospect, I understand that I probably did not want 
to understand its meaning too clearly. Because I was also afraid that something bad might 
happen to me. Yet, I was not ready to confront my own fears. 
One day, in February 2011, while I was walking in one of the central districts of 
Istanbul, I noticed a man walking behind me in the crowd. I immediately felt that I had 
seen the man somewhere else before and that he was an undercover policeman following 
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me. Surprised by my own reaction, I thought that I was under the influence of stories I 
heard about Narova in the 1990s and that was why I was overly suspicious of strangers. 
Nevertheless, I wanted to be sure that he was not a policeman. I slowed down and let the 
man walk in front of me. He walked a few steps farther ahead of me and then bent over, 
pretending to tie his shoes. Still, my mind could not fully accept that he was an undercover 
officer. Once I had moved past him, I stopped to talk on phone and again let him pass me. 
He stopped once again and waited for me to continue walking. At this point I was 
convinced that he was a policeman. That very evening, while I was walking home, I saw 
the same man waiting in front of my apartment. I was so scared, of the policeman waiting 
there that I did not dare enter my building. The streets were empty and I did not have any 
neighbors or friends who lived close by. I felt extremely alone. I felt like Istanbul was a 
huge dark hole and that I was completely alone with the policeman inside. I felt that he 
had the power to do anything he wanted. I turned around and started walking in the 
opposite direction, thinking that the police would come and kidnap me—though I knew 
that the police kidnappings were not common anymore. But, still, what if the police 
changed their “policy” I wondered. What if they had begun to kidnap again? 
A couple of days later, while I was waiting at a subway station in one of the central 
districts of Istanbul, a young activist woman from Narova passed by. A few seconds later, 
I saw a man walking behind her telling someone on the phone “she is now walking toward 
the end of the station, keep an eye on her.” I realized that he was an undercover policeman 
communicating with another one. I was afraid for her safety. What made me feel more 
worried than seeing her being followed by the police was the fact that she was alone in a 
subway station packed with people she did not know. If I was not there and if they 
kidnapped her, there would not be any witnesses who knew her.  A couple of weeks after I 
first saw the undercover policemen following me, I realized that as I left the neighborhood 
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another undercover police officer followed me. This time, the policeman made it clear that 
he was following me by making the bus stop between two bus stops and by not giving a 
ticket to the bus driver. 29 Standing next to my seat, staring at me angrily and showing his 
fist to me as if he was going to punch me in the face, he also made it clear that the police 
did not want me in that the neighborhood. Once again I was terrified and avoided looking 
at him. I got off the bus at a station close to the house of a friend, who was at home at the 
time. The police officer also got off the bus and started to follow me. While walking in the 
direction of my friend’s home, I called her and told her to look out from the window as I 
approached. I wanted to have a witness in case something happens. Then, I realized why 
Narova’s especially activist residents have always felt safer in their neighborhood. As 
potential targets of police violence, they want to have witnesses in case the police assault 
them. Moreover, having familiar faces around and knowing that you can ask for help, 
eases the feeling of loneliness that emerges when one feels endangered. Hence, I realized 
that one of the reasons why Narova residents have felt safer in their neighborhoods might 
be due to the fear provoked by the presence of undercover policemen.  But no one ever 
cited this as a reason for their fear. Why was that? 
The following year, in 2012, when I started investigating the human rights abuse 
application documents of TIHV, I realized that fear is one of the most difficult things to 
talk about. While investigating the therapists’ notes taken during the sessions with those 
who were subjected to police violence, I noticed that even though these people were afraid 
of being followed by the police, they never spoke of this fear with their friends and 
relatives. Many people told their therapists that they did not want to leave their homes or 
neighborhoods because when they do they feel like the police are following them. I 
realized that I developed the same sense after being followed by the police. I became 
suspicious of persons walking behind me. I also realized how difficult it was to deal with 
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that fear while walking alone in unfamiliar locations, where no one could help you in the 
case of an assault or kidnapping. The fear of being followed by the police caused me to 
restrict my movement about the city, just like so many other targets of police violence. 
Hence, the fear created by the undercover policemen was also another force that 
contributes to the perception of the state as a powerful entity that controls the space and 
the movements of people. In other words, the undercover policemen on the one hand 
prime people's imaginations to perceive the state as a ghostly figure that chases after its 
enemies. On the other hand, by making some parts of the city more dangerous for Narova 
residents it contributes to the further isolation of Narova’s (activist) residents, as well as 
preventing encounters between them and other inhabitants of Istanbul. I did not meet 
anyone else besides me who did not live in Narova but went to Narova as often as I did. 
But my experience with the undercover policemen also proves that, like the SOU members 
who were trying to prevent non-residents’ visits to the neighborhood, the police still 
attempt to prevent visits to Narova —all of which further contributes to the 
marginalization of the neighborhood.  
 
“Varos: Bombs that are ready to explode” 
The media also played a significant role in separating Narova in particular, and 
similar neighborhoods in general, from the rest of the city. This was achieved by 
stigmatizing these places as dangerous zones. By the mid 1990s, the media had begun to 
use the concepts of varos and “the Other Turkey,” to define working class neighborhoods. 
Varos is a Hungarian term in origin, and it literally means “behind the city walls” (Erman 
2001). While the concept of varos applied to the city’s working class neighborhoods, as 
Aslan (2011) demonstrates the mainstream media mostly referred to Alevi populated 
neighborhoods as examples of varos.  According to the discourses of varos and of “the 
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Other Turkey,” the urban poor harm urban culture and the state's ideology, and “challenge 
the authority of the state” (Erman 2011). The term was first used by the mass media in 
Turkey, and it has strong pejorative connotations. Briefly, varos implies that the urban 
poor are both culturally and politically distinct and marginal people, with roots in a 
“backward” rural past, and that they pose a threat to the state with their support of radical 
political organizations (Demirtas and Sen 2007).  
            The emergence of the term and its widespread use coincides with the Gazi events 
of 1995 and the May Day demonstrations of 1996. After these two events, Narova and 
similar neighborhoods began to be portrayed by the media as dangerous zones, and the 
people who live in these neighborhoods were represented as dangerous, uncontrollable, 
and ready to strike at any given moment (Etoz 2000, Erman 2001). As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, although during the Gazi events Gazi residents protested the 
police violence that had been taking place in the neighborhood for some years, state 
officials insisted that the problems arose from  religious tension. And the Gazi riot was 
portrayed by the media as the riot of the “Other Turkey,” the “unruly,” urban poor who 
were totally different from the “normal Turkey.” For instance, a famous journalist, Yalcin 
Dogan, in an article on his visit to a varos tells readers in an astonished way that “varos” 
is not and/or cannot be a part of Istanbul: “Varos is a different world. When I came here, I 
realized that this place is a different world. Is this Istanbul? Is this a place that will be 
integrated into Europe? Is this place part of Istanbul?” 30 
On May Day 1996, the police shot three young men to death. Those men were 
probably members of illegal Marxist organizations before the demonstration started. After 
the shootings, the members of the illegal groups began to clash with police forces by 
throwing stones at them. The clash between police and the people soon spread to the 
whole demonstration area. Despite the murder of three young men and the clashes 
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between the police and the people, the young people who shattered the windows and 
destroyed the tulips in the demonstration area became the major images of May Day 1996 
in the Turkish media. The images of these young people from the varos who were 
destroying the tulips and throwing rocks were used to symbolize the “Other Turkey” 
(Gonen and Yonucu 2011). After these two events, working class Alevi neighborhoods 
began to be depicted in the media as a destructive and “dangerous bomb” that would 
explode and damage the entire city. For instance, the news coverage of the demonstrations 
organized to protest the Gazi events in other Alevi populated neighborhoods took place in 
the newspapers with melodramatic, incendiary headlines such as: “Umraniye 
exploded,”31 “Pendik may explode,” “Varos: Bombs that are ready to explode”, “Varos 
said I will explode” (Aksoy 2001). 
As is clearly seen by the metaphors used to describe Alevi populated neighborhoods, 
these kinds of representations attributing destructive powers to the people who reside in 
varos, contributed to the stigmatization of these areas as no go-areas and zones populated 
by the enemy-like strangers of the “Other Turkey.” Such descriptions contributed to the 
legitimation of police violence taking place in these neighborhoods and strengthened the 
boundaries between the middle and upper class Turkish urbanites, who supposedly 
deserve to live in the city, and the residents of varos. Additionally, they prevent building a 
bridge of understanding between different groups.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that in their attempts to activate their sovereign power in 
Narova, the Turkish ruling elites initiated militarized spatial control of the neighborhoods. 
The spatial isolation of Narova through militarized techniques led to the stigmatization of 
the neighborhood as a no-go area. Arbitrary police violence, which has dominated the 
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social life of the neighborhood since the 1990s, transformed the social relations of Narova. 
As violence became ordinary and normal in Narova, strong community ties were 
weakened and the community became fragmented. The demonstrations that took place in 
Narova with the participation of thousands in the early 1990s, were gradually replaced 
with demonstrations of just a few hundreds people. Moreover, erosion of solidarity among 
Narova residents negatively affected the camaraderie among revolutionary groups. Today, 
relations among various groups organized in the neighborhood are noticeably weak. 
Although in the past members of different organizations worked in collaboration, today 
each group organizes their activities separately, and even tries to sabotage other groups’ 
activities.  
As Narova and similar neighborhoods turned into zones where violence was 
routinely anticipated and no-go areas, everyday encounters between residents of these 
neighborhoods and others became limited. In this process, Istanbul’s non-Alevi 
populations and Alevi populations became strangers to one another. Due to this this 
process, the everyday experiences of working-class Alevi neighborhoods residents have 
been radically altered and no longer resemble those of residents living in other working 
class neighborhoods.   
As Coronil and Skurski (2006) argue, violence is a force that that ruptures the flow 
of everyday life. Violence as an autonomous agent disrupts order and overwhelms 
meaning.  This powerful agent, violence, has become one of the most significant forces 
that affected Narova residents’ perceptions of reality. Their everyday experiences with 
arbitrary violence became key to informing their daily concerns, political subjectivity and 
political objectives. Hence, the isolation of Narova, did not only contribute to the 
fragmentation of the community of Narova, but also the fragmentation of the socialist 
movement in particular, and society in general. Turnout at today’s May Day 
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demonstrations in Istanbul is evidence enough of how fragmented the Turkish left has 
become. The corteges of illegal revolutionary organizations almost exclusively consisted 
of working-class Alevis,32 and the corteges of legal socialist parties generally consisted of 
middle and upper class professionals, intellectuals and college students.  
As the ties between the middle class and working class socialist were weakened the 
members of illegal organizations’ political projects and subjectivity began to be informed 
by the reality in Narova and their projects and political practices began to be organized 
around the demands of these neighborhoods. In the following Chapter I discuss what 
happens when the members of illegal revolutionary organizations develop their projects 
according to the demands of Narova like neighborhood. By the 1990s, in addition to 
arbitrary police violence, the introduction of criminal gangs and the criminalization of 
Narova's youth began to dominate the social atmosphere of Narova. Accordingly, the 
following chapter, which focuses on the anti-crime campaigns initiated by some Narova 
residents, will highlight the processes that turned around 300 hundreds of Narova youth 
into terror suspects and convicts. As I elaborate in a theoretical discussion with reference 
to Aretxaga (2003), in places where political violence informs and affects social relations, 
police forces and their threatening Other become fetishes to one another and their political 
subjectivity is constructed through an “endless play of mirror images.”  Accordingly, I 
also illustrate, the ways in which, Narova’s young radicals whose political subjectivity and 
fantasies were molded by arbitrary police violence, attempted to declare their own 
sovereign power in the neighborhood by trying to deactivate the power of the police/state 
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1 A seventy- two years old woman from Narova. 
 
2 A fifty-two years old man from Narova. 
 
3 The only person who is still in prison regarding the Gazi trial is a young socialist who is accused of “having 
attempted to change the constitutional order by armed means” Among the policemen who shot at the crowd, 
only two were found guilty and sentenced to four years of imprisonment; however, they were not imprisoned 
(Tuleylioglu 2011). 
 
4 Hanefi Avci is now in prison on charges of terrorism. Notorious for using torture against socialists, Avci has 
been found guilty of being a member of a radical Marxist organization in favor of armed struggle, Revolutionary 
Headquarters (DK). 
 
5 Spring demonstrations were not only limited to workers’ marches. Throughout the spring of 1989, the workers 
organized a series of actions such as collective half-naked marches, barefoot marches on the highway, closing 
the busiest streets of Istanbul to traffic, going to work late, slowing down production, etc.  Information available 
at: http://www.emekdunyasi.net/ed/guncel/454-39-89-bahar-eylemleri-boyle-olur-iscilerin-bahari.  Last visited 
September 26, 2012. 
 
6 Established in 1978, Dev-Sol, became active by the late 1980s again.  Dev-Sol was a splinter group of THKP-
C.  Later, in 1994, it became The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party’ Front (DHPK-C). 
   
7 Established in 1995, the MLKP was, like the DHKP-C, in favor of urban guerrilla organizations and 
mobilization of the masses. 
 
8 Established in 1972, the TIKKO became active again during the late 1980s.  The TIKKO is a Maoist 
organization in favor of urban and rural guerrilla struggle. 
 
9 Established in 1996, the ODP is an umbrella socialist party, which included various socialist groups ranging 
from Stalinists to Trotskyites, from feminists and LGBT activists to libertarian socialists. Though ODP s still 
active, it is now a much smaller party.  In the national elections of 1999 and 2002, ODP got 0.80% of the 
general vote, which means approximately 250.000 people voted for the ODP in the elections of 1999 and 2002. 
In the 1999 and 2002 elections, some groups within the ODP voted for the pro-Kurdish Party, DTP, as they 
believed that the Kurdish struggle needed the support of the socialists. In 2007, this number decreased to 0.15 
%. Information available at http://www.secimsonuclariturkiye.com/ Last accessed: March 1, 2013. 
 
10 Established in 1996, the EMEP is an Albanian-oriented socialist party with Stalinist tendencies.  In the 
national elections of 1999, EMEP got 0.17 % of the general vote, which means approximately 52.000 people 
voted for EMEP in 1999. The party did not join the election in 2002. And, in the 2007 election it received 0.08 
% of the general vote, which makes approximately 26.000 people. Information available at 
http://www.secimsonuclariturkiye.com/ Last accessed: March 1, 2013. 
 
11 Established in 1993, the SIP, which has been re-named the Communist Party of Turkey, was a Soviet style 
Stalinist Party. In the national elections of 1999, SIP received 0.12 % of the general votes. SIP, gained 0.19% 
and 0.21 of the general votes in 1999 and 2002.   
 
12 Unfortunately there are no independent social science studies on the post-coup revolutionary organizations of 
Turkey. However, there are a number of dissertations written by Turkish and American police and soldier 
academics on DHKP-C/ Dev-Sol.  These dissertations mostly focus on understanding the recruitment processes 
of DHKP-C and why it became a popular organization. Police interest in DHKP-C/Dev-Sol can be seen as 
evidence of the threatening power of the organization.  See: Teymur 2007, Sevinc 2008, Yayla 2001, Cline 
2004, Ekici 2009, Kenville 2000. 
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13 DHKP-C continued similar assassinations throughout the 1990s. The most recent violent action of the 
organization was a suicide bombing attack to the US embassy in February 1, 2013 to protest the imprisonment 
of the members of Progressivist Lawyer’s Association who are accused of being members of the DHKP-C.  
Information available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-305927-leftist-terrorist-group-dhkpc-claims-us-
embassy-bombing.html Last accessed: March 1, 2013. 
 
14 Information available at: http://almanakturkiye.wordpress.com/1990-2/ Last accessed: March 1, 2013. For a 
detailed list of the DHKP-C’s targets see Kenville (2000), a dissertation submitted to US Naval Academy. 
 
15 It is impossible to determine the exact number of the members and supporters of these organizations. 
However, participation in May Day celebrations give us clues about the approximate number of the supporters 
of such organizations. For instance, in 1996, around 70 thousand demonstrators participated in the May Day 
demonstration in Istanbul.  This demonstration was probably the most crowded May Day demonstration took 
place after the coup. DHKP-C was among the most crowded groups in the May Day demonstrations with the 
participation of no less than a thousand people. After 1996, the participation to May Day demonstrations 
gradually declined. See: http://www.sendika.org/2002/05/1-mayisin-ardindan/  Last accessed March 1, 2013.  
Further f evidence that these organizations did not remain marginal in the 1990s was the popular support Grup 
Yorum, abranch   of DHKP-C, gained. Grup Yorum, with some of their songs being directly based on the 
personal stories of  DHKP-C militants, was among the top selling bands throughout the 1990s (Milliyet, July 02, 
1999). Grup Yorum has released 20 albums since 1987. The band’s members have frequently been arrested, 
imprisoned, and tortured. Their albums have been confiscated and their concerts raided. The group’s 25th 
anniversary concert on June 12, 2010, which drew an audience of fifty-five thousand people, proves that the 
band’s political music still holds popular appeal in Turkey.
 
16 In 1996, political prisoners started a hunger strike in Turkey. While 12 prisoners died due to starvation, 14 
prisoners, four of whom were beaten to death, were killed by the state’s security operations. Annual Report of 
TIHV, 1996. 
 
17 Among the most common slogans of the 1990s were: We will drown fascism in the very blood it shed, The 
murderer state will pay the price, Mothers’ anger will strangle the murderers. These slogans, I believe, hint at 
the people’s desire for revenge. 
 
18 During the mid-1990s, DHKP-C, even published its own constitution to be used after the revolution, titled 
“Constitution of the People.” 
19 The story of Gundem, a pro-Kurdish journal, offers an example of the control over and pressure on the 
Kurdish press in the 1990s. The emergency governor banned the distribution of the journal in the region. More 
than 75 of Gundem’s employees were killed from 1992 to 1994.  Newspaper sellers and distributors joined 
reporters on the list of those murdered for doing their jobs. In 1993, Turkey was number one on the list of 
journalists killed by country. Information available at:  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=press-tells-the-story-of-kurdish-journalists-in-
19908217s-2010-10-13.   Last accessed: September 25, 2012.   See also Cemal 2003, on the control over the 
Turkish mainstream media on Kurdish issue. 
 
20 Hayri Kozakcioglu, who is responsible of large scale human rights abuses both in the Kurdish region and in 
Western Turkey, was found dead at his home in May 22, 2013 soon after the negotiation process between the 
PKK and the government started  (Hurriyet, May 23, 2013). Kozakcioglu’s testimonies would be crucial in 
throwing light on the disappearances extralegal killings and political murders took place during the 1990s. 
 
21 I believe that the prevention of human encounters between potentially threatening populations and others are 
key to the Turkish elites’ ruling strategies. While examining the archival material in THIV, I came across the 
cases of two men, around the age of 70, who applied to THIV after being severely tortured by the police on 
different occasions.  What made me read the details of their case was that both of the men were from villages in 
Western Turkey. Having encountered only a very few torture cases of those who are originally from Western 
Turkey, I read the details of the case. These two men were tortured in different times by the police after having 
seen with a Kurdish man. They were both accused of helping the PKK and their torturers warned them that they 
must not make friends with the Kurds again. 
 
22 Halime was a member of the Socialist Power Party between the years 1995 and 2002.
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23 This system lists extensive personal data such as information on arrest warrants, previous arrests, foreign 
travel restrictions, avoidance of military service, desertion, refusal to pay military tax and delays paying tax. 
Served sentences are as a rule removed from this information system and entered onto the database of criminal 
records (Gonen 2011). Moreover, as Inanici (2011) explains “subjective notes of the police about the persons, 
which do not have any legal value, are also recorded in the GBT. Even though a person is acquitted of a political 
crime, the record is never erased from the database. What is more, intelligence is also recorded even on people 
about whom no criminal investigation exists ” (238). 
 
24 Here she makes a word play. The slang way to say to kill in Turkey is gebertmek, which sounds similar to 
GBT. 
 
25 Tunceli is the official new of Dersim. In 1935, a law was passed to change and Turkify the name of Dersim 
(Ayata and Hakyemez 2013). 
 
26 The lyrics of the song written by the socialist band Ozgurluk Turkusu [The song of freedom], after the death 
of Sevcan, a seven years old kid, who was run over by a panzer in Armutlu, an Alevi populated neighborhood, 
in 1992. 
 
27 The young man’s left leg was injured severely and he cannot walk properly anymore. For the injury report see 
Turkish Human Right Association, Dossier Number 2006/378.  The young man later left for Germany under the 
status of political refugee. 
 2828 Information available at: http://www.evrensel.net/v2/haber.php?haber_id=1486 Last accessed: May 25, 
2013. 
 
29 In Turkey, public transportation is free of charge for the police.
 
30 Milliyet, March 15, 1995
 
31 The story of this headline, for instance, is about the demonstration organized in Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi in 
Umraniye to protest the Gazi events. This demonstration resulted in the fatal shooting of five people from 
Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi at the hands of the police. 
 
32 It is not possible to understand whether or not a person is Alevi by looking at her/his physical appearance. 
However, as I argue in a theoretical discussion with reference to Tugal (2011) Turkey’s Sunni working classes 
gradually turned to moderate Islam or right-wing politics after the coup of 1980s.
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CHAPTER V 
The police, gangs and revolutionary organizations: A furious competition 
over law and territorial control 
 
The French philosopher Badiou (2002), in his article on the global war on terror, 
pointing out that the war on terror has replaced traditional wars waged between the states, 
asks “indeed, how does one declare war on a few delinquent civilians or fanatical bombers 
or on a group of anarchists?” (23). The declaration of war against a small group of 
individuals might seem irrational at first. There is a significant difference between the 
power and destructive capacities of well-organized armies and police institutions and a 
group of people ––no matter how well armed. This chapter, focusing on the processes and 
relations that turned around three hundred young people from Narova into terrorist 
suspects and convicts by the late 2000s, demonstrates that there is indeed a rationale 
behind the declaration of war against a group of people/terrorists. The chapter, first of all, 
critically engages with the questions: Who are rendered as terrorists/enemies of the state?  
What kind of practices and performances challenge the political power associated with the 
state? How do the ruling elites who continuously attempt to make and preserve their own 
law (cf. Benjamin 1978) respond to the populations who challenge and threat the power 
associated with the state?   
In order to seek answers to the questions above I focus on the criminalization of 
Narova youth by the early 2000s and on the anti-crime campaigns developed by Narova’s 
politically engaged youth. Demonstrating that criminalization of Narova has been 
perceived by its residents as a project developed by the state in order to depoliticize and 
even destruct the community in Narova, I ask: What happens if the state is perceived as an 
enemy actively engages in projects to destruct the community?  After discussing how the 
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state is perceived as contra the community and pointing out historical Alevi fears 
informative of such perceptions, I illustrate Narova youth’s attempts to establish law and 
order in the neighborhood. I argue that such attempts threatening the police power in the 
neighborhood turned some Narova youth into the rivals of the state and/or great criminals.  
As Girard (1987) theorizes, the relationship of rivalry produces the mimetic desire to 
be like the rival. This is precisely why for Girard violence is always reciprocal. 
Accordingly, this chapter illustrates that the relation of rivalry between Narova youth and 
the state’s security forces does not only originate from Narova youths’ attempts to 
establish their own law and order but also from their mimetic performances of police 
violence. Anthropologists, inspired by Girard’s notion of mimesis, which induces the 
subject to take the same posture toward the object as the rival takes toward the object, 
underline the mimetic relation between the representatives of the state and their enemies 
and/or rivals (Feldman 1991, Taussig 1993, Zilberg 2009, Robben 2010). As Girard 
(1987) underlines, the mimetic relation is not a mere imitation of the performances of the 
rival/Other. Mimesis or mimetic rivalry goes beyond mere imitation; it is “an assimilation 
into one another, a circulation between selves and anti-selves feeding of each other’s 
correspondence” (Zilberg 2007:65). I argue that police violence, which often operates 
through intimate encounters –– as in the case of torture, house raids, body searches–– is 
productive of mimetic desire among the targeted populations to manifest their own power. 
This chapter also illustrates the ways in which young radicals of Narova imitate policing 
practices and display their power through mimetic performances of sovereignty/violence. I 
argue that through the mimetic desire provoked by the continuous cycles of police 
violence, some Narova youth engaged in a relationship of mimetic rivalry with the police 
in which their desire became one and the same with that of the police —to manifest and 
hold power. In other words, the relationship of rivalry between the police and Narova 
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youth contributes to the assimilation of the police as the external object within the 
revolutionary self. 
 
Criminalization of poverty 
 The early 2000s marks a beginning of a new era in Narova, and indeed, in all of the 
other working-class neighborhoods of Istanbul. By the early 2000s, working-class youth 
began to engage in criminal activities such as pickpocketing, dealing drugs, prostitution. 
In addition, in this process, marijuana and other drugs, especially ecstasy and speed, 
became readily available in working-class neighborhoods in especially the big cities of 
Turkey (Yonucu 2005, Yonucu 2008, Gonen 2013). Scholars of crime and criminalization 
underline the connections between neoliberal reorganization of society and the 
criminalization of poverty (Bauman 2013, Bourgois 2003a, Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 
Gonen 2013, Hiemstra 2010, Parenti 1999, Wacquant 2009). Wacquant (2001) argues that 
a significant portion of the working class “has been rendered redundant and composes ‘an 
absolute surplus population’ that will probably never find work again,” with reference to 
this societal reorganization  (1642). In this process, crime has emerged as a substitute for 
welfare provisions and as an alternative income-generating activity for those who have 
became “permanently redundant” (Auyero 2000, Bourgois 1989, 2003b, Bauman 1997, 
2005, Giroux 2008, Parenti 1999, Wacquant 1999).   
 Furthermore, as scholars of crime and criminalization underline criminalization of 
poverty is a technique of governance, a means of “social control” (cf. Parenti 1999) that 
contributes to the creation and containment of dispossessed and “dishonored” groups. 
Parenti (1999), for instance, points out that criminalization and criminal justice are “about 
managing and containing the new surplus populations created by neoliberal economic 
policies, even when the populations are not in rebellion” (15). He argues that street crime 
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in the USA has been as effective as the state terror in Central America in preventing 
activism. As crime frightens the people away from streets and puts the disadvantage, 
hence potentially resistant groups behind the bars, it emerges as a significant obstacle in 
front of political mobilization. In a similar vein, Comaroff and Comaroff (2006), Garland 
(2001), Siegel (1998), Mauer (1997) and Wacquant (2001) underline the depoliticization 
effect of crime and discourses about crime. In their works focused on different parts of the 
world, they all illustrate that crime displaces attention away from the material and social 
effects of neoliberalism and “translate[s] a political issue into a criminal one” (Hall et al. 
1978:224, emphasis in original).  
Although Turkey’s neoliberalization process began right after the coup of 1980, 
the criminalization of poverty did not begin in earnest until the 2000s. Until then, familial 
and neighborhood solidarity networks had prevented the working class from falling into 
absolute poverty, and thus from engaging in crime (Pinarcioglu and Isik 2001, Bugra and 
Keyder 2006, Yilmaz 2008). Today, however, we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
kind of poverty in Turkey (Keyder and Adaman 2006, Bugra 2007, Keyder and Bugra 
2008, Yilmaz 2008). Studies on urban poverty in Turkey illustrate that the social solidarity 
networks that had been bridging the gap left by a lack of state welfare provisions, are 
weakening (Yilmaz 2006, Keyder and Bugra 2008). As working-class neighborhoods 
transform into places of poverty, working-class youth begin to engage in underground 
activities to generate income (Yonucu 2008, Gonen and Yonucu 2011). The drug trade 
and the emergence of petty crime gangs in working-class neighborhoods, which are by and 
large divided according to ethnic, religious and regional homeland ties, have affected these 
various neighborhoods in distinct ways (see Gonen 2011, Yonucu 2008). This chapter 
focuses on the ways in which crime has transformed social relations in Narova, a 
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neighborhood where the state is experienced as an “alien body”—an enemy poised to 
attack the people.    
 
Anti-crime campaigns in Narova: Contra the state  
  
Scholars of crime and criminalization demonstrate that facts and fictions about 
crime provoke fear and give rise to demands for more security (Buur and Jensen 2004, 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2004, 2006a, 2006b, Hansen 2006, Parenti 2000, Lemanski 2004, 
Low 2006, Luur 2006). These studies illustrate two main tendencies in citizens’ demand 
for security. First, the increase in police control, which includes civilians’ collaborations 
with the police (Cattelino 2004, Comaroff and Comaroff 2007, 2009, Hansen 2006, Sagar 
2005). Second, development of alternative security systems in the absence of police who 
provide security. Comaroff and Comaroff (2004), in their article on the circulation of 
crime discourses in South Africa, illustrate that such discourses give rise to fears that in 
turn create a demand for more police. The demand for more police, contributing to the 
expansion of police power legitimizes police or civilian violence against criminals and 
allegedly potential criminals (Parenti 2000, Gonen and Yonucu 2011, Hansen 2006). 
Cattelino (2004), for instance, in her work on civilian crime prevention campaigns in 
Canada, illustrates that these campaigns giving rise to police-citizen collaborations 
contribute to a division between legitimate and illegitimate citizens. They effectively turn 
the underprivileged populations, such as Blacks, immigrants, and working classes into 
potential criminals.  
Goldstein (2003), in her work on everyday life in a Brazilian favela, illustrates that 
the poorest populations “who thoroughly reject a corrupt police force […] seek some 
organized entity that can administer ‘justice’ in the local arena” (207). Similarly, Leeds 
(1996), Shirley (1990) and Buur (2006) in their works on poor, marginalized communities, 
point to the need for an alternative justice system among communities who perceive the 
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police as incompetent and corrupt. These scholars demonstrate that in the absence of the 
police that gain the trust of the community local gangs or vigilantes meet the demands for 
more security. Hence, according to Leeds (1996), in providing an alternative system of 
justice, these groups create a “parallel state.” Agreeing with Leeds’s concept of “parallel 
state” Goldstein (2003), too, demonstrates that local gangs “perform internal security and 
crime control functions” within the favelas in the “absence of the state” (209).  
However, the case of Narova does not exactly fit it these two tendencies.  As one 
might imagine, in Narova where the state is experienced as an “alien body,” the residents 
of Narova did not ask for more police. They, rather, attempted to create their own local 
crime control and punishment processes. However, their attempts to bring justice in the 
neighborhood were not a parallel state activity but instead ran contra the state. Instead of 
filling the space left empty by the police, they themselves appropriated the role of the 
police by actively attempting to exclude the police from the neighborhood, hence by 
deactivating police power in the neighborhood. As I will illustrate below, such attempts 
lead to hundreds of Narova youths’ legal accusations with the “crime against the state.” 
Narova residents did not immediately run their activities contra the state. Instead, 
believing that the police would not do their job to control crime in the neighborhood and 
that the police collaborate with criminals, they organized parallel state/policing activities. 
These activities were first initiated by the Neighborhood Beautification Association 
(NBA). As I discussed in the Introduction, Narova is home to various revolutionary 
organizations. While these organizations sometimes collaborate with each other, they do 
not always get along well, and each organizes its own campaigns and activities separately. 
Accordingly, during the early and mid-2000s, a number of anti-crime/anti-degeneration 
activities were simultaneously organized by different neighborhood organizations. While 
some of these attempted to provide alternative justice and/or security by relatively 
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peaceful methods, others appropriated more violent techniques. This chapter focuses on 
the crime prevention activities of the Neighborhood Beautification Association (NBA), 
which appropriated relatively peaceful methods. I focus on the NBA, because the 
organization’s activities gained it wide public support within the neighborhood. It was also 
one of the main targets of gang and police violence.  Besides, I only had the access to the 
court documents of the NBA members who have been tried as terrorist suspects. During 
the course of my fieldwork, the lawyers of other associations’ were put in prison with the 
accusations of supporting a terrorist organization. I, therefore, could not reach to their 
court documents.  In addition, in order not to be seen associated with such groups I 
avoided talking to them in-depth. 
 
Establishing the Neighborhood Beautification Association  
   In 2003, around twenty middle-aged residents of Narova initiated an anti-
degeneration campaign. While most of those involved had no political attachments at the 
time, they had all been members of different revolutionary groups during the 1970s. In 
order to trace the history of the campaign I met Hasan, who had been an active participant 
in its initial stages. Thinking that it might be helpful for me to talk to more than one 
person about the process, Hasan also invited his three friends Bilal, Ercan and Huseyin, all 
of whom had also taken active part in the campaign. I listened their story at a coffee house 
owned by Hasan. While having our teas, Hasan explained how and why he and his friends 
decided to do something about local crime: 
 
I came to this neighborhood when I was 18. We built this neighborhood all together 
back then. And, of course, we want to protect what we have built collectively. […] 
All of a sudden at the beginning of the 2000s several new coffee and gambling 
houses were opened here. These new coffee houses were not ordinary coffee houses. 
Gambling and other sorts of dark things were going on in these places. Also, some 
guys from outside the neighborhood began to sell drugs here. We realized that our 
youths were also hanging out with them, using, and even selling drugs. My friends 
and I gathered together, talked about the situation and came to the conclusion that if 
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we did not do anything to stop it, it would become worse. The neighborhood would 
become uninhabitable and our youth would end up either in prisons or hospitals. We 
wanted to protect our neighborhood and our youth.  
 
Hasan and his friends thought that by developing a crime prevention campaign 
within a legal association, their activities would be considered legal and legitimate both by 
neighborhood residents and the police. They thus established the association in 2003 and 
organized within it. In 2003, the NBA had around 50 members. Two years later, this 
number reached 500. The NBA became the most acknowledged center of crime 
prevention activities in the neighborhood until its eleven most active members were 
imprisoned as terror suspects after an October 2007 operation. The association is still open 
today. It has 45 members and is no longer active.  
As an initial step in their crime prevention activities, Hasan and the other members 
of the NBA identified the drug addicts in the neighborhood. As community relations and 
communal ties are still strong in the neighborhood, this was not difficult for them. They 
identified 127 habitual users,1 most of whom were from families who had lived in the 
neighborhood for more than 20 years. These users, as Hasan recalled, were between the 
ages of 13 and 22, mostly male. NBA members visited their homes, talked to their parents 
and tried to convince them to stop using. They also elicited the support of psychologists 
working at the neighborhood community center, who in turn offered free rehabilitation to 
some. With the help of doctors working at the community center, five drug addicts have 
received addiction treatment. Although Hasan and his friends repeatedly argued that they 
believed in employing peaceful methods in their fight against gangs and criminals, they 
also felt that force was sometimes necessary. Ercan, a 57-year-old man who also worked 
with the NBA in 2003, explained how and why this was so: 
I remember times when we went out with our sticks to chase glue sniffers.  We would 
start to chase a glue sniffer with, let’s say, 6 people and then on our way tens of other 
people would join us. Those days were great. We were determined to protect our 
neighborhood. The neighborhood was acting all together. We even came to the point 
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that we learned the gang members’ code names. I’ll never forget; there was one 
dealer called “Lanky.” We went to his house with the neighborhood headman and a 
group of people from the neighborhood. We knocked on the door. Someone opened it 
and we asked if Lanky or whomever was there. He yelled at us and said that he was 
not there. In a few seconds, Lanky showed up. He looked at us and asked us very 
aggressively what we wanted from him. The headman started to say, “What you do is 
not good, it is a crime” and so on. Lanky began yelling at him. I got mad. I pushed 
him towards the wall, punched him in the face. I said, “Listen! We are all behind our 
headman. You cannot yell at him. Those who built this neighborhood will not 
abandon it. We will not let you stay here. He then totally changed his tone and started 
to ask in an apologetic manner, “What did I do? What crime did I commit? 
 
    According to Ercan, it would have been impossible for them to scare gang members 
and criminals without showing force. It was also understood they had the collective power 
necessary to use force against them. However, they emphasized that apart from beating the 
most notorious criminals, whom the residents often complained about, they did not use 
any other kinds of force. My interviews with other people about NBA activities also 
testify to their words. As the NBA began to appear as a force going head-to-head with 
gang members, it also began to receive more support from residents. NBA members, in 
addition to going out and talking to the parents of youth involved in crime and to gang 
members about leaving their neighborhood, also made a list of coffee houses, casinos and 
pubs.2  They went to these places to make speeches about the importance of protecting 
their community and the possible dangers of gambling and drug consumption. According 
to Hasan and his friends, as the NBA gained public support, the gangs began to see them 
as a threat and challenged the organization to stop them “with their bullets.”  
 In order to raise public awareness, NBA members organized a concert in December 
2003 with the participation of around 1500–2000 people. During the concert, gunmen 
fired randomly inside the coffee house owned by Hasan, then head of the NBA. Luckily 
nobody died. The next week, a group of masked men raided the coffee house at night, 
ransacking the empty establishment. A couple of days after that, Hasan’s wife was shot in 
the leg while walking down the street.  
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Like many Narova residents, Hasan did not expect justice from the law/state. After 
listening to numerous stories about how the police saw Narova residents as “enemies,” and 
after realizing that the police represent the potentiality for violence in the neighborhood, I 
knew that I would sound too naive if I asked Hasan whether they received any help from 
the police. Nevertheless, after I listened to the story, I asked what the police did in 
response to the assaults and shots. With a very familiar look in his face —a look I knew 
from other Narova residents— he responded, “The police? What do you expect from 
them? They came to the coffee house, they took notes and nothing happened.” Neither 
those who raided the coffee house nor those who shot his wife have been found. This 
event was interpreted in the neighborhood as evidence of police collaboration with the 
gangs and reinforced the perceptions that the police collaborate with the gangs.  
  
The state against the community and the fear of eradication 
Studies on crime and poverty illustrate that poor populations tend to complain 
about systems of police corruption and of corrupt officers who work in collaboration with 
criminals (Andving and Fjeldstad 2008, Bordua and Reiss 1966, Davis 2006, Dixon 1999, 
Kashem 2005). As Goldstein (2003) shows, Rio’s poor favela dwellers, for instance, use 
the term “police bandit” to highlight the “corrupt nature of the police” (189). When I did 
fieldwork in the Istanbul district of Zeytinburnu in 2003, most of the drug addicts and 
small-scale dealers I talked to told me the police were involved in the process. During the 
initial stages of this project, as I was searching for a field site and before I had settled on 
Narova, I visited Hekimbasi —a mostly Sunni Turkish-populated working-class 
neighborhood where residents also testified to the police’s connection with criminal gangs. 
They complained about police corruption and interpreted their involvement as a method 
for officers to make money. Narova residents, however, do not perceive the relationship 
	  	   141	  
between the police and gangs simply as police corruption, or as wrongdoings of individual 
corrupt police officers. For them, the introduction of gangs to the neighborhood was part 
of a state project, which was planned in advance, with the aim of criminalizing Narova 
youth in order to depoliticize them and cause the neighborhood to deteriorate. As I will 
illustrate below, nearly all of the Narova residents I talked to were convinced that the state 
was solely responsible for the crime in the neighborhood.  
As I have argued above, criminalization of potentially resistant groups is used as a 
technique of governance in many different parts of the world.  In Turkey, too, as I have 
illustrated in my previous research, criminalization of working class youth effectively 
contributes to their depoliticization (Yonucu 2008, Gonen and Yonucu 2011). In a 
neighborhood like Narova, which is under constant police surveillance, the presence of 
gangs and crime illustrate that the police are indifferent to the non-political crime. At the 
initial stages of my fieldwork, I conduct an informal interview with one of the highest rank 
police officers in Istanbul. This police officer told me “central locations and middle and 
upper class neighborhoods of Istanbul are now free of crime. Because we succeeded in 
constraining crime in varos.”  It was not the reduction of the crime rates3 but “constraining 
the crime in varos” was a success for him. During the interview, I understood that his 
concern was not to end crime in varos, but to prevent potential uprisings in these 
neighborhoods. Because, after telling me that the crime was constrained in varos, he asked 
me if there would be uprisings in Istanbul’s varoses as there were in the suburbs of Paris 
and London. He later added that the police organization should develop preventive 
techniques to prevent possible uprisings.  
In Narova, as well as in other Alevi-populated neighborhoods and towns, crime 
prevention campaigns organized by citizens, some of whom are members of various 
revolutionary organizations, are called “campaign(s) against degeneration.” This rhetoric 
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implies an authentic cultural identity that is under threat of eradication. The assumption of 
an authentic culture and the fear of is its eradication become clearer in the title of a 
campaign organized in Narova in 2005: “Defend Your Own Culture Against the Attack of 
Degeneration.” The title not only hints at a fear that their authentic cultural identity might 
be lost, but also considers “degeneration” to be an active agent, an external force that 
attacks culture, and hence also the community, with purpose. For Narova residents the 
agent of degeneration was the state.   
For instance, when I asked Hasan about whether he had received any help from the 
police after the assault, Ercan jumped into the conversation, saying, 
State forces are on the inside of this thing! They allow gangs to sell drugs in the 
neighborhood to end [oppositional] politics in here. All these gang members are 
directed here by the state. They are trained by the state. They act according to state 
initiative. Go, go talk to the people in Gazi, Okmeydani, Nurtepe.4 You will see the 
same thing there too.5  
  
Bilal continued, 
The state plans this whole thing. They act according to a plan. The state is not the old 
state any more. They do not only use force anymore. In the past, they used to 
terrorize. Now they also criminalize. They’ve gotten smarter. They could not end 
the resistance by using force. Now they want to degenerate our youth. This is their 
new method to keep them away from politics. A very well planned method!  
 
Nodding at Bilal’s words above, Huseyin, with visible anger on his face, said,  
Very true! What he says is so true. You know what, this is a one-sided operation led 
by the state. Since 1980, they have wanted to integrate the people into the capitalist 
system. This is the politics of the state. They wanted to create a new generation that 
cuts ties with its past, who neglects its own culture, who is alienated from its essence.  
 
 All three of the people I cited above imagine the state as an enemy that actively 
wages war against Narova residents, as well as the residents of other Alevi- and leftist-
populated neighborhoods. I heard similar opinions from multiple people of various age 
groups around the neighborhood. At first I thought this was a connection primarily drawn 
by the neighborhood’s more politicized residents, who had witnessed the violent 
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atmosphere of the 1980 coup era and of the 1990s. After all, although Hasan and his 
friends had not been members of any political organizations for at least 15 years, they still 
define themselves as socialists. However, after I talked to more people, I realized that 
Hasan’s and his friends were representative of the views of Narova’s Alevi residents in 
general. For instance, before I talked to Ceylan, an 18-year old girl who is uninterested in 
politics, I would never have guessed that she would make a similar association. I knew 
Ceylan fairly well from the education co-op at which I was teaching. She used to come in 
every day to study while she was preparing for the university entrance exams. Before the 
interview, I saw her nearly every day for three months, during which period we chatted 
about her exams, what to expect from life at university, etc. Unlike some of the other 
young people at the co-op, I had never heard her talk about politics. I decided to invite her 
for an interview to see how young people who were less politically engaged thought about 
crime in the neighborhood. The following is an expert from our interview: 
Me: I heard that there used to be a lot of gangs in this neighborhood in the past. Do 
you remember those times?  
 
Ceylan: Yes, I do. It is the police’s business. The crime incidents have increased 
since the police began to come to the neighborhood. Before then there were no 
thievery, for instance. 
 
Me: How so? 
 
Ceylan: Let me give you an example. One day, a friend of mine was going to the 
market. He saw a policeman smoking pot on the way to the market around the high 
school. He could not say a word. How could he? If he had, they would have taken 
him into custody. Another friend of mine also told me that once a police officer 
stopped him on the street and told him, “You are from Narova. I have an offer for 
you. I will give you a monthly salary and you will tell me what has been going on in 
your neighborhood. I will save your future. My friend, of course, refused his offer. 
There are plenty other events like this.    
 
 Me: What has thievery to do with the police? 
 
Ceylan: We have two relatives who have grocery stores in this neighborhood. They 
both got robbed. You know that the police do not like us. We do not like them either. 
They want to harm us. The police give orders to the thieves. They tell them to go and 
rob our places. I witnessed such things many times.  In Armutlu, for instance, a 
policeman stopped a young woman walking and harassed her. I saw it with my own 
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eyes. But what can you do? You cannot file a complaint against him. How can you 
complain about the state to the state? (Emphasis mine).   
  
  Ceylan could simply have interpreted these incidents as the wrongdoings of 
individual corrupt police officers, or as examples of police transgressions of the law. 
However, in order to persuade me that the police are responsible for the crime in the 
neighborhood, in addition to giving examples about police misconduct, she also asserted 
that the police did not like them (the residents of Narova). When I asked her why this was 
the case, her response was that 
[t]hey do not like us because there are a lot of revolutionary organizations here. It is 
the same in places like Okmeydani, Gazi or Armutlu. They do not like the people 
there either. These neighborhoods are all the same. There are revolutionary 
organizations in these neighborhoods. They do not like the revolutionaries. 
 
Me: There is one more commonality among these neighborhoods. All of them are 
Alevi-populated neighborhoods. Do you think it has anything to do with their Alevi 
identity?  
 
Ceylan: I guess so. I guess it is mostly the Alevis who get organized in this country 
because Alevis are oppressed by the state. In general Kurds and Alevis get organized. 
Take Sunnis for instance. They are not oppressed. Why would they be oppressed? 
Take the Maras massacre: it was against Alevis. Take the Sivas massacre: it was also 
against Alevis. There have been Alevi massacres continuously. In order to stand 
against the police, they have to get organized. I think this is the main reason why 
Alevis are organized.  
 
 
For Ceylan, the police/the state do not like the neighborhood because of the revolutionary 
organizations based there. Although she does not directly relate the state’s assumed 
enmity against Narova residents with the neighborhood’s Alevi identity, she associates 
Alevis with revolutionary organizations. Moreover, she defines Alevi people as oppressed, 
and as the “victims” of continuous massacres. This definition, as well as her argument 
about the police’s dislike of revolutionaries, I believe, explain why residents of Narova, 
perceive corrupt police behavior as evidence of a state project to destroy their community. 
That is to say, the perceived collaboration of some police with gangs, the ongoing police 
violence against political activists, the police’s indifference to the gang attacks against 
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NBA activists, all of these keep memories of violence against the Alevi and socialist 
communities fresh in people’s minds.  
As Aretxaga (1995), with reference to Lacan explains, “subjectivity is always 
grounded in history—a history that includes the scars left by forgotten episodes and 
hidden discourses as much as conscious narratives.” (125). In her analysis of the “dirty 
protest” of Irish political prisoners, she demonstrates that the protest was informed by and 
organized against the historical British attempts to erase the Irish political identity. 
Similarly, we cannot think political subjectivities of Narova residents independent of the 
massacres and pogroms against Alevis. As members of Alevi community, I believe the 
Narova residents’ recent fear of their communities’ eradication is provoked by more 
deeply rooted historical fear of eradication informed by a series of violent attacks against 
the Alevi community. Hence, memories of police violence that has taken place in the 
neighborhood since its establishment are taken together with the history of Alevi 
massacres to be symptomatically6 expressed in the concept of “degeneration,” which 
contributes to perceptions of the state as an enemy with the intent to harm the community 
at large. There is a significant difference between perceiving police collaboration with 
criminal gangs as corruption and perceiving it as a planned state project against the 
community. My question here is, what happens when the state is perceived as an 
aggressive enemy, which actively develops projects against the community? 
  As the police’s indifference to and alleged collaboration with the criminal gangs 
evoked the historical fear of eradication, the Alevi habitus of local law-making and law-
maintaining practices entered the scene. These practices, as I discusses in Chapter II, 
aimed at providing law and order within the community not only by making local law but 
also by not letting the law enforcers and the security forces of the Ottoman and Turkish 
central authorities to intervene in the community. As Narova residents began to be 
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convinced that the crime is a state technique, the Narova youth began to attempt to 
exclude the police from the neighborhood while they were trying to provide law and order.  
 
The second phase of the NBA: The NBA as the local justice provider 
The violent event I described above marked the first break in the history of the 
NBA. Hasan and several friends who were all around the same age, and with whom he had 
initiated the campaigns against degeneration in the neighborhood, began to feel powerless 
against the criminal gangs and the police. Feeling that their lives to be under threat, 
decided to stop working through the association. Ercan explained his decision: 
 
There have always been people in this neighborhood who want to stop the 
wrongdoings here, but those they are fighting against are not disorganized.  They are 
not simple gangs, not simply drug users. They are as organized as the people gathered 
at Silivri7 prison right now. They work as systematically and with as much 
organization as those at Silivri. You have to take them seriously. There is a big force 
behind them. 
     
Huseyin continued, 
He is right! It became impossible to do any good in this neighborhood.  Whenever 
you want to do something the state is always there against you! I got tired … Look at 
the people of our age in this neighborhood. They have all become alcoholics now. 
They are all depressed. Even I drink. How can I not drink, my beautiful sister?  How 
can you stand it without drinking?  
 
 After hearing his words, I remembered how much the idealistic young activists in the 
neighborhood criticized the middle-aged, former activists for their excessive alcohol 
consumption. And after speaking with some more middle-aged men d who also feel there 
is no longer a place for activism in Narova, Huseyin’s words echoed in my mind: “How 
can I not drink, my beautiful sister?  How can you stand it without drinking?” 
 As the interview transcriptions above illustrate, in Narova, the series of violent 
attacks that formed the turning point in the NBA’s organizational history reinforced 
existing perceptions of the state as an all-powerful enemy with dark, underground 
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connections. Hasan and his friends, like many other Narova residents who used to be 
members of various political organizations and who are now cynical about political 
activism, felt weak against this omnipotence and abandoned their efforts with the NBA. 
Younger members, however, especially those who are politically engaged, interpreted the 
assaults as confirmation of their influence and were encouraged to continue their fight 
against “degeneration.” 
  After Hasan and his friends left the association, Halil and his friend from the 
Socialist Party of the Oppressed8 began to take a more active role in the association. In 
line with the original NBA policies they continued to a) talk and try to convince drug users 
to stop, b) work in collaboration with the community center to provide free rehabilitation 
for drug addicts, c) talk to neighborhood casino owners to try to convince them to close 
their businesses, d) talk to the people who frequent coffee houses in which gambling was 
allowed and warn them not to gamble there, e) organize community meetings, f) organize 
rallies against crime and g) beat up drug dealers in an effort to curb this activity in the 
neighborhood.  
NBA members did not use guns in their attempts to resolve what they saw as 
criminal issues in the neighborhood. However, as all nine members I spoke with argued, in 
some cases they “had to” use force in their fight against criminals. For instance, if they 
saw a drug dealer in the neighborhood, 10 or 15 young guys would spontaneously gather 
and beat him. The NBA also became a center where residents would go to complain about 
domestic violence, sexual harassment and mistreatment by their bosses. In such cases 
NBA members would also go to talk with the violent partner in a threating tone, beat up 
the sexual harasser, organize a rally against   sexual harassment and so forth.  
As I have argued above, the NBA is no longer active and no campaign against 
“degeneration” in the neighborhood currently exists. Nevertheless, I witnessed people still 
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going to NBA members to elicit their help with the daily injustices they faced in the local 
arena. The following event sheds some insight on how NBA members went about 
resolving some of these daily injustices. On a summer night in 2011, I was sitting and 
chatting with a group of young people at the neighborhood park. A young woman came 
over and wanted to talk privately with Kazim, who is an NBA member. Kazim left the 
group and talked with the young woman for around half an hour. After the conversation, 
he came back, telling me and two other young women in the group, “Girls, I am sorry, we 
have to leave you alone here. I will take the guys with me. We will be back soon.” 
Without a word, and without asking Kazim what had happened, all of the three young men 
in the group stood up and left. It seemed to me they are accustomed to such events. After 
they left, I looked with confusion to the women. Esma, who also once worked at the NBA, 
detected my confusion and explained, “Don’t worry Deniz! They are probably going to 
beat someone up then come back. Some pervert probably harassed that girl. We will learn 
about it when they come back.”  
 Esma’s guess was right. A man had followed the girl and said nasty things behind 
her as she walked through a nearby neighborhood. The girl, scared and angry, went to 
Kazim and his friends and asked them to “punish” him. Kazim, having known her for 
years and also feeling responsible for protecting the women of the neighborhood, did not 
hesitate to jump to her aid. As he told me later, they found the guy in a coffee house and 
asked him to step outside. At first, he refused, but relented upon their insistence. In front 
of the coffee house, Kazim told him that they heard about what he had done to the girl.  
The guy reportedly panicked and denied the accusation. Kazim told him they heard about 
everything that happened in and around the neighborhood, and that no crime would be left 
unpunished. He added, “I also told him that if he even dared to look at a woman on the 
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street again we would not be as kind with him next time.” After Kazim finished speaking, 
one of his friends punched the guy in the face and they left.  
 In addition to “punishing” the “criminals,” the NBA also organized social 
activities. In 2005, with the call of the NBA, 12 local organizations gathered in support of 
a platform they called “Defend Your Culture Against Degeneration.” This platform, 
according to NBA members and some other Narova residents, was an attempt to 
strengthen the culture of solidarity in the neighborhood. As part of the effort, football 
tournaments and concerts were organized to get youth involved in social rather than 
criminal activities. In 2006, the NBA also began to publish a weekly newspaper that 
organized essay and drawing competitions for youth and children. Members also tried to 
attract attention to what had been going on in the neighborhood by way of press releases 
and public discussions held at their office.9 
  As the activities organized by the association gained public sympathy in Narova, 
young and active members of the NBA became a very popular in the neighborhood. Halil 
especially, who became head of the NBA in 2005, also became a very respected figure in 
the neighborhood. Halil and his friends’ success in mobilizing residents around the 
organization, and their determination to end crime in the neighborhood, even attracted the 
attention of the national media. One national newspaper, for instance, printed a one-page 
interview with Halil and his friends about the NBA in November 2005.10 The article 
presented the organization’s members as local agents of justice.  
As the NBA continued to gain popular support, it became the center of police 
attention. Dilek and Hakan, 18-year-old twins who used to live on the same street as the 
NBA office, told me how difficult it was for them to live there when they were small kids:  
When we used to live there our parents didn’t allow us to go out and play on the 
street, because there were always some men either standing or walking in front of the 
NBA office. They were undercover policemen. You could never guess what might 
happen. You would see the men walking up and down all day long and hear the noise 
of their transmitters. They were constantly watching the people who went there and 
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spying on them. Once—I remember we were 12 or 13, something like that—I saw 
tens of policemen shattering the association’s windows with their batons. They even 
beat up a young guy from the NBA in front of the association and left him all 
bloodied. He was lying there in a pool of blood for 10 or 15 minutes. I guess people 
were scared to go out and help him. Finally some women from the building across 
from ours, went down and took him upstairs to their house to help him.     
 
 NBA members also told me that undercover policemen watched them every day, 
and that on several occasions they had found surveillance cameras hidden in buildings 
across from theirs. According to what a number of members told me, they had been 
threatened by undercover policemen, who told them that if they did not stop working for 
the NBA they would be imprisoned. Some members were also asked to collaborate with 
the police and spy on the members of illegal revolutionary organizations and their 
activities.11   
 In addition to the police repression, the NBA also continued to be targeted by 
local gangs. On July 15, 2005 as Halil and three friends were walking down a 
neighborhood street, a group of young men stopped them and warned them not to 
intervene in their business at the risk of being shot. Halil and his friends told them that 
they would continue to work against the gangs. In response, one of the young men pulled 
out a gun, while another took out his knife. Halil and his friends held their ground. “We 
had gotten so used to seeing guns in the neighborhood back then,” Halil told me during 
our conversation about the his experiences in the NBA, “when they took the gun and the 
knife out we just stood still. We did not run away.” Halil and two of his friends were shot 
and the fourth man was stabbed.12 That night, in protest, militants from several illegal 
groups took over the streets, setting garbage cans ablaze, throwing Molotov cocktails and 
chanting, “The gangs will be accountable to the people!” Hundreds of policemen poured 
into the neighborhood, which according to what witnesses told me, turned into a war zone. 
After spending three months in the hospital, Halil and his friends went back to work on 
their crime prevention campaign.  
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However, the gangs continued to threaten the NBA members. On February 25, 
2006, three members, including Halil, along with two attorneys from the Progressivist 
Lawyers Association13 and two representatives of the Human Rights Association, went to 
talk to the police chief in charge of the neighborhood about the threats they had been 
receiving from gang members. He explained the reason they asked for the police chief’s 
help this way: 
We began to get scared. Those guys could have killed us. We went to the police 
because what we were doing in the neighborhood was completely legal. What we did, 
whom we were going to talk to, the campaigns we organized, were all totally public. 
We did not have anything to hide. We wanted to show the police that we were 
confident enough to go and talk to them. We were confident because we had the 
support of the people in Narova. 
 
Although Halil believed their actions to have been completely legal,14 and that they 
had nothing to hide from the police, it is nevertheless telling that they did not go to see the 
police chief on their own, but escorted by lawyers and human rights activists.  Hence, 
while on the one hand they needed assistance from the police against the gangs, they also 
needed assistance against the police. As Halil put it,  
We knew that the police did not like us. We, therefore, wanted to show them we had 
the support of lawyers and human rights activists. We knew that they saw us as a 
threat against their power in the neighborhood. We had control of the neighborhood. 
We were not allowing gangs into the neighborhood. And we also had control over the 
illegal groups. The revolutionary youth respected us. If we told them they went too 
far they listened to us. They were more considerate the next time. We could control 
them. The police knew it. That police chief himself had called me several times and 
told me to ask the kids [the young illegally operating revolutionaries] to stop their 
demonstrations.  
 
As his words demonstrate, Halil was aware that public sympathy for his 
organization constituted a challenge to police power in the neighborhood. He also 
predicted that the police would take some action to recapture this power. He believed, 
however, that as long as he did not transgress the law, he would be under its protection. 
Having been raised in Narova, he also knew the police to employ extra-legal methods 
against activists. In such cases, human rights advocates assist local activists. So, by 
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bringing them along, I believe Halil to have been sending the police a message that if his 
visit resulted in any threats of violence, such indiscretions would be made public.  
Two month after his visit, gang members once again stabbed Halil. On his third 
day in the hospital, he was taken into custody. He spent that day in a cell. The following 
day, he was taken to court, accused of being a member of a terrorist organization. He was 
released the same day. Undaunted, he continued to work in the NBA until being arrested 
and imprisoned as a terror suspect in October 2007.  In their attempts to maintain order in 
the neighborhood, which came in the form of threatening criminal gangs and containing 
some illegal organizations, NBA members earned the sympathy of residents but emerged 
as a rival to police power in the neighborhood.  
 
Revolutionaries as lawmakers 
While the NBA’s active members aimed to establish law and order in the 
neighborhood through the active participation of residents, and with minimal force, many 
other small-scale legal and illegal groups in the neighborhood were on the sidelines 
advocating the use of force as a crime-fighting measure.  Although some of these groups 
remained marginal, they all had their own supporters. Studies on political violence illustrate 
that paramilitary forces, such as revolutionary militants and pro-independence guerrillas, 
mimetically reproduce performances of state sovereignty (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 
2004, Aretxaga 2000, 2005, Buur 2006, Feldman 1991). Buur (2006), for instance, in his 
work in local vigilante groups in South Africa, demonstrates that while “punishing” the 
criminals, local vigilantes applied the forms of torture learned in the exile camps of the 
apartheid regime or in apartheid’s torture chambers. Bourgois 2001, in his work in political 
violence in El Salvador, argues that “[t]hrough an almost mimetic process, the government’s 
brutality was transposed into the guerilla’s organizational structures and internal relations” 
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(11).  In a similar vein, Zilberg (2007) illustrate mirroring between gangsters and guerillas in 
El Salvador.  
 As I discuss in the Introduction, Feldman and Aretxaga, from a Lacanian perspective, 
argue that such mimetic practices are due to a mirror relation between police and soldiers and 
those who fight against them. For Aretxaga (2003) both nationalist violence and state 
violence are produced not arbitrarily, but “through what Derrida (1994: 97) has called a 
‘phantomatic mode of production’: a structure and modus operandi that produces both the 
state and its threatening Other as fetishes of each other” (402). The relationship of rivalry 
among the militants and the state security forces, by reminding the lack/the jouissance stolen 
them by the Other, continuously produce the desire to cover over the lack. The all-powerful 
Other, as is in the cases of state security forces of repressive authoritarian regimes, is the very 
productive of the desire to manifest power/violence. The forceful presence of the police 
forces by threatening the very presence/being of Narova residence appearing as the Other, 
who stole their jouissance, produce the desire among the young radicals of Narova to steal 
the jouissance of the Other by imitating its forceful techniques. Accordingly, as I illustrate 
below, various youth groups in Narova, by checking identities of the people at Narova streets, 
stopping and frisking the potential gang members, carrying guns or beating up the criminals 
mimetically reproduce police practices. Through these practices they enjoy becoming-like the 
Other, a sovereign-like being who threatens the very being of the Other. These practices, 
contributing to the assimilation of the police into the revolutionary, turn Narova’s young 
radicals into illegal police. 
  
i) Public displays of “revolutionary” punishment and extra-legal custody  
In addition to the NBA, the other legal association that once fought crime in the 
neighborhood was the Basic Rights Association (THD) known as the legal organization of 
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the DHKP/C. Different than the NBA, the THD is not a neighborhood based association. 
It works in several other Alevi populated neighborhoods. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, the police had been constituting and manifesting their sovereignty in the 
neighborhood through displays of power and violence throughout the 1990s. The members 
of the THD15 made similar public displays of power in the neighborhood. In contrast to the 
NBA, they applied physical punishments against the criminals and suspects. They had 
adopted the technique of publicly exhibiting the “punishments” they dealt out to those 
whom they determined to be “guilty.” They beat drug dealers, drug users, pimps, and 
thieves, they shaved prostitutes’ hair, etc., and they put the beaten and/or tortured bodies 
of their victims on display around the neighborhoods in which they operated. THD 
members, for instance, after beating one drug dealer, took him to the main street of the 
neighborhood. There, they handed him a microphone and forced him to apologize to the 
people of Narova and assure them he would not be involved in such activities again. In 
order to further publicize their acts of punishment, the THD members also share such 
activities with the public on their monthly journals. Also, similar to the extra-legal 
custodies of the 1990s, THD members forcibly kept some alleged criminals in secret 
locations for “interrogation.” They used the term “custody” in their journals.  
In their journals, the THD members argue that the decisions regarding the 
punishments are taken in the “people’s court.” However, unlike the people’s courts of the 
1970s, their courts are not held publicly, but secretly. I do not have enough information 
regarding the operation process of their courts, however, according to what I heard from 
other residents, when residents apply to THD for help, the THD members establish an 
interrogation committee among themselves. After the interrogation, the punishment 
committee, again consisted of the members of the THD, decides on the punishment 
method and punishes the alleged criminals accordingly. Although many Narova residents 
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dislike the THD’s techniques, there are also some people who consider the THD as the 
protector of the community.  Journalist Ahmet Sik, in his article series on THD activities 
in Okmeydani, illustrates that there were a number of parents in Okmeydani who were 
grateful to the THD as the THD members helped their children to quit drug consumption.  
Buur (2006), in his work on a local vigilante group in South Africa, demonstrates 
that these groups, in spite of the public support they gained, apply punishments away from 
the public gaze. For Buur, this is because the vigilante groups do not want to have 
eyewitnesses in the case of a complaint against them.  This shows that these local groups, 
which like the Narova youth challenge the authority of the police, were afraid of the police 
and law. The example of the THD, however, demonstrates that the THD members were 
either not afraid of the police, or they wanted to be seen so. I did not have the chance to 
talk to them about this issue. However, drawing on another example I can confidently 
claim that their argument would be that they were not afraid of being publicly seen. I will 
explain why I think so.   
During my fieldwork there had been several occasions when I saw and heard some 
youth groups chanting the names of the illegal revolutionary organizations, which are 
legally considered as terrorist organizations. Such chants usually took place during the 
demonstrations in Narova. In a country like Turkey, where any one can easily be accused 
of being a member of a terrorist organization, I found it very interesting to witness that 
these young people were publicly declaring their sympathy for “terrorist organizations.”  
When I asked a number of Narova youth why they risked themselves by chanting the 
names of illegal organizations, they all argued that it was because they were considered as 
legitimate by the residents. Hence, they were sure or they appeared to be sure that no one 
would witness against them. However, the neighborhood is under constant surveillance of 
undercover policemen and police cameras. I asked them what they thought about chanting 
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while the undercover policemen and police cameras are in the neighborhood. All of them, 
in different times, replied “if the police want to accuse you with membership to a terrorist 
organization they would do it anyways. They need no evidence.” This clearly indicates 
that they did not believe that the police obey the law and that they thought that the 
juridical processes operate according to the police’s decision. Furthermore, they also 
wanted to demonstrate that they were not afraid of the police and their law, that they can 
freely show their side. Hence, the demonstrations in the neighborhood were the stages 
where the young radicals show how brave they were and that they were proud of their 
organizations. The presence of the police, which provokes fear and intimidation in the 
neighborhood, produces the desire among the young radicals show their bravery. One of 
the ways to show brevity in a neighborhood like Narova is to act like the police, the source 
of fear and intimidation.  
 Here, we can turn back to the case of the THD. We can argue that the THD 
members, also not trusting the law, probably, believed that if the police wanted to put 
them behind the bars they would do it anyways, regardless of evidences. But more 
importantly, their public punishments were also means to demonstrate and construct their 
power in the neighborhood. As I discuss in the previous chapter with reference to 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punishment, public executions demonstrate the “unrestrained 
presence of the sovereign. The public execution did not reestablish justice; it reactivated 
power” (49). Hence, we can argue that the THD’s publicly displayed punishments are 
indicative of the THD’s concern with demonstrating and establishing their sovereign 
power in the neighborhood.  In a friendly chat with a NBA member about the activities of 
the THD, referring to THD’s punishment techniques the NBA member said “ such a state 
[Turkish state] would have such a revolutionary organization. What do you expect? While 
fighting against another they became the same.” This sentence clearly underlines the 
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mimetic rivalry between the THD members and the police forces, which contributes to the 
assimilation of the police as the rival, into the identity of revolutionary self of the THD 
members.  
 
ii) Identity-checking revolutionaries, neighborhood patrolling  
Identity checks and neighborhood patrolling were additional ways in which some 
revolutionary groups attempted to activate their power. The identity checks, as I illustrate 
in Chapter IV, are indeed familiar to the residents from the 1990s. Narova’s young 
radicals identity checking activities are also very similar to what took place in the 1990s. 
According to residents, in the years between 2005 and 2007, at least three or four different 
illegal revolutionary groups could be found conducting armed neighborhood street patrols 
on any given night. Additionally, rumors circulated among residents that some 
revolutionary groups were collecting taxes from criminal organizations. Young 
revolutionaries from various organizations, bearing guns and masks,16 took it upon 
themselves to check the identity cards of people and/or collect tax from them on the 
streets, at coffee houses and in casinos. As I discuss in the previous chapter, identity 
checks with masks and guns are indeed performative acts of sovereignty. The mask and 
the gun, granting a psychology of impunity (and anonymity), provides one the freedom to 
transgress the law, the mask situates one as above the law. Besides, identity checks and 
neighborhood patrolling are performances of control over the population in a specific 
territory. S/he who checks the identities decides who is to be kept in and who is not, who 
is an enemy and who is not or who is to be punished and who is not.  
The identity checks endangered the police’s physical presence in the neighborhood 
and challenged their authority. Caner, who was involved in anti-crime campaigns in mid-
2000s and who later had to flee to Germany after he learnt that he is sentenced to 35 years of 
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imprisonment told me in our interview in Germany that they were particularly searching for 
the police, and were trying to turn the neighborhood into a police-free zone.    
 
Caner: Police was the source of all sorts of ugliness and dirtiness in the 
neighborhood. We wanted to free the neighborhood of the police. In those years [mid 
2000s] there were a lot of strangers in the neighborhood. Many of them were gang 
members and police. In order to keep the neighborhood clean we had to push them 
away. At nights the young guys were walking with their guns and stopping the 




Caner: You know, the questions such as  “where do you live?  Why they did you 
come to the neighborhood? Are you working with the police? If we found them 
suspicious, we would threaten them. 
 
Me: What do you mean by threaten? 
 
Caner: You know, we would tell them if we see them in the neighborhood again we 
would beat them, things like that. Once I remember, the guys stopped an undercover 
police. He got so scared. He was in his car. We stopped the car and asked his identity 
card. He did not want to give it. He was so scared, he left his car in the neighborhood 
and he ran away.  
 
In turn, undercover officers who are discovered by revolutionaries are expelled and 
warned not to come back. As many residents explained it, the police lost control of the 
neighborhood in 2005 and 2006. A friend of mine interviewed a policeman, who had 
previously worked undercover in Narova, and his testimony supported the residents’ 
version of events; he confirmed that police feared entering the neighborhood during the 
mid-2000s. The youth groups’ actions continued until the “terror operations” started soon 
after the amendment of anti-terror law in 2006. One of the first operations was organized 
against the NBA with the participation of two thousand heavily armed policemen, 
accompanied by several military tanks in October 2007. This operation was followed by 
several other police operations –– targeted the youth from various organizations–– who 
were actively engaged in crime prevention campaigns. Although, crime prevention 
activities of Narova youth have by and large ended, a similar struggle among the police, 
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criminals and gang members continue in many other Alevi populated neighborhoods of 
Istanbul.  
 
 Conclusion  
 This chapter illustrates the processes and relations that turned a significant number 
of Narova youth into terrorist suspects and convicts. I argued that criminalization of the 
neighborhood, provoking the historical Alevi fears that the state is developing projects to 
eradicate their community, gave rise to projects to protect the neighborhood against the 
state. In their attempts to protect their neighborhood, Narova youth became rivals of the 
state/police in the neighborhood.  The rivals of the state, as I explained earlier, are those 
who can control the territories and the people in them by using violence legitimately. The 
rivals reveal the areas that escaped from the control of the fantasy state. Narova youth’s 
attempts to provide law and order in the neighborhood, through use of force, is a 
manifestation of their rivalry with the state, a manifestation of their attempts to declare 
themselves as the “state.”  
 Newman (2004) and Badiou (2002) point out that that the very word terror was 
historically used during the state formation process in post-Revolutionary France in the 
1790s. They hint at the structural relation between terror and state formation. Newman 
(2004) argues “the Terror of the French Republic was a way of masking or covering over 
the symbolically empty place of power that was left in the wake of the Ancien Régime”  
(569). The non-state terrorist exposing the empty place of power is the rival of the state. 
Accordingly, it is no coincidence that the young people of Narova, who exposed the areas 
“escaped” from the state’s monopoly of violence, are accused of being terrorist. Newman 
also notes that terror embodies the fantasy of “a social whole, of a society reconciled with 
itself” (572). Modern state formations grounded informed by the fantasy of terror always 
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assumes an enemy. As this chapter illustrates, the relationship enmity is an intimate one. 
The relationship enmity, and its various manifestations in the form of violence, is 
productive of mimetic desire. Accordingly, this chapter also discusses Narova’s young 
radicals’ mimetic desire to be as powerful as the state. I argued that in a neighborhood 
where performative displays of police violence are taken as evidence of the sovereign 
presence of the state, young radicals expected to acquire power by mimetically 
reproducing these performances. Violence is not only a call for submission but is also a 
call for counter-violence. It is, indeed, a call for a vicious cycle of violence. The decades 
long police violence in Narova have been productive of the desire among Narova youth to 
be as powerful as the police and to defeat the enemy/Other police who stole the jouissance 
of the community. 17This desire manifested itself in counter-violent activities of Narova 
youth urged the police to declare their own sovereignty/violence. As I illustrate in the 
following chapter, this time the performance of police violence moving away from the 












	  	   161	  
Notes to Chapter V 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 Including users of soft drugs like marijuana.  
 
2 According to their list there were 213 coffee houses in the neighborhood, eight casinos and 27 pubs. 
 
3 The police institution does not share crime rates with researchers. At the initial stages of my fieldwork I 
wanted to conduct police ethnography. Although, I quickly got special permission to  conduct participant 
observation within the police institute, which includes participation in their professional meeting, when I 
requested information about the crime rates, I was told that that might be an issue and that they had to make 
investigation about me to see if I am connected to a terrorist organization or not.  Explaining me that such an 
investigation would take months, the police officers suggested me not to request data about crime rates. 
 
4 Gazi, Okmeydani, and Nurtepe are all Alevi-populated neighborhoods.  
 
5 For a description of the introduction of a small-scale drug gang to Gazi neighborhood, and of the Gazi 
residents’ fight with the drug dealers, see the special report in the journal Nokta, November 2, 2006.  
6   I employ symptom in here as a trace of the repressed history. As Zizek (1989) argues, “in working through 
the symptom we are precisely bringing about the past, producing the symbolic reality of the past”  (157). 
 
7 The military generals and some other alleged members of Ergenekon are being held at Silivri prison.  
 
8 The Socialist Party of the Oppressed is a legal socialist party. It is also known as the legal wing of the MLKP.    
 
9 The video records of these public discussions, which take place with the participation of around one hundred 
people, are still available on YouTube. In order to protect the privacy of the members I will not cite the URL.  
 
10  Here again, in order to protect the privacy of the individuals I will not cite the newspaper.    
 
11 The press releases regarding the police threats towards the NBA members are still available online on 
Youtube.   In order to protect the privacy of the individuals I will not cite the URL. 
 
12 The event was covered by the socialist media.  
 
13 The lawyers who went to the police office to support the NBA members are now in prison as terror suspects. 
 
14 Punching people is not actually a legal activity in Turkey. When Halil says that what they were doing was 
legal he means that their activities are all public and that unlike what the members of illegal revolutionary 
organizations do they do not use guns.  Plus, as Halil and many other Narova residents told me, Halil was never 
involved in an act of beating someone.   
 
15 As the THD was under constant police surveillance due to its association with the DHKP/C, I preferred not to 
interview its members. I, therefore, could not reach a number of THD members in the neighborhood. Although 
THD is not active nowadays in Narova, it is still active in many other Alevi neighborhoods.  
 
16 There was even a group called The Masked Five, which was named after a mainstream Turkish movie. In 
spite of the ambitious acts of the group members (i.e. neighborhood patrolling) the name of the group also 
indicates the naivety of its members. 	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CHAPTER VI 
Before The Anti-Terror Law, In the Justice Palace1 
 
“The state is the life itself” 
Idris Naim Sahin, Ministry of    Interior. 
 
Date: January 12, 2011. Place: The 9th Specially Authorized Assize Court2 (SAAC) 
in Istanbul.  It is Halil’s turn to defend himself before the law for the 10th time.  “Do you 
know the story of the rabbit and zebra?” asks Halil to the judge. The judge, hidden behind 
the screen of his laptop, raises his head and looks at him confusedly. Talking very fast, 
Halil tells the story of the rabbit and the zebra to the judge. “Once upon a time, in a very 
big forest, a monkey sitting in a tree sees a rabbit running very fast. She yells after the 
rabbit and asks ‘Hey rabbit! Rabbit! Why are you running so fast? What happened?’ The 
rabbit yells back at the monkey while was still running: ‘I heard that the hunters are 
around and shooting all the zebras.’ The monkey gets confused. ‘But you are not a zebra,’ 
she says. ‘Why are you still running away?’ The rabbit, without stopping, replies ‘Ah! By 
the time I proved that I am not a zebra, I would already be dead.’” Halil continued without 
a breath, “Yes, Mr. Judge,” he said, “I was not as smart as the rabbit.” The judge, getting 
angry, yells at him in a patronizing tone. “What are you saying? Be respectful! We are in a 
courtroom! Behave yourself!”  
After the terror operation against the NBA in 2007 Halil spent four-and-a-half years 
in a cell with his two friends due to accusations of beating a policeman and seizing his gun 
upon the orders of the terrorist organization, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party 
(MLKP). He has been on pretrial release since April 2012. He might go back to prison and 
stay there for approximately twenty more years. I personally met Halil and his friends a 
month after their release. Before I met them, I heard their names many times from the 
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neighborhood residents.  Because of their relatively peaceful fight against the gangs, Halil 
and his friends are highly respected figures in the neighborhood. Numerous people told me 
about their contribution to the decline in drug consumption and in the number of the drug 
gangs as well as the closing of gambling houses in the neighborhood. Halil’s choice to 
explain his situation before the law with reference to a fable reveals much about the 
current condition of law and (in)justice in Turkey. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
today there are around three hundred young people in Narova behind the bars with the 
accusations of “crime against the state.” There are also hundreds of other young people 
from various Alevi populated neighborhoods who are in prison due to same accusations. 
While I was writing this dissertation several waves of terror operations took place in 
Istanbul’s Alevi populated neighborhoods. The targets of these operations were the youth 
who were engaged in fight against crime in their neighborhoods. 
  This chapter, focusing on the case of Halil, illustrates the operation of the anti-
terror law on the ground. First of all, analyzing the current anti-terror law of Turkey, I 
illustrate how the current government manifests its totalitarian tendencies within the legal 
sphere. I demonstrate that the anti-terror trials operate as the showground of the police’s 
sovereign power within the juridical field.  Second, drawing on the court documents, 
interviews with Halil and his friends and their attorneys and my observations during the 
MGD trials, I analyze Halil’s and his friends’ case. I argue that the current anti-terror law 
creates a group of “undesirables,” categories of people outside the protection of the law 
(cf. Arendt 1973) by depriving the terrorist suspects and terrorist convicts of their juridical 
rights.  Finally, pointing out the current governments’ aspiration for total domination and 
continuous cycles of violence in Narova residents’ lives, I illustrate how this aspiration 
manifested in the courtrooms contributes to the perceptions of injustice and violence as an 
ill-fate among those who were subjected to political violence.   
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The new anti- terror law and Turkey’s ever increasing numbers of “terrorists” 
 Turkey is among the countries which has the highest number of those convicted as 
terrorists.  According to research conducted by the Associated Press in 66 countries, 
which accounts for 70 percent of the world’s population, Turkey alone accounted for a 
third of all convictions, with a total of 12,897 in 2011.3 The drastic increase in the number 
of terror convicts after the amendment of the anti-terror law is noteworthy. Although in 
2005 there were only 273 terror convicts, the number of convictions for terrorist activity 
reached 6,325 in 2009 and this number has doubled since the big wave of the Union of 
Communities in Kurdistan (KCK)4 operations began in 20095 (Insel 2012: 34). This sharp 
increase in the number of terror convicts, is, of course, directly related to the changes 
made in the anti-terror law, which initially was introduced in 1991. 
 
 Wide and vague definitions of terrorism  
  Focusing on the case of the USA, Badiou (2002), points out the vague and elusive 
essence of the war on terror. For Badiou, it is precisely the vagueness of the category of 
the terror/ist opens up a space for the “American imperial power.”  In a similar fashion, 
analyses of anti-terror laws of different countries, such as of the UK, the USA, Germany, 
Canada and Australia, underline the wide and vague definitions of terrorism in terror 
legislation and demonstrate how this vagueness leading suspension of the most basic 
human rights and civil liberties and contribute to the re-emergence of anti-democratic, 
authoritarian state formations  (Golder and Williams 2007, Pue 2003, Roach and Trotter 
2005, Safferling 2004, Zoller 2004). In Turkey, too, the anti-terror law, which considers 
all kinds of political crimes as acts of terrorism (Ertekin 2011), contains a very wide and 
vague definition of terrorism. Article 1 of the law defines terrorism as  
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 any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the 
aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its 
political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity 
of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish 
State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, 
eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external 
security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and 
violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat. 
 
 Legal scholars have criticized the vague phrases in this definition  -- e.g.,  
“pressure,” “terror,” “intimidation,” “weakening the authority of the state,” “general 
health” -- for paving the way for arbitrary applications of the law, and hence for human 
rights violations (Ertekin 2011). Given the broad and nebulous definition of terrorism, the 
profile of terror convicts is also varied. Those categorized under the abstract notion of 
terrorist include: former state officials such as generals, police officers who are critical of 
the current government, Kurdish people who are organized in an illegal or even legal pro-
Kurdish organization, people who are supposedly sympathetic with the pro-Kurdish 
movement, socialists, human rights activists, human rights lawyers, and critical journalists 
and academics who have access to a wide public audience. Under such a loosely defined 
definition of terrorist, some of the accusations seem arbitrary, if not completely illogical, 
and give the impression that anyone who is critical of the government can be a terrorist 
suspect. For instance, a former police chief, Hanefi Avci, notorious for using torture 
against socialists, has been under arrest since 2010. He was arrested not for being a 
torturer but for allegedly being a member of a radical Marxist organization, Revolutionary 
Headquarters (DK).6 A renowned left-wing journalist, Ahmet Sik was arrested for writing 
a book at the bequest of the nationalist right-wing organization, Ergenekon. The book, 
which criticized the Turkish police organization, had not even been published yet.  And, 
sadly, the new anti-terror law knows no age limit. There are hundreds of detained Kurdish 
kids who are accused of being members of the PKK for merely throwing stones at police 
cars.7 
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The arbitrary accusations effectively provoke the fear that anyone, who is critical of 
the government, can potentially go behind the bars. Accordingly, Istanbul Bar Association 
organized a serious of workshops titled “Usual Suspects,” to inform the public about their 
rights and what to do in the case of a police raid.8 I illustrate below, the police, indeed, 
selectively approach to those who are critical of the government. The main targets of the 
terror operations are those who challenge the authority of the government on the ground. 
In other words, the terrorist suspects become suspects due to their practices that actually or 
potentially challenge the authority of current government.  
    
When intentions get into the law 
The new anti- terror law is distinctive in its focus on the intentions and alleged aims 
of the people/suspects (Inanici 2011b, Aydin 2012, Ertekin 2011). The law defines over 
sixty additional crimes, including even sexual harassment and prostitution, as terrorist 
acts9 if they are “committed with the intention of terror” (emphasis mine)10 (Inanici 2011a, 
Aydin 2012).   By introducing the concept of intention as a potential act of terrorism, 
Article 6 of the Law declares that something as subjective as intention is a valid criteria 
for prosecution. Accordingly, Kanar (2011), the former head of the Human Rights 
Association of Turkey and a prominent attorney working on political crime/terrorism 
cases, argues that since the amendment of the anti-terror law interrogations and hearings 
concentrate on revealing the (terrorist) intentions of suspects.   
 At first sight it seems that by doing so, the law attributes the judicial authorities, 
such as judges and prosecutors, a god like character ––as for believers it is only the God 
who has access to the persons’ inner world. However, actually it is not the judicial 
authorities, who were attributed with God like power, but the police. The emphasis on the 
intentions actually limits the judges’ and prosecutors’ participation in the decision making 
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process in terror cases. Taking the intentions as valid criteria for prosecution eliminates 
the need for material evidence of an overt act against the defendant. This is mainly 
because terrorist suspects have found suspicious according to the information gathered by 
the undercover police. The undercover police usually gather information about the 
suspects by following them daily bases and listening to their phone conversations. In the 
absence of the need for material evidence, the undercover police’s opinions become the 
sole evidence against the accused.  
The operation of terror trials full with the examples of decision made according to 
the police’s opinions about the suspects. For instance, although in Turkey the prosecutors 
have to collect evidence both against and for the suspect, Inanici (2011)’ s investigation of 
indictments of the prosecutors shows that some indictments are the exact copies of the 
police’s written accusations and even have the same typos (21). The case of Necati Abay, 
the spokesperson of the Solidarity Platform of the Imprisoned Journalists, who is 
sentenced to eighteen years and nine months for being a member of the MLKP, also offers 
a perfect example of this logic in action. Necati Abay has officially been sentenced 
according to his alleged intentions. With the absence of any material evidence against 
Abay, the judge in charge of the case, relying solely on the police accusations, argued 
“there was no evidence other than conviction” and passed a guilty verdict based on Abay’s 
alleged intentions.11 Halil’s case is yet another example to this logic, which, as I explain 
below, is familiar to us from Arendt’s analysis of totalitarian regime. Moreover, as it has 
been revealed recently the juridical field in Turkey is increasingly turned into a field 
dominated by pro-government judges and prosecutors. Over the last couple of years, a 
significant number of oppositional judges and prosecutors, who served in the big cities, 
were appointed to small provincial towns away from the center (Ertekin 2013). The story 
of a young woman judge candidate who recently committed suicide also revealed how the 
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AKP cadres have dominated the juridical field. This young candidate, although she 
completed the necessary procedures to be appointed as a judge, was not appointed for 
three years due to her critical stance against the AKP. Her friends’ attitude after the 
candidate’s suicide was even more revealing of the current situation within the juridical 
field. A colleague of the candidate interviewed with a journalist with a mask covering her 
face and told her that she, herself, and the judge-candidate’s other colleagues could not go 
to her funeral. They were afraid that if they were seen in her funeral, they would be 
punished and appointed to a small town by the government.  
 
Twin Track System of (in)Justice  
As is underlined by critical legal scholars, the feelings of emergency provoked by 
the fantasies and/or fears of terror have given rise to re-emergence of a twin-track criminal 
justice system (Campbell and Connolly 2006 and 2007, Guardiola-Rivera 2005, Hussain 
2007, Neocleous 2007). This system divides the population into two as citizens and 
potential terrorists who are subjected to different criminal laws and regulations. By 
replicating over sixty crimes defined in the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) and by imposing 
heavier sentences and longer imprisonment for the very same crimes, the new anti-terror 
law creates a twin track and/or “fragmented” (cf. Walker 2002) criminal justice system. In 
addition, due to terror regulations terrorist suspects do not possess the rights granted to the 
other criminal suspects. For instance, they cannot have more than three attorneys although 
regular suspects can. They can be detained for ten years without trial whereas the longest 
duration of pre-trial detention is a year and six months for regular suspects.12 Needless to 
say, ten years pre-trial detention already operates as a heavy punishment. Hence, in 
addition to being legally defined as a terrorist, being a suspect itself becomes a crime. 
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Arendt (1973) arguing that punishment for possible crime is intrinsic in the totalitarian 
rule demonstrates a similar logic in the totalitarian regimes. She says  
 
Totalitarianism's central assumption that everything is possible thus leads through 
consistent elimination of all factual restraints to the absurd and terrible consequence 
that every crime the rulers can conceive of must be punished, regardless of whether 
or not it has been committed. 
 
This logic is best expressed in the words of the Minister of Interior, Idris Naim Sahin,’s 
words: “The best crime is the one which has not been committed yet.” By counting an 
uncommitted act of terror as a crime, Sahin defines the potential to act to be equivalent to 
the act itself. Sahin’s words were, indeed, a warning against the public. By warning the  
“potential criminals,” in this case all citizens, that they can be punished before they 
commit crime, Sahin, announced that the polices’ eyes are on the people, and that they 
follow them so closely that they can catch them before they turn their criminal aims into 
action. In another speech, Sahin specifically pointed out where one has to stay away in 
order not to become a terrorist suspect; he defined the universities, associations, trade 
unions and NGOs as the “backyards of terrorism.”13 
Soon after Sahin’s speech several terror operations took place in the trade unions, 
bar association and universities.  As result, several hundreds trade union activists, 
attorneys, students and professors, most of whom were allegedly associated with the pro-
Kurdish movement, were put behind the bars as terrorist convicts in 2012. According to 
Sahin’s and/or the government’s logic, in spite of the “warnings” if one still continues to 
work as an activist, it is a transgression ––transgression of the unwritten law of the  
(totalitarian) government.  Although it is completely legal work in a trade union or in a 
labor organization, after the Ministry of Interior’s words, it became a transgression that 
deserves to be punished.  This unlawful law has been applied within the sphere of the law, 
in the juridical field.  
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One of the biggest consequences of this transgression of this unwritten law is not 
being recognized as a citizen granted juridical rights. As Arendt (1973) argues, “first 
essential step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in man” (447). 
For her, one of the ways to kill the juridical person is to put certain categories of people 
outside the protection of the law. What we have recently witnessed in Turkey is very 
similar to Arendt’s analysis of the Nazi Germany. The anti-terror law producing a 
category of the terrorist deprives certain populations of their juridical rights. As I 
demonstrate in the case of Halil, the anti-terror law appears as an overwhelming power by 
not recognizing the suspects as juridical person.   
 
The killing of the juridical person 
 One of the most influential ways of depriving the suspects of their juridical rights 
is denying the suspects’ right to defense. The anti-terror law in Turkey strictly limits the 
suspects’ right to defense. First of all, pursuant to Article 10 of the anti-terror law, 
attorneys’ communications with defendants may be restricted if there is a suspicion that 
the attorney is also connected to the terrorist organization. According to the same article, a 
judge may order a partial or total restriction of access to the prosecution file by the defense 
attorney and he/she without any justification may prohibit defense attorneys’ attendance in 
the hearings. To make things worse, defending a member of a terrorist organization 
considered as an evidence for being a member of terrorist organization. Accordingly, there 
are hundreds of lawyers are in prison as terrorist suspects or terrorist convicts. 
Furthermore, the hearings in the SAACs are carried out with the participation of several 
suspects charged under the same or similar case. Due to the time pressure, the collective 
hearings do not permit all attorneys who want to speak to have the opportunity to address 
the court. Accordingly, all sixteen of the defense attorneys I interviewed admitted that 
	  	   171	  
they had already given up seeking justice. As Kozakcioglu, the head of the Progressivist 
Attorneys Association (CHD),14 argues that under such unfriendly conditions, the defense 
attorneys primarily serve as the witnesses to the injustice their clients face and as recorders 
of the current conditions in Turkey (Kozagacli and Bora 2012: 38). Kozakcioglu, himself, 
along with eight other members of the CHD, were arrested as terrorist suspects in January 
20, 2013 and they are still in prison as of September 2013. 
 
The Case of Halil: a Beaten Policeman and a Captured Police Gun 
 As I discuss above the protagonist of the anti-terror law is the undercover police. In 
Halil and his friends’ case, too, undercover police appear as the prominent figure of the 
case from the very beginning. Halil and his friends case starts with the capturing of an 
undercover policeman’s gun in the neighborhood in October 8, 2007. According to the 
Halil and his friends’ the policeman later told them that the police had set up the whole 
event to arrest Halil and his friends. Either the police organized the event or not, it still is 
symptomatic of what was happening in the neighborhood then. Either the youth seized the 
police’s gun on purpose or not, as I discuss in the pervious chapter, the police’s power, 
which is symbolized in his gun, was already deactivated in Narova when the event took 
place.  
Haydar, the young man who admitted to the court that it was he who had beaten the 
policeman, described the event as follows:  
 
I was in the neighborhood all day and saw a guy following me wherever I went. He 
was staring at me indignantly. Since we had gotten used to the threats of the gangs in 
the neighborhood, I thought the guy was a gang member. I got pissed at one point and 
went and asked him who he was and why he was staring at me.  He responded that it 
was not my business to ask him who he is. I got mad and started punching him. His 
transmitter fell off and I realized that he was a policeman. It all happened 
spontaneously. 
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The event happened on the main street of the neighborhood.  As Haydar started to beat the 
policeman, a crowd gathered to watch what was happening.   According to Haydar’s 
testimony, some people among the crowd joined in the fight to protect him after another 
undercover policeman intervened, trying to protect his colleague. In the courtroom, the 
beaten policeman and all of the other five witnesses, agreed on Haydar’s narration about 
how the fight started. However, the policeman claimed that the other people did not 
spontaneously join the quarrel, but that it was planned in advance. Contrary to this 
argument, in his testimony, the policeman also stated that after his transmitter fell down, 
he heard Haydar shouting with surprise, saying “Oh! He’s a policeman!”15 As Haydar’s 
and the other suspects’ attorneys argued during the proceedings, this statement, indeed, 
proves that the assault was not organized in advance, as the official written police 
accusation suggests, but happened spontaneously. However, that morning at around 1:30, 
seventeen people, all of whom were active members of the NBA and also members of the 
Socialist Party of the Oppressed, were taken into custody accused of participating in a 
terrorist act. Two thousand heavily armed policemen, accompanied by several military 
tanks, participated in the operation.16 They raided several houses and internet cafes to look 
for the people on their list, all of them were members of the NBA. The massive 
participation of police forces was so effective that it was still fresh in the neighborhood 
residents’ memories in 2011. A middle-aged resident’s words illustrate how powerless the 
residents felt vis-a-vis thousands of police forces: 
All the street entrances were occupied by thousands of policemen. It was as if there 
was a war.  There were tanks. The helicopters were flying above. They came here to 
terrorize the neighborhood. And, we couldn’t do anything. We simply watched those 
kids being put in the police cars. Can you believe that? In a neighborhood like this… 
It made it clear that the revolutionaries do not have any power in this neighborhood 
anymore. It is so sad. We just watched them being taken away. We could not protect 
them.17 
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Seven of the people who were taken into custody were released after three days and 
ten of them were arrested accused of organizing a terrorist act against the police.  Four of 
those who were arrested and tried spent four-and-a-half years in a high security prison and 
the rest are still in prison as pre-trial detainees.  What counted as a terrorist act in this case 
was beating a policeman by allegedly following the orders of a terrorist organization.  
Besides, other active NBA members, who were not found during the operation, were later 
arrested with allegations of membership to a terrorist organization. 
Halil and the nine other people arrested and taken to trial for participating in this 
allegedly organized police beating are, in legal terminology, accused of: 1) Being members 
of an illegal armed organization, the MLKP 182) Qualified plunder19 a) by use of 
weapons, b) by taking advantage of terror action carried out by the existing and allegedly 
existing criminal groups, c) by securing benefits for criminal groups.  3) Resisting public 
officials and preventing them from performing their duty a) by using force or threat against 
a public officer to prevent him from performing a duty,20 b) commission of this offense 
against judicial authorities,21 c) commission of this offense by concealing one’s identity, 
or jointly by more than one person,22 d) commission of offense by use of a weapon or 
taking advantage of terrorist activities of organized criminal groups.234) Felonious injury 
a) by causing harm or pain to another person or executing an act which could lead to 
deterioration of health or mental abilities of others,24 b) by virtue of public office.25 As is 
the case in the other terrorism cases, the individual files are combined and the hearings 
take place collectively with the participation of all suspects and defense attorneys.   
 
The undercover policemen’s testimonies as the sole crime evidence 
The sole evidence of Halil’s participation in the event are police testimonies along 
with the testimony of a witness who first testified against him but later, in the very first 
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court hearing, argued that his testimony was taken under psychological torture and thus 
did not represent the truth.  According to this witness, the police officers at the police 
office told him that they are going to harm his seven month-old baby unless he testifies 
against Halil and his friends. Neither this witness’s accusation did put the allegedly 
torturer policemen in a suspicious position before the law nor the two witness policemen’s 
inconsistent testimonies led the judge question the reliability of the police testimonies. The 
two witness policemen, in their first written testimony dated October 8, 2007, argued that 
Halil was among the crowd and was hitting one of them. However, almost a year later, in 
the hearing dated July 24, 2008, one of the policemen argued that he knew Halil from his 
activities at the NBA and that he was not sure if Halil actually hit him.  The second 
policeman did not change his testimony. These two policemen, also, gave contradictory 
testimonies about other suspects’ presence during the assault. However, both of them 
agreed on seven of the suspects’ membership in the MLKP. 
The only evidence submitted regarding the accusation about Halil being a member 
of a terrorist organization is a CD promoting the MLKP, which police claimed was found 
in his apartment when his house was raided.  According to Article 17 of Judicial 
Preventive Search Regulations, policemen have to copy hash values (digital signature) of 
the CDs they want to collect as evidence and make the people in the house sign a 
document testifying that the CD was found at the home. However, the policemen did not 
copy hash values of the CD and they did not ask anyone in the household to sign a 
document indicating that the CD was found in the home. Hence, this evidence is legally 
invalid. In response to Halil’s attorney’s question to the police about whether there were 
any other items of evidence of Halil’s membership in a terrorist organization, the 
policeman replied that he has been following Halil for sometime and that there were no 
other items of evidence other than seeing Halil in public demonstrations and at press 
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releases.  According to him, such participation proved that he was a member of a terrorist 
organization.26 
According to Halil’s self-defense given at the first hearing on April 4, 2008, six 
months after his arrest, he left his job at 5 pm, took the bus and went home, which was ten 
minutes driving distance from the main street where the event took place. Before going 
home, he stopped by his friend’s apartment for 10 minutes.  His friend also confirmed that 
he stopped by at her place around 7 p.m. and his parents also testified that he was at home 
with them by 7.30. In addition, none of the five witnesses who were watching the beating 
claimed to have seen Halil there.  More importantly, the route he followed after he left 
work and his exact location at the time of the event was revealed after his attorney 
documented Halil’s cell-phone conversations on the day of the event. His GSM records 
show that he was nowhere near the event. However, the documentation of the GSM 
records was not taken into consideration by the judge.  
The police testimonies were not only privileged over the testimonies of the 
witnesses and material evidence but also over the conclusions of the two prosecutors of 
the case. Although Turkey’s current legal system is notorious for its biased prosecutors in 
terrorism cases,27 the first and the second prosecutors of the case concluded, “there is not 
sufficient information and evidence for the accusation that the assault was planned in 
advance by a terrorist organization and that the assaulters acted on behalf of a terrorist 
organization” on February 4, 2010 and on May 3, 2011 respectively.28 Both of them urged 
the judge to drop the charges of terrorism against Halil and his friends. However, after the 
prosecutors announced their conclusions, both of the hearings ended with the judge’s 
verdict that there was a “cause for strong suspicion of guilt” and a “well-grounded 
suspicion of evasion of justice and tampering with the evidence.”29 As in all of the 
previous cases, the judge did not state the grounds for suspicion justifying his decision.30 
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The judge’s negligence of prosecutors’ decisions, material evidences, witnesses’ 
testimonies give the impression that he does not think that he needs to obey the legal 
procedures. According to the suspects and their families, the judge is simply following the 
orders of the police who want the suspects to be punished. Indeed, we can argue that 
judge’s attitudes throughout the trials can be read as an open manifestation of his 
decisions’ reliance on the police’s judgments about the case and his taking the side of the 
police no matter how unreliable they sound.   
The examples above are only a few examples from this case replete with procedural 
violations. Indeed, it is not even necessary to analyze the court documents to see how the 
law functions by suspending itself. Participation in only one of the hearings would be 
sufficient to see how the law abandons itself in the courtroom.  Only two consecutive 
hearings of the case took place over the course of my fieldwork in the neighborhood.  In 
the following section drawing mainly on my observations of the trial, which took place on 
December 11, 2012, I illustrate the operation of the trial.  
   
The Trial in the (justice) palace 
The trial took place in Caglayan Adalet Sarayi, literally the Caglayan Justice Palace, 
located in the Caglayan district of Istanbul. Inaugurated on July 2011, as the Ministry of 
Justice Sadullah Ergin proudly announced, the Caglayan Courthouse is the largest 
courthouse in Europe, with an area of 3 million square feet. Fifteen minutes before the 
trial I met with Orhan, a close friend of Halil's, in front of the “justice palace.” The 
Caglayan Courthouse, with its extremely high ceilings, makes one feel like a tiny little 
creature as soon as one enters. It is not only the ceiling that makes one feel so; what takes 
place during a trial makes one feel non-existent.  
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Feeling like little creatures, Orhan and I went up to the 6th floor, where terror-related 
hearings take place. Although the trial was supposed to start at 11 a.m., along with the 
friends and relatives of the accused we waited for three hours in front of the courtroom 
until the trial started. No one informed us as to how long the trail would be delayed. Thus, 
we could not leave the waiting room for three hours. For three hours, I, Orhan and 32 
other people sat still in the “justice palace” and waited for injustice to take place. The 
mothers and fathers of the accused were especially nervous…While we were waiting, 
Orhan told me why he was not tried with Halil and other active members of the NBA, 
although he himself was working actively in the NBA in mid 2000s. He hid in the ceiling 
when the police raided the internet house where he was hanging with his friends: 
When I saw the police coming towards the internet house, I told my friends that we 
should hide. They told me that there was no need to hide. They were sure that the 
police were not going to take them. They were like “why would we hide? We are 
innocent.” But I knew that they [the police] did not care whether you were innocent 
and or not. They were unhappy with our activities in the NBA; they were looking for 
an excuse to take us. I hid anyways. Just in case. You never know. I went to the 
rooftop and jumped in the chimney. I fell down from the fifth floor to the basement. 
You should have seen me. I was all black. The residents of the building thought that a 
thief went into the building. They all gathered together and came to the basement to 
beat me. You should have seen it… It was quite a scene. There were these men there 
with sticks and knifes. I yelled “ stop, don't hit me. Go and look out side, there is an 
operation. I am hiding from the police, I am not a thief.” Then they stopped. I asked 
them to let me stay in the basement. I stayed there for like two or three hours. When I 
went home my whole body was aching. I didn't go to the hospital that night. I did not 
want to be seen outside. The next day, it turned out that there wasn't a single bone in 
my body left unbroken. But, I felt lucky for sometime. All those who told me that 
they were innocent went to prison. And, see, some of them are still in prison. But now 
I am also accused of being a member [of a terrorist organization]. I don't know what 
will happen. I do not mind staying in prison for five or ten years. It is still better than 
escaping to Europe and living there for the rest of your life. I don't want to live there. 
 
That was the last time I saw Orhan. A couple weeks after the trial he learned that he 
was condemned to 30 years of imprisonment due to accusations that he was a member of a 
terrorist organizations. As I later heard from his friends, he escaped to Europe, which is 
known as an open-air prison among Narova youth.31  
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At 2pm., the soldiers told us that the hearing would start soon and that we should go 
into the courtroom.  Usually, in terror hearings, due to the limited space for audience, not 
all of the friends and relatives can enter the courtroom. It was very depressing for me to 
see how mothers and fathers whose only chance to see their children was during the 
hearings had to leave the courthouse without seeing them.32 This time we were lucky. We 
could all go in. There were 32 members in the audience, 8 suspects, four gendarmes, three 
attorneys, one prosecutor, one head judge, and two assistant judges. However, two of the 
attorneys had to leave soon after the hearing started because they had other hearings to 
participate in. The hearing was opened by the defense. First Irem began to make his 
defense. Irem had been in pre-trial detention for 5 and a half years. His attorney was 
imprisoned on terror charges. Thus he had to make his own defense. Five years after being 
arrested, this was Irem’s first time giving a defense speech.  He read the defense speech he 
prepared in his cell.  His defense went: 
 Having stayed in prison for five and a half years due to a crime I did not commit, I 
will not explain to you why I am innocent. I am very well aware that you keep me in 
prison although you know that I am innocent. As a responsible citizen who wanted to 
keep his neighborhood free of crime, I did my best to protect my neighborhood. 
When I go out I will continue fight for the democratization of this country. What is 
taking place right now in here is a serious threat against democracy and human rights. 
This country’s poor people, are being criminalized and put in prisons. The people 
who love this country and fight for the people’s rights are stigmatized as criminals. I 
am not defending myself. You keep me in prison on purpose. If fighting against crime 
is a terror crime, then you are free to punish me as a terrorist. 
 
While Irem was talking, the prosecutor’s eyes were closed, giving the impression 
that he was sleeping. The two assistant judges were playing with their laptops and never 
raised their heads from their laptops. The head judge was either hiding behind his laptop 
or looking at some files in front of him. None of those who represent the law in the 
courtroom seemed like they were paying attention to what Irem said. After Irem finished 
his defense speech, the head judge raised his head from his laptop and asked the remaining 
attorney if she had a question or a comment to make about her defendants. The attorney 
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asked the judge why her defendant H. was in pre-trial release while her other defendant, 
Y., whose file was exactly the same as the defendant H., was still in prison. The judge did 
not answer her question. He did not even explain why he did not answer. He just ignored 
the question, pretended that it did not happen. Again, neither the judges nor the prosecutor 
raised their heads and looked at the attorney. The prosecutor continued to sleep.  
 The judge’s and prosecutor’s words, attitudes and behaviors were almost exactly 
the same in both of the trials I attended. It was as if the attorneys and the suspects were 
speaking to an empty room. It was as if there was an invisible glass between these two 
parties, which prevented the judges, and the prosecutor to see the accused and their 
attorneys. After the defense, avoiding the attorneys’ questions and without making any 
comments on the defense's speeches, the judge turned to the prosecutor and asked him 
about his decision. The prosecutor opened his eyes and without any explanation demanded 
that the accused should remain in prison.  
The avoidance of any contact with the suspects and their defenders continued during 
the announcement of the court decision. In both hearings, after the prosecutor announced 
his decision, gendarmes took the suspects away and the attorneys and the audience were 
asked to leave the courtroom and to wait in the waiting room. The judge did not announce 
the decision to the audience in person. After waiting for fifteen minutes, a gendarme 
brought the decision letter to the waiting room. The judge decided to release some of the 
guys while their case remains open and to continue the imprisonment of the others. There, 
again, were no explanations regarding the court decision. As the court decision was read 
aloud by a young woman among the audience, we heard the screams and cries of mothers 
and lovers. The waiting room was full with the people with deep sorrow in their faces. 
After the last hearing, I left the room with Orhan and Aret, whose son had been in prison 
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for 9 years. I could not ask them how they felt about the trial. The feelings of sorrow, 
anger and being defeated suffused the air.   
The law’s representatives’ performances during the hearings can be read as a 
manifestation of how law recognizes certain people by not recognizing them in person. 
The judge, by consistently avoiding the questions directed to him by the attorneys and by 
not providing any explanations regarding his decisions declares that there is no justice 
within the sphere of the law. As Arendt (1973) argues, totalitarian regimes make a 
distinction between criminals and undesirables: “Criminals are punished, undesirables 
disappear from the face of the earth; the only trace which they leave behind is the memory 
of those who knew and loved them”(433). For Arendt, the law does not apply to 
undesirables, the undesirables are the ones who are deprived of any juridical status and 
camp becomes the place of the undesirables. Accordingly, we can argue that in the case of 
Halil and his friends, too, the very place, which represents the law becomes the places of 
lawlessness. This law/lesness declares Halil and his friends undesirable; as the ones who 
have to be taken out of sight. Turkey’s prisons have become camps. The undesirables have 
been forced to live in dark and Kafkaesque labyrinths of the law. 
 In Caglayan  (Justice) Palace, I felt that I heard the heard the cold and distant 
voice of the sovereign(ty)––the voice of a group of men who believe that domination is 
unavoidable in order to reproduce the relations of production. I left the (Justice) Palace 
with Orhan and Aret. We did not talk much on our way to the bus stop.  We could not 
even look into each other’s eyes for a while. It was Aret who first broke the silence. “They 
brought us here again to show us that there is no justice in this country. What are they 
trying to do? Why the hell they are making these trials anyway? They are making fun of 
us!” he complained. Orhan, who was yet to disappear, replied,  
did you hear that they are not even going to make these trials in the courtrooms 
anymore? Because of the excessive number of political cases, they found it 
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burdensome to carry people from the prisons to the courtrooms. And supposedly 
there are not enough courtrooms for all those trials. They are considering conducting 
the trials online. The prisoners will stay in prison and they and the judge will see each 
other through a camera.  
 
Aret stared at him, angrily for a minute or so.  He did not say anything. Orhan, 
turned towards me and continued: “There is no law in this country.  They are even 
breaking their own law… Could you see the law in that courtroom? 








 “It is what fell to my share” 
I first met Halil and his cell-mates, who are also charged in the same case, at a small 
party on the terrace of a common friend Meral from the neighborhood a month after their 
release. It was a small gathering to celebrate their release. As Meral told me before, they 
were all very funny and making fun of their time in prison. While having our drinks, we 
talked for hours about life inside and outside of prison.33 They told us about their illegal 
wine-making adventures in their cell, the pleasant taste of that secretly made wine, their 
impatience while waiting for it to ferment, and their disappointment when it got 
confiscated by the guards three days before the New Year. We listened to their funny 
prison stories, laughed with them, and appreciated the beauty of sitting together under the 
stars and the ability to look at the sky freely. As the hours passed and the funny stories 
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reminded them of the sad ones, we switched to the more serious ones. Serkan, who was a 
19-year-old college student when he was arrested, and who spent four-and-half years in 
the same cell with Halil, still seemed astonished by how many years he had spent in a cell. 
He then described how he had heard about the beaten policeman:  
When I saw all those policemen in the neighborhood I understood that something had 
happened. I asked around about what happened and heard the rumors that my friend 
Hasan was among those who had beaten the police, so I went to see Hasan. Hasan 
told me that he had nothing to do with the event. I did not believe him. I was teasing 
him and was forcing him to confess. He got really mad at me. He started yelling at 
me. ‘What kind of a friend are you? How come you don’t believe me?’  Can you 
believe that? Hasan is one of my best friends and I did not believe his words. And, 
look what happened in the end? I spent four-and-a-half years in prison because of the 
very same crime, which I did not commit. 
 
Serkan stopped and took a deep breath. Aysen, Meral’s landlord, who happened to be 
there by chance and who has never been around socialists and Alevis before, could not 
believe what she heard. “This is unbelievable! This is like an Aziz Nesin story,”34 she said 
in an astonished tone. Throughout the night, Aysen would jump into the conversation 
repeating, “This is just like an Aziz Nesin story!” Aysen’s comments would remind us that 
Halil and his friends’ story is the story of Turkey.  Although the techniques of control and 
violence transform over time, it is a story of never-ending (in)justice.  
Serkan agreed that the whole thing indeed seemed like an Aziz Nesin story. “I 
already knew that it was a fascist state,” he said when he was trying to explain what kind 
of shock his arrest was for him: 
When they took us, I was thinking, ‘it’s a fascist state, you can’t trust it. You never 
know what they will do.’ But, still I was not expecting them to keep me in prison for 
four and a half years. I was thinking that we would get released within a month.  
 
Halil jumped into the conversation: Yes, that’s true. When we were first taken I told 
them ‘okay, we are here for at least a year.’ They all got mad at me. They were 
shouting at me, ‘What? Are you crazy? We can’t stay here more than a month! 
 
 Serkan and the other cell-mate, Ozkan, laughed. We kept quiet. Halil continued,  
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I knew that the police were mad at us because of what we did in the NBA. I thought 
they would keep us in prison for a year or something like that to warn us. I was not 
expecting this at all… 
 
 Afterwards, Halil once again reiterated that they spent four and a half years in prison, and 
Serkan began to talk about the difficult conditions in prison. He talked about how cold 
their cell was, how terrible the food was, how conservatively they had to use the 
mayonnaise or Nutella because of the high prices in the prison canteen. He also talked 
about the people he met inside--about the young guy who was condemned to two 
aggravated life sentences and an additional twenty years, about the people sentenced to 30 
years, 40 years, and about an old man who has not been outside for 30 or more years. At 
one point, he stopped and said: 
Do you know? There is a proverb: make someone appreciate malaria by showing 
them death. Our situation is like that. After seeing all those young people who will 
die in prison, we came to appreciate four and a half years. 
 
Aysen, looking sadly at Serkan, wanted to say how sad she felt for them: “It is such 
a pity,” she said. But Serkan did not let her complete her sentence. Cutting her words, he 
said, “don’t pity us. There is nothing to feel pity for. Everything has its price in Turkey.” 
Aysen, still wanted to express her feelings. She wanted to say that what she was hearing 
right there was unacceptable. “But poor you,” she said, “Why should you have to pay a 
price?” Serkan, who, a couple of minutes before had likened his situation to accepting 
malaria, in an attempt to prove that there was not much to feel sorry for, asked Aysen, “ 
Do you know Ugur Kaymaz, Aysen?” Aysen shook her head no. “Who is he?” 
 
Ugur Kaymaz was a 12-year old Kurdish boy who was killed by the police while 
standing in front of his house. Do you know those people who died in hunger strikes 
for a better Turkey? I believe that wherever you are on the earth, if you see a human 
being slaughtered and if you do not do anything against it, it means that you are 
alienated from yourself. You are alienated from your humanity. We wanted to stay 
human, contribute to humanity. We protected our neighborhood from the gangs. Do 
you know how I explain my situation? There is this poet, she says ‘what fell to my 
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share in this life is struggle.’ And, as for these four and a half years…It is what fell to 
my share. 
 
Does Serkan, a young working class Alevi who was born into an environment filled 
with the stories about state violence against his grandparents and parents, and in a 
neighborhood defined as a semi-open prison, simply accept the injustice he faces as a fate? 
Does an all-pervasive, godlike figure of the police/state––or police-state as Serkan puts 
it—turn violence into an ill-fate?  
 
 Law/violence as fate  
  Halil and his friend’s case, as well as thousands of other terror cases bring Kafka’s 
famous short story, Before the Law, to mind. To summarize it briefly, a countryman comes 
to a gate wishing to gain entry to the law through an open doorway. But the gatekeeper 
tells the man that he cannot go through at the present time. The man asks if he can ever go 
through, and the gatekeeper says that it is possible. The man waits at the door, hoping to 
go gain entry, until he is about to die. Right before his death, he asks the gatekeeper why 
no one else has come in all the years, even though everyone seeks the law. The gatekeeper 
answers “No one else could enter here, since this door was destined for you alone. Now I 
will go and close it.”  
Benjamin, in his reading of this story and Kafka’s novel Trial, underlines the fated 
character of law. For Benjamin, “law is not accidental but fated, a destiny which appears 
here in all its ambiguity.” For him, “violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of 
law” (emphasis mine). Benjamin was a Jewish communist in Nazi Germany. Being Jewish 
and being a communist was a lethal combination in Nazi Germany. He was a member of a 
community who disrupted the impossible promise/fantasy of the German nation-state. As 
a communist writer, he also actively called on people to demolish the law and order of the 
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capitalist Germany and to establish a new one. Thus, it was impossible for him not to see 
the violence inherent to law. Furthermore, as a person who was born into a Jewish 
community, a community that remained at the margins of the law and order of state 
formations for centuries, it is also understandable for him to have experienced law and the 
violence it carried with it as a fate. In other words, “violence crowned by fate” became 
apparent in Benjamin’s life. It also became apparent in Serkan’s life. After all, they have a 
lot in common. Serkan, like Benjamin, was also born into a community at the margins of 
the state. Thus he was born into the stories of violence against his ancestors. He is also 
against the prevailing law and order of the capitalist state formation and actively invited 
people to built a new law and order. Hence, violence and fate inscribed in law was 
apparent to Serkan as well.  
To generalize, it would not be wrong to argue that working-class Alevis in Turkey 
are destined to violence. However, this is not to say that they are destined to violence 
because of their Alevi identity. I am also not saying that it is not because of their Alevi 
identity. They are destined to violence because of alternative law making and law 
maintaining practices that have kept the Alevi community at the margins of the state 
formation process for centuries. Local law-making and law-maintaining practices became 
a habitus which informs the political subjectivities of Alevi people and these practices 
persistently challenge the law/violence of the state, and ensure that Alevis continue to be 
the targets of political violence. The continuity in violence makes it perceived as an 
inevitable fate. 
If we return to Kafka’s story, we should bear in mind that both the writer and the 
interpreter of the story were Jews in Europe. They both felt the dark, cold and 
overwhelming side of the law (of the state). However, I think that Benjamin’s connection 
between law, violence and fate, which largely draws on his own experiences, is a broad 
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one. He overlooks how the practitioners of law approach citizens selectively. As Schmitt 
(1985) argues, “all law is situational law” (13). That is to say the door of the law is always 
open to those whose interests match with the interests of the ruling elite. In other words, as 
I discussed with reference to Gramsci, the relations of production are not only reproduced 
through relations of domination. The ruling elite are always in need of a population who 
considers their violence, including exploitation, legitimate. The sovereign/violence is not 
always visible to these people. After all, the sovereign, who decides on the exception, is 
nothing but a group of people who represent the interest of the ruling elites -––the 
bourgeoisie in capitalist state formations. And these people need the consent of the 
masses. Thus, not all people experience law as a fate, which carries violence.  
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter points out the totalitarian tendencies of the current government, which 
became visible through anti-terror law. With its wide and vague definitions of terrorism, 
which pave the way for a wide variety of arbitrary applications, and with its claim that its 
authorities can even discern one’s inner feelings/ intentions and therefore punish 
accordingly, the anti-terror law declares the unlimited sovereignty of those who represent 
the state. Agamben argues that “one of the essential characteristics of the state of 
exception [is] the provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers”(Agamben 2005:7). What we witness today in Turkey is the deliberate 
erasing of these distinctions. Today, the juridical field in Turkey is moving away from 
what Bourdieu described as “the site of a competition for monopoly of the right to 
determine the law” (817). With pro-government judges and prosecutors dominating the 
terror cases, terror trials have recently become places of manifestation of police power and 
the violence inherent to law.   
	  	   187	  
The case of Halil and his friends’ is one of the earliest terror cases after the 
amendment of anti-terror law. It was an exceptional case until 2009, when large-scale 
terror operations started. Looking at the case in retrospect, today we can argue that it was 
indeed a harbinger of what was to come. As I explained, Halil and his friends became 
terrorist suspects because they challenged the authority of the police in their 
neighborhood, in a small local setting. Their case shows us that the current government 
sees any kind of practice that falls outside of police control, or that could potentially 
challenge the police’s power, as a threat against the very foundations of the state. In other 
words, the Prime Minister and his supporters consider any oppositional act as a declaration 
of rivalry with the state. For instance, during the KCK operations, which targeted Kurdish 
activists working in trade unions, labor organizations and Bar Associations, Prime 
Minister Erdogan accused these people of “building a state within the state.”  
As Arendt argues, the police know no difference between the insider and outsider, 
and this is why their presence as the sole organ of power “can still be partially explained 
by the totalitarian aspiration to world rule” (420). To put it more explicitly, when police 
become “the guarantor of the regime” all human beings becomes potential enemies. 
Hence, the emphasis on the police as the sole power is symptomatic of the aspiration for 
the limitless expansion of (colonizing) power. The government of Turkey does not want 
any sphere within the country to fall outside be outside its direct control. Hence, it is no 
coincidence that today, as I write this dissertation, the Turkish public has begun to talk 
about the possibility that Turkey will attack Syria, as well as the government’s imperial 
projects in the Middle East. 
We are witnessing in Turkey today a shift from the state-sponsored extra-legal 
violence of the 1990s (Sabuktay 2012) to the realm of legal violence. The new anti-terror 
law is a manifestation of the law’s violence within the sphere of the law. The courtrooms, 
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where terror trials take place, unlike what Bourdieu (1989) says, became the places of 
revelation; they reveal human intervention within the sphere of law. In other words, the 
courtroom becomes the arena of  “the striptease of the state” (Coronil 2000) and of the 
law. Nevertheless, terror trials still have a mystification effect. The scope of injustice and 
silencing of the suspects and their defender’s voices when added to a decades-, even 
centuries-long, history of violence and oppression, make young Alevi youth feel like they 
are destined to a life of violence. Fate/destiny belongs to the realm of the sacred. Hence, 
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1 In Turkey, the buildings in which different courtrooms are located are literally called Justice Palace. 
 
2 The State Security Courts (SSC) were closed in 1999 and the SACS were opened in their place. Unlike the 
SSCs there are no military Judges in SACs. Terrorist suspects’ trials are held in SACs, specializing in “crimes 
against the state” and notorious for their contempt for any defense proceedings on the part of the accused, -- 
obviously in clear violation of  “the right to fair hearing” (Kanar 2011). Article 6 of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) provides a detailed right to free trial including the right to a public hearing before an 
independent and impartial tribunal within reasonable time, the presumption of innocence and other minimum 
rights for those charged with a criminal offence (adequate time and facilities to prepare their defense, access to 
legal representation, right to examine witnesses against them or have them examined, right to the free assistance 
of an interpreter). 
 
3 Information available at: http://bianet.org/english/world/132522-over-one-third-of-worldwide-terror-
convictions-from-turkey. Last accessed:  September 15, 2012. Although there is no official information about 
the total number of terror convicts in 2012, due to the new wave of operations, which took place throughout 
2012, this number should be higher now. 
 
4 An illegal pro-Kurdish movement. 
 
5 This includes about 8,000 pro-Kurdish politicians, attorneys, academics, writers and members of the media 
arrested on KCK terrorism charges since 2009. 
   
6 Revolutionary Headquarters is an illegal Marxist-Leninist organization in favor of armed struggle. DK first 
came to public attention in April 2009, when some of its members were involved in a six-hour gun battle with 
police in Istanbul. Information available http://todayszaman.com/news-173752-turkey-press-scan.html. Last 
accessed: October 22, 2012.  
 
7 Information available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/31/turkey-terror-jail-human-rights.  Last 
accessed: October 22, 2012. 
 
8 Information available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/31/turkey-terror-jail-human-rights.  Last 
accessed: October 22, 2012. 
 
9 See Law no. 5532, published in the Official Gazette, July 18, 2006. 
 
10 See Article 6 and 7 under Number 3713 of the anti-terror law.  Counterterrorism Law 3713 defines terrorist 
acts as “actions undertaken with the aim of weakening, destroying, or seizing state authority, destroying the 
security of the state both at home and abroad, and destroying public order.” 
 
11 http://bianet.org/english/english/129818-heavy-prison-sentence-for-journalist-abay Last accessed: September 
15, 2012. 
 
12 Article 102 of Code on Criminal Procedure. 
 
13 http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-266922-counter--terrorism--vs-freedom.html Last accessed: 
September 15, 2012. 
 
14 Kozakcioglu was arrested in January 20, 2013 and is now in prison an alleged member of a terrorist 
organization. 
 
15 The 9th Specially Authorized Assize Court in Istanbul. File 2007/418.  Hearing Number 1. April 04, 2008. 
 
16 The operation was covered in national mainstream media. The media coverage also testifies that two thousand 
policemen participated in the operation. 
 
17 Interview with Ayhan. January 23, 2011. 
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18 According to Article 314/2 of TPC the offender can be sentenced to imprisonment from 5 to 10 years. 
 
19 According to Article 149 1/a, f, g of TPC the offender can be sentenced to imprisonment from ten to fifteen 
years. 
 
20 According to Article 265/1 of TPC the offender can be punished with imprisonment from six months to three 
years. 
 
21 According to Article 265/2 of TPC the offender can be punished with imprisonment from two to four years. 
 
22 According to Article 265/3 of TPC the punishment to be imposed should be increased by one third of the 
above penalty. 
 
23 According to Article 265/4 of TPC the punishment to be imposed according to the above subsections is 
increased by one half of the above penalty.
 
24 According to Article 86/1 of TPC the offender is sentenced to imprisonment for one to three years.  
 
25 According to Article 86/3 of the TPC the punishment to be imposed should be increased by one half of the 
above penalty. 
 
26 The 9th Specially Authorized Assize Court in Istanbul. File 2007/418. Hearing on July 24, 2008. 
 
27 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012. Information available at: http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/world-report-2012-turkey Last accessed: September 15, 2012. 
 
28 The 9th Specially Authorized Assize Court in Istanbul. File 2007/418.  First Indictment submitted on February 
4, 2010 and Second Indictment submitted on May 3, 2011. 
 
29 The 9th Specially Authorized Assize Court in Istanbul. File 2007/418. Hearings on September 4, 2010 and 
May 03, 2011. 
 
30 The case now continues with the third prosecutor after the previous two prosecutors are taken out of the case 
as their duration of service in the case is ended. 
 
31 According to a research recently being conducted by Umit Cetin, a graduate student at the University of 
Essex, suicide is a significant problem among young Alevi refuges in Europe. 
 
32 Prison visits are also very problematic. Terrorist convicts and suspects are usually detained in the prisons 
away from their hometowns. As the detainees usually come from working class backgrounds it is difficult for 
their families to go and visit them. Besides, terrorist convicts and suspects right to see their visitors are often 
suspended. 
 
33 See Goldstein 2003, for an analysis of the place of jokes and laughter in dealing with experiences of violence.  
In this work, Goldstein points out how the residents of a Brazilian favela laugh when they were talking about 
traumatic experiences such as rape, murder and, etc. 
 
34 Aziz Nesin is a famous socialist writer born in 1915, well known for his satirical style. People’s 
powerlessness before the law and police, arbitrary uses of police force and injustice of the law are among the 
repeated themes in his fictional stories. 
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CONCLUSION 
 On the morning of September 30th, I sat in front of my computer to complete the 
conclusion of my dissertation. Before I opened the word document, I wanted to take a look 
at the news. Usually, when I am working on the dissertation, I choose not to read the news. 
The news for the last two years has been quite depressing.  It becomes difficult to write 
after reading how many more people were put behind the bars, how many more people the 
police wounded, how many more Kurds were killed and how many more mass graves were 
found in the Kurdish region. But September 30th was my last day for working on my 
dissertation (at least that was what I thought at that moment) and I thought the news could 
not be that bad. I went to the web page of a local newspaper and I saw a picture of a young 
man, wearing a T-shirt with the word Feda written on it – a word that implied the sacrifice 
of one’s life. The young man in the picture was 21 years old Hasan Ferit Gedik. He was 
working for THD in Armutlu, an Alevi neighborhood. Four gang members who were 
selling drugs in another Alevi neighborhood, Gulsuyu, shot him to death. Four bullets hit 
his head. Two others hit his back. He died immediately. He was taken to the hospital for an 
autopsy soon after he was killed. The police would not allow his family or his lawyers to 
enter the hospital. They let material evidence that could have been used against the 
murderers disappear. 
     Hasan Ferit’s funeral was held on October 1st in Armutlu. That morning, thousands 
of policemen accompanied by akreps occupied Armutlu, and they closed the entrance and 
exits of the neighborhood. All those who attended the funeral had to submit to ID checks. 
They also had their bodies and bags searched. Hasan Ferit’s friends were angry and 
feeling vengeful at the funeral. They were swearing, “the state will pay the price, Hasan 
Ferit’s revenge will be taken.” This meant that in the following weeks or months, a suicide 
bomber (possibly a survivor of the death fast that took place in 2002) would enter a police 
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office and kill himself/herself along with some policemen. Then they would publish the 
event on their web page. They would say, “those who are responsible for the death of 
Comrade Hasan Ferit have been punished.” They would also add “Comrade Hasan Ferit is 
alive!” I could guess what would happen. So could the police. It is hard not to see.  
   When violence becomes fate, life can easily be sacrificed. Probably, for Hasan Ferit, 
whose picture of him wearing a Feda t-shirt is now being circulated by the media, 
sacrificing his life was not something he never considered. 
  Hasan Ferit was actively working to end crime in his neighborhood. He was also 
working as part of the opposition against the urban transformation project, which would 
mean the demolition of his neighborhood. According to this project, Armutlu residents’ 
houses will be demolished and they will not be given new houses. Hasan Ferit was 
involved in the effort to to publicize this outcome. After the uprisings of summer 2013, 
public discussion forums were organized in many different districts of Istanbul. Hasan 
Ferit spent his summer nights participating in the forums organized in the upper and 
middle class districts around Armutlu and informing people about what was being planned 
for, and what would happen to Armutlu. Hence, Hasan Ferit himself acted as a bridge 
between Istanbul’s upper and middle classes and working classes. In a country where 
segregation and criminalization is an important technique of rule, what Hasan Ferit did 
was transgressive.  
   After reading the news about Hasan Ferit, I went to his Facebook page. What I saw 
there made the whole dark picture even darker. Hasan Ferit’s last post was about the 
Socialist Party of the Oppressed (SPO), the party of which Halil is also a member. Hasan 
Ferit had criticized SPO members for not being revolutionary enough and for being 
followers of the Kurdish movement, which was, in his opinion, supported by the 
imperialist USA. 
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Yet, another Jewish philosopher’s, Adorno’s words are haunting my mind: To write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. At this point, all the theoretical concepts seem barbaric 
to me. But I will try. I will try to conclude this dissertation. 
This dissertation, in a way, is the story of Hasan Ferit. It tries to explain why Hasan 
Ferit was killed and why he positioned himself not only against the police/state or the 
police state, but also against other socialist groups. Hence, this dissertation is the story of 
the thousands of Alevi youth who are members of small-scale radical and marginalized 
revolutionary organizations and who end up in prisons as a result of their fight against 
crime.  
  In this dissertation, I conceptualize the state as a fantasy product and as an external 
force, which has been realized through various performances of sovereignty in people’s 
lives. The fantasy of the state is built on the impossible promise of monopoly over 
violence and law. It is impossible for the ruling elites to be considered legitimate by all 
citizens, who have diverse and distinct histories, cultural practices and traditions of law 
and order. It is also impossible for the ruling elites to gain the consent of the all of the 
citizens. As I illustrate in the context of Turkey, the founders of the Turkish Republic and 
their followers were not considered as legitimate by some populations, such as Kurds and 
Armenians, who were located away from the Ottoman center of power and enjoyed 
autonomous rule by local leaders for centuries. Alevis, on the other hand, as Muslims who 
did not fit into the idealized Islamic categories of the ruling elite, never enjoyed an 
autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire and have stayed at the margins of the 
Ottoman and Turkish state formations for more than five centuries. Hence, for the Alevi 
population, too, the central ruling elites have remained as an external force. The 
populations, who have a strong tradition of autonomous rule, see their local leaders as 
more legitimate than the central ruling elites. When the founding cadres of the modern 
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state formations started to consider the local power holders as bandits to be destroyed, 
these people chose to side with local power holders as they were more familiar to them 
when compared to the new elite. Accordingly, in Turkey, resistance against the central 
state has never ceased among certain populations since the beginning of the modern 
central state formation process in the 19th century.   
The founding Turkish elites, in order to take potentially or actually resistant 
populations under their direct control, have always used force against them. These 
populations, such as the Armenians, Kurds, Alevis and the socialists, have not only 
become targets of military and police violence in Turkey, but they have also been the 
primary targets of symbolic violence provoked by state ideology. The ruling elite and 
those whose interests match those of the ruling elites produce and reproduce the fantasy of 
the state in order to maintain existing power relations. The fantasy of the state in Turkey is 
accompanied by the fantasy of a national whole, whose wholeness is threatened by the 
Other/enemy/terrorist. The fantasy of the national whole is supported by two other 
fantasies. The first is the fantasy of the state as an entity devoted to provide social unity, a 
social wholeness, by eliminating its enemies. The second is the fantasy that there are 
internal enemies and/or the Others within, who threat the jouissance of the nation and its 
state. This second fantasy produces symbolic violence against potentially resistant 
populations, i.e. minorities and the organized working class, by stigmatizing them as 
enemies of the nation and the state. Symbolic violence against these populations prevents 
domination from being recognized by the Turkish masses and effectively contributes to 
the concealment of relations of exploitation and domination. However, violence against 
resistant populations contributes to the demonization of the state in the eyes of these 
populations. The targets of the ruling elite’s symbolic and physical violence do not believe 
in the fantasy of the state, and its promise to make society whole. On the contrary, as I 
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illustrate in this dissertation, they see the state as an obstacle to the wholeness of their 
community, hence to the jouissance promised by the fantasy of the whole. However, as I 
discuss in the case of Narova, such a perception of the state does not necessarily make its 
population critical of the state form. On the contrary, state violence produces a 
relationship of mimetic rivalry between the representatives of the state and those who are 
subjected to their violence. State violence produces the desire to be like the state among 
the targeted populations and gives rise to the mimetic performances of the state by the 
targets of violence. As I illustrate, the state, which has been materialized through various 
performances of violence in Narova, produces the desire among Narova youth to abolish 
the state, to end its law and to provide their own law and order in the neighborhood 
through use of force. Such a desire to hold power and be like the state leads to a 
relationship of rivalry between the police and Narova youth and also among various local 
revolutionary groups within the neighborhood. This competition, consequently, results in 
more violence and further marginalization. I illustrate that in addition to the psychological 
motivations behind the mimetic rivalry, one of the main reasons that give rise to the 
relationship of rivalry is the isolation of the neighborhood through militarized spatial 
control techniques. The militarized spatial control of the neighborhood, which sets the 
ground for violent and intimate encounters with the police and Narova youth, informs 
Narova residents’ political fantasies and desires and turns violence into a means of 
confronting the Other.  
Throughout the dissertation I draw attention to the power and effects of militarized 
spatial control. I argue that militarized spatial control, which entails fragmentation of 
urban space, is not only about managing and controlling unruly populations; it is not only 
a project designed for the present. It is a project that shapes and transforms the future. It 
also transforms people’s relations and has been influential in their perceptions of the world 
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and reality. While the state becomes present and real in the neighborhood through 
militarized spatial control techniques, such as identity checks at the checkpoints and 
patrolling tanks in the neighborhood, the use of such techniques also creates an 
atmosphere of war in the neighborhood, incites Narova residents to counter-violence, and 
effectively transforms their everyday realities and experiences. Due to the presence of the 
masked policemen, panzers and checkpoints in the neighborhood, Narova residents’ 
everyday experiences have radically differed from those of the residents of surrounding 
neighborhoods and have given rise to the radically distinct perceptions of the social world 
between these two parties. I demonstrate that militarized spatial control of Alevi working 
class neighborhoods, have been effective in the fragmentation of the working class politics 
and polarization of socialist organizations in Turkey.  
I illustrated that Narova youth’s relationship of rivalry with the police has led to the 
imprisonment of approximately three hundred of young people as terrorist convicts in high 
security cell-type prisons over the last decade. Accordingly, I have analyzed the ways in 
which the state’s power is manifested in the legal sphere and discuss the effects of this 
manifestation. The courtrooms of terror trials have become stages that reveal the 
sovereign/man in the law in Turkey. The suspension of law within the legal sphere, 
falsifying the promise of the law, reveals that lawmakers are also lawbreakers. In other 
words, Turkey’s terror trials are places where one sees the “cruel one” who sits within the 
justice/law. I demonstrate that the revelation of the cruel one within the sphere of the law 
does not lead to the demystification of the state. On the contrary, it further contributes to 
mystification of state power in the eyes of the citizens who do not see the state as an 
independent institution whose aim is to provide law and order. As I illustrate throughout 
the dissertation, for Narova residents, the state is not something over and above individual 
people. It does not provide law and order; it rather produces disorder in order to control 
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the population effectively. They see the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie, who are 
concerned with the maintenance of the existing capitalist relations of production. 
However, it is precisely due to this this de-mystified perception of the state that the police 
and law enforcers continuously attempt to mystify the state in the eyes of Narova 
residents. The very “striptease of the state” (Coronil 2000) in the courtrooms grants the 
state with god-like powers in the eyes of Narova residents. Such a striptease, 
demonstrating that the lawmakers hold unrestricted power, makes the people feel they are 
powerless, defenseless and entrapped. Besides, charges of aggravated life imprisonment, 
which are very common in anti-terror legislations, steals the “right to hope” away from 
terrorist convicts and gives rise to a deep feeling of hopelessness among the convicts as 
well as their relatives and friends. Such powerful feelings turn the world into an ultimately 
unjust and insecure place and lead to perceptions of violence and injustice as a fate in the 
eyes of the suspects, convicts and witnesses. As is known, in Judo-Christian traditions it is 
God who determines one's fate. Hence, the perceptions and experiences of the state 
violence as a fate contribute to mystification of the state as a God-like power with 
unrestricted demonic powers. 
What happens when one believes that state violence is fate? 
Hasan Ferit’s t-shirt pops up in front of my eyes.   
When violence becomes fate, life turns into something, which can easily be 
sacrificed. The sacrifice of life for the sake of the cause of (holy) war against the capitalist 
state grants the otherwise wasted lives with a respectable status.  
  Moreover, when one feels trapped in cycles of violence and when there is no hope 
for the future, death does not seem like much of a threat. The scarification of the body for 
a cause brings meaning to a meaningless and hopeless world. Hence, it is no coincidence 
that when I was writing this dissertation, a number of young people, one from Narova and 
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all from Alevi neighborhoods died as suicide bombers. It is also no coincidence that a lot 
of young people were wounded as a result of gang attacks and yet they still continue to 
fight against crime. 
Recall Hakan’s words, which I cited in Chapter I. Hakan, a young man from 
Narova, after explaining that Narova youth do not have many options for the future, goes 
on to say,  
If you are born in Narova, you have three choices. If you are lucky enough, you will 
get into college and leave the neighborhood and never come back again. Chances for 
that are very low. Your second option is to work with the gangs. You will sell drugs, 
use drugs, steal cars, whatever. If you want to stay clean, if you want to listen to your 
conscience you will be a revolutionary. 
 
This dissertation is devoted to all those who want to stay clean in this dirty capitalist 
world. Sadly, however, as this dissertation demonstrates, even being a revolutionary and 
being ready to sacrifice your life does not keep one clean. The dirt that comes with the 
promise of the state and/or state promise spreads all too easily. That is to say, the state 
violence operates as an active call for counter-violence and it produces the desire to be 
like the state, to take over the state and be the state. I believe that the real challenge to 
state formation does not emerge from the relationship of mimetic rivalry. As I demonstrate 
in the dissertation, such a relationship entraps one in cycles of intimate encounters with 
the representatives of the state. Such encounters inform our desires and fantasies, hence 
political subjectivities, and let the state rationale intervene in our political projects. Those 
who want to abolish the state formation, first of all need to learn not to put the state at the 
center of political struggle and not to develop their political projects through the mirror of 
the state.
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